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ABSTRACT 
 
Liberal Translations: Secular Concepts, Law, and Religion in Colonial Egypt 
by 
Jeffrey Culang 
 
Advisor: Beth Baron 
 
This dissertation is a conceptual history of Egypt’s national formation between the 1880s 
and the 1930s. This period involved the convergence of nationalism, colonial rule, missionary 
activity, and new modes of governance at the national and international levels. Drawing on state 
and missionary archival material, periodicals, legal compendia, laws, and parliamentary 
transcripts, and adapting methods developed by Reinhart Koselleck, I trace shifts within Egypt’s 
socio-political lexicon through processes of translation and demonstrate their effects upon social 
experience and political aspiration. I focus on a set of liberal-secular concepts critical to national 
politics—religious freedom, public interest, nationality, and the minority—as they appeared in 
Egypt and were adapted by jurists, colonial officers, parliamentarians, and “ordinary” Egyptians 
in ways that advanced their respective interests. Following the fluid, contextual, and contingent 
process through which these concepts accumulated meanings, I show that each had a distinct 
genealogy linked to its conditions of translation and reinterpretation. This finding challenges 
understandings of the nation-state as a fixed form that, originating in Europe, was replicated 
across the globe.  
	 v	
As Egyptian legislators gradually entered the concepts under study into Egypt’s 
expanding modern legal system—top-down, rigid, and disciplinary—they fixed their meanings 
in text in ways that enhanced the regulatory capacities of the state. The Egyptian state’s 
articulation of religious freedom and public interest enabled it to wield increasing power over 
religion and to gradually dismantle Egypt’s Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities, whose 
more flexible legal structures had sustained the common good through bottom-up cultivation of 
morality. Meanwhile, its definition and ascription of nationality and minority status linked 
religious groups to emergent national categories along a grid of loyalty and disloyalty to the 
Egyptian nation. Rather than opening space wherein religious divisions could be overcome 
through the convergence of equal citizens, these liberal-secular transitions established new forms 
of difference based on flattened notions of identity. Against automatic associations of secularism 
with tolerance and boundless possibility, I argue that the unfolding of liberal-secular law in 
Egypt introduced unprecedented discord and delimited the country’s religious and political 
horizons. As Egypt enhanced its sovereignty in the 1920s and 1930s, law proved an essential tool 
of the state to produce a homogenous and governable population. Muslims and Copts emerged as 
the two essential elements of the Egyptian nation, while other non-Muslim groups, including 
Armenians and Jews, were subjected to the gaze of suspicion and novel forms of exclusion.  
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This dissertation is a conceptual history of the secularization of Egyptian law and society during 
the colonial period (1882–1936). It focuses on four legal-political concepts that were critical to 
this process: religious freedom (hurriyyat al-‘itiqad), public interest (al-maslaha al-‘amma), 
nationality (al-jinsiyya), and the minority (al-aqalliyya). I trace these concepts from their 
translation into Arabic and Egypt, to their adaption by subjects in Egypt’s streets, courtrooms, 
parliamentary halls, and colonial offices, to their codification and activation within modern law 
as part of a regulatory secular state apparatus. The German historian Reinhart Koselleck, one of 
the main contributors to theorizing conceptual history, defined concepts through their 
differentiation from words. For Koselleck, concepts are a series of expressions that make up the 
sociopolitical terminology within a given historical context. Though they are associated with 
words, not all words are sociopolitical concepts, and whereas words can be unambiguous in 
meaning, concepts are characterized by their ambiguity, bundling together a range of meanings 
that often extend beyond the words that contain them.1 The concepts in which Koselleck was 
especially interested—so-called “basic concepts”—were those that are indispensable to a 
historical moment. They are concepts that subjects must work within and through, claim and 
articulate, as they act in the world. In line with the broader linguistic turn in which he fit 
uneasily, Koselleck presumed a relationship between basic concepts and “reality,” seeing them 
as “joints linking language and the extralinguistic world,” or as the conditions of possibility for 
social and political experience.2 As such, they can be seen as depositories of human experience 
																																																						
1 Reinhart Koselleck, Future’s Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, translated and with an 
introduction by Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004 [1979]), 84–86. 
2 Reinhart Koselleck, “A Response to Comments on the Geschichtiche Grundbegriffe,” in The 
Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts: New Studies on Begriffsgeschichte,” ed. Hartmut 
Lehmann and Melvin Richter (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1996), 61. On his 
elaboration of conceptual history, see Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing 
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continuously in the process of becoming, unfolding contingently, fluidly, and differently in 
particular historical contexts. 
Koselleck made clear, however, that he was not interested in a merely positivistic 
recording of shifting sociopolitical concepts, a project that could continue without end. Instead, 
he sought to provide a theory of historical times, or the structure of historical process, that could 
serve as a much-needed object of enquiry for a discipline that lacked one (i.e., history as its own 
subject, or “history itself”). This depended on the development of a theory of periodization, “the 
temporal specifics of our political and social concepts.”3 During periods of epochal change, the 
fields of meaning circumscribing sociopolitical concepts shift, reshaping social and political 
experience. Writing on modern Germany, Koselleck focused on what he termed the “saddle 
period,” when the premodern use of language transformed into modern usage. Roughly spanning 
the years 1750 to 1850, the saddle period involved the denaturalization of older experiences of 
time—natural, repeatable, static—and the emergence of new experiences of time where it 
continuously proceeds into a novel and unforeseeable future. As a split emerged between the 
“space of experience” and the “horizon of expectation,” old concepts such as “democracy,” 
“freedom,” and the “state” gained both anticipatory content and a sense of movement.4 “The 
entire linguistic space of sociopolitical terms has,” Koselleck noted, “moved from a quasi-static 
tradition that changed only over the long term to a conceptuality whose meaning can be inferred 
from a future to be newly experienced.”5 Drawing on Koselleck, this study couples an attempt to 
trace the shifting significations of Egypt’s sociopolitical linguistic register during a 
																																																						
History, Spacing Concepts, trans. Todd Samuel Presner and others, foreword by Hayden White 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
3 Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History, 5. 
4 Ibid., 5. 
5 Ibid., 6. 
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transformational period with an anthropological investigation of social experience. It presumes 
that concepts form not in a linear or progressive fashion as the teleological “evolution” of ideals, 
but through historical contingency, acquiring new significations through time as locally 
embedded actors attempt to shape them to pursue their own interests.  
Koselleck recognized a plurality of histories rather than a singular “History,” but his 
notion of the saddle period was specific to Western and Central Europe. In much of the colonial 
world, the reconfiguration of concepts along modern lines, and the emergence of new 
sociopolitical terms, occurred later and involved an added layer of translation linked to the 
colonial encounter. For Egypt, one could identify a saddle period lasting roughly from the 1830s, 
with Mehmet Ali’s establishment of a translation school and its founding director Rifa‘a Rafi‘ al-
Tahtawi’s rearticulation of classical Islamic concepts such as adab (ethics) along modern lines,6 
to the mid-twentieth century, with Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir’s commitment to development through 
technocratic bureaucratic rule. I focus, however, on the period from the late nineteenth century to 
the 1930s. This starting point coincides with the rise of a new social category of the effendiyya, a 
middling elite of urban intellectuals and professionals who sought reform and inaugurated a 
broader engagement with liberal-secular ideas under colonial conditions.7 The ending point, 
roughly the mid-1930s, marks Egypt’s attainment of near-complete sovereignty (the last British 
																																																						
6 See Rifa‘a Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi, Tahlis al-Ibriz ila Talhis Bariz au al-Diwan al-Nafis bi-Iwan Baris 
(Bulaq: Dar al-Tiba‘a al-Hidiwijja, 1834). For analysis of this rearticulation, see Ellen 
McLarney, “The Islamic Public Sphere and the Discipline of Adab,” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 43 (2011): 429–49. 
7 On the effendiyya as a category, see Lucie Ryzova, “Egyptian Modernity through the ‘New 
Efendiya’: Social and Cultural Constructions of the Middle Class in Egypt under the Monarchy,” 
in Re-Envisioning Egypt, 1919–1952, ed. Arthur Goldschmidt and Amy Johnson (Cairo: 
American University in Cairo Press, 2005), 124–63; and, more recently, Ryzova, The Age of the 
Efendiyya: Passages to Modernity in National-Colonial Egypt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014).  
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troops would not depart until 1956) through the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the 
Montreux Convention of 1937. Between 1922 and the Free Officers’ Revolt of 1952, Egypt was 
a nominally independent state governed by a liberal constitutional monarchy, with power 
concentrated in the hands of the king, less allotted to parliament, a much-vaunted modern 
judiciary, and the British shaping politics from the background. Thus, the period covered by this 
study was one in which liberalism—defined here less in terms of a set of ideas articulated by its 
canonical thinkers than as a discursive space that offers a common political and moral language 
to identify problems and debate them—was widely engaged at the legal, political, and social 
levels.8 I consider this engagement a form of translation: less a neutral, one-for-one transfer of a 
word from one language to another than an act of intervention invariably involving alterations in 
meaning mediated by one’s linguistic registers, culture, and tradition.9   
In colonial Egypt, translation also acted as a form of dislocation, as entering concepts 
linked to local variants to form novel meanings, or else erased these variants entirely. Integrated 
into the national-colonial legal apparatus, the new concepts began to disable old forms of life and 
oblige new forms to take their place.10 Thus, as I will describe, religious freedom displaced the 
laws of blasphemy through which communal authorities had long regulated speech and averted 
its sometimes-harmful social consequences as part of upholding a morally sound community. 
																																																						
8 On liberalism as a discursive tradition, see Talal Asad, “Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular 
Criticism,” in Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, by Talal Asad, Wendy 
Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood (Berkeley, CA: The Townsend Center for the 
Humanities, 2009), 25–26. 
9 The literature on critical approaches to translation is broad. For an influential discussion, see 
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
10 This is a characteristic of what David Scott dubs “colonial governmentality.” David Scott, 
“Colonial Governmentality,” in Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and 
Life Politics, ed. Jonathan Xavier Inda (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 23. 
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Public interest diverted the older notion of the public social good (also al-maslaha al-‘amma), a 
concept within Islamic law that had been used by jurists (‘ulama’) to promote the public’s social 
welfare and, as with blasphemy laws, sustain a moral community. Nationality displaced prior 
definitions of the Egyptian (al-misri), in the process creating a new category of the Egyptian 
national whose formation precipitated the politicization of religious groups and the reinscribing 
of them into racialized categories of national belonging. And the minority displaced the ta’ifa 
(community or group), enmeshing ta’ifas into new unequal relations of power part and parcel to 
nation-state politics. Thus, on a broader level, I describe the formation of a sovereign state which 
produces and regulates its population through top-down and fixed legal structures demanding 
discipline through the threat of punishment.11 This process gradually dismantled and replaced 
autonomous moral communities whose own legal structures—open and flexible—were intended 
to maintain the common good through the bottom-up cultivation of embodied ethical practices.12 
I have chosen to focus on religious freedom, public interest, nationality, and the minority 
because they were indispensable to Egypt’s national formation. The dissertation traces how these 
concepts, increasingly normative at the global level, came to be translated into Arabic and Egypt. 
As I will show, they materialized in unpredictable and contingent ways in a complex context 
characterized by the convergence of national formation, colonial intervention (including 
missionary work), and new modern modes of governance that were gradually displacing older 
forms of life and structures. Their significations continued to shift as they became integral to 
public discourse, offering Egyptians of all religions a new vocabulary with which to identify 
																																																						
11 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan 
(New York: Random House, 1995 [1977]). 
12 On this contrast, see Wael Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s 
Moral Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).  
	 7	
problems and debate them, and as they entered Egypt’s national legal system. As part of the 
overall secularization of law, these concepts contributed less to an open space wherein religious 
difference would be dissolved through the construction of an undifferentiated citizen, than to 
new forms of more hardened religious subjectivity, unprecedented manifestations of religious 
discord, and novel forms of exclusion. After its establishment in 1922, the Egyptian nation-state, 
defining itself in terms of the majority religion as “Islamic,” increasingly came to define Egypt’s 
moral and political vocabularies and imaginaries. In short, I argue that Egypt’s liberal period, 
and more specifically the expansion of liberal-secular law as part of the emergence of the nation-
state, created the conditions of possibility for the homogenization of Egyptian society in the 
following decades. 
 
Interventions 
This project intervenes into several areas of scholarship in modern Egyptian history and in 
anthropology. In its description of the formation of the Egyptian nation-state, the study builds on 
a broad scholarship on Egyptian nationalism. Since the publication of Benedict Anderson’s 
Imagined Communities, a preponderance of historical literature on modern Egypt has undertaken 
the important task of delineating the material and intellectual processes through which the nation 
was constructed and reconstructed.13 This literature has sought to counter nationalist 
																																																						
13 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006 [1983]). See also Ernest Gellner, Nations and 
Nationalism, introduction by John Breuilly, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006 
[1983]); and Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, 
Reality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 [1990]). On the construction of 
Egyptian nationalism from different angles and critiques of nationalist historiography, see Israel 
Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian 
Nationhood, 1900–1930 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Gershoni and Jankowski, 
Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); 
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historiography emanating out of Egyptian academic circles (and, to a lesser extent, by an older 
generation of scholars who wrote in English), in which the nation has been represented as 
eternal, unified, and coherent, awakening in the modern period from a long slumber to liberate 
itself from colonial domination.14 This dissertation also adopts a skeptical posture toward 
nationalist narratives, albeit more implicitly. However, as David Scott has observed in a more 
general manner, postcolonial critiques of the answers of anticolonial nationalists to their present 
predicaments have often left unaddressed whether the questions of nationalists are or should be 
the same as those animating the postcolonial present.15 While criticizing the essentialism of their 
nationalist peers, postcolonial historians have shared with them a desire to plot how the nation, 
now imagined rather than primordial, developed in search of redemptive futures. In other words, 
despite the addition of postcolonial modes of analysis, the structure of the plot has remained 
largely the same. In an attempt to address a different set of questions that stem from present 
																																																						
Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and 
the Egyptian Working Class, 1882–1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); 
Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt 
(Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2002); Donald Malcolm Reid, Whose Pharaohs?: 
Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World War I 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003); Mona L. Russell, Creating the New 
Egyptian Woman: Consumerism, Education, and National Identity, 1863–1922 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Beth Baron, Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005); Lisa Pollard, Nurturing the Nation: Family 
Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing, and Liberating Egypt, 1805–1923 (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2005); Michael Gasper, The Power of Representation: Publics, 
Peasants, and Islam in Egypt (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); Ziad Fahmy, 
Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2011). 
14 For nationalist and Marxist readings in which the nation is eternal, see, e.g., works by ‘Abd al-
Rahmad al-Raf‘i; M. A. Rifa‘t, The Awakening of Modern Egypt (London: Longman, 1947); and 
Ali Barakat, Tatawwur al-Milkiyya al-Zira‘iyya fi Misr fi al-Nisf al-Thani min al-Qarn al-
Thamin ‘Ashr (Cairo: Dar al-Thaqafa al-Jadida, 1977). 
15 David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2004). 
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predicaments, this dissertation turns from the nation’s imagination to the formation of the 
sociopolitical concepts that conditioned it, the meanings of which are often taken for granted, as 
well as to their effects. As Talal Asad has argued, the unleashing of modernity around the globe 
conscripted non-Western societies to engage with and be managed by the categories that 
modernity ushered in.16 This process was complex and locally contingent, giving rise to novel 
meanings that, as we will see, are at the root of some of today’s major political fault lines in 
Egypt and globally. In sum, rather than describe a different way in which the nation was 
imagined, I attempt to trace the complex manners in which the basic sociopolitical concepts 
structuring the act of imagining in Egypt—globally available but locally configured—took form.   
 The dissertation also adds to an extensive literature on the colonial history of Egypt. This 
literature is primarily divided between social and intellectual history. Social historians have 
generally sought to recuperate the agency of subaltern colonial subjects—children, peasants, 
women, workers, and others—whether in “everyday life,” as resistance to colonial power, or 
enmeshed with the state in complicated and mutually constitutive relations of power.17 Though 
this scholarship is divided by methodological and analytical commitment, it implicitly shares the 
kind of anticolonial nationalist concern to expose the negative structure of colonialism and 
longing for anticolonial revolt identified by Scott. Influenced by recent theories of colonialism 
																																																						
16 Talal Asad, “Conscripts of Western Civilization,” in Dialectical Anthropology: Essays in 
Honor of Stanley Diamond, vol. 1, Civilization in Crisis, ed. Christine Gailey (Gainesville, FL: 
University Press of Florida, 1992), 333–51. 
17 See, e.g., Judith Tucker, Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985); Mine Ener, Managing Egypt’s Poor and the Politics of Benevolence, 
1800–1952 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); John Chalcraft, The Striking 
Cabbies of Cairo and Other Stories: Crafts and Guilds in Egypt, 1863–1914 (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2004); Baron, Egypt as a Woman; Liat Kozma, Policing Egyptian 
Women: Sex, Law, and Medicine in Khedival Egypt (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
2011); and Hanan Hammad, Industrial Sexuality: Gender, Urbanization, and Social 
Transformation in Egypt (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2016). 
	 10	
put forth by Frederick Cooper, Ann Stoler, and others, intellectual historians of colonial Egypt 
have sought to move beyond analytical binaries between colonizer and colonized, metropole and 
colony, that were taken as axiomatic in earlier colonial histories of Egypt and elsewhere.18 
Theorizing translation and circulation, scholars have traced ideas, intellectual practices, and their 
human and textual vessels across oceans and borders to delineate the formation of colonial 
knowledge and attendant institutions within the colony as part of the fashioning of modern 
Egypt.19 Rather than simply transplanted from London, colonial knowledge was produced in 
Egypt, in some cases prior to the onset of formal colonial rule, and drew on local epistemological 
and ethical sources. On this basis, scholars have substantially revised how we conceive of the 
forging of modernity in Egypt, from a British imposition inherited by Egyptian nationalists, 
bureaucrats, and experts to a complex coalescence of desires, acts, and discourses.20 This 
approach to the study of colonialism strongly informs how I have approached the formation of 
																																																						
18 See, e.g., Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, eds., Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a 
Bourgeois World (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997). 
19 Omnia El Shakry, The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and 
Postcolonial Egypt (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Elliot Colla, Conflicted 
Antiquities: Egyptology, Egyptomania, Egyptian Modernity (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2008); Michael Gasper, The Power of Representation; Hibba Abugideiri, Gender and the 
Making of Modern Medicine in Colonial Egypt (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010); 
Wilson Chacko Jacob, Working Out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in 
Colonial Modernity, 1870–1940 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011); Samera Esmeir, 
Juridical Humanity: A Colonial History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); Amr 
Shalakany, Izdihar wa-Inhiyar al-Nakhba al-Qanuniyya al-Misriyya (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 
2013); Marwa Elshakry, Reading Darwin in Arabic: 1860–1950 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2015); Ryzova, The Age of the Efendiyya; Iza R. Hussein, The Politics of Islamic 
Law: Local Elites, Colonial Authority, and the Making of the Muslim State (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2016); Omnia El Shakry, The Arabic Freud: Psychoanalysis and Islam in 
Modern Egypt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017). 
20 For the older view, see Timothy Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1991 [1988]). Mitchell’s own theorization of modernity changed over time: 
Timothy Mitchell, “The Stage of Modernity,” in Questions of Modernity, ed. Timothy Mitchell 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 
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concepts in colonial Egypt. Meanwhile, I believe that this focus on concepts can help to bridge a 
divide between social and intellectual histories. The aim is not to approximate a more “total 
history” but to explore and highlight the powerful interplay between the articulation of concepts, 
thinking, and practices.  
 Recent historical scholarship on Egypt’s missionary encounter has described the various 
ways in which American and European Protestant missionaries shaped religion and politics in 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Egypt.21 My research builds on this literature in three ways. 
First, it draws on sources from the Egypt General Mission (EGM), a British missionary group 
that has received less scholarly attention relative to other missions.22 Second, it adds a 
genealogical approach where social and institutional history have reigned. Third, it highlights the 
role of missionaries in the unfolding of secularism in Egypt. 
In this latter respect, the dissertation also builds on recent work in anthropology on 
secularism and religion, much of it on Egypt. Following on the work of Talal Asad, over the last 
decade a range of scholars have revealed secularism to be a political process involving not the 
bifurcation of religion and politics but their close imbrication. These scholars have shown that 
secularism demands that the modern state intervene into religious life, transforming normative 
traditions and religious practices.23 In an influential recent work diverging somewhat from this 
																																																						
21 See in particular Heather Sharkey, American Evangelicals in Egypt: Missionary Encounters in 
an Age of Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Paul Sedra, From Mission 
to Modernity: Evangelicals, Reformers and Education in Nineteenth-Century Egypt (London: 
I.B.Tauris, 2011); and Beth Baron, The Orphan Scandal: Christian Missionaries and the Rise of 
the Muslim Brotherhood (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014). 
22 For a new study on European missions, including the EGM, see Samir Boulos, European 
Evangelicals in Egypt (1900–1956): Cultural Entanglements and Missionary Spaces (Leiden: 
Brill, 2016). 
23 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003). For works following on Asad, see, e.g., Saba Mahmood, Politics of 
Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
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literature, Hussein Agrama has argued that secularism should be analyzed less in terms of the 
state’s regulatory capacities than as a persistent question within the state’s legal and political 
arms over where to draw the line between religion and politics. This irresolvable question, he 
contends, authorizes the state to intervene time and again in the seemingly sacrosanct realm of 
the private when and wherever it deems such intervention necessary for preserving the public 
order, transforming religion in the process.24 Anthropologists have provided fruitful avenues for 
considering the trajectory of liberal-secular concepts such as public order in Egypt and elsewhere 
in the region, but their discerning historical claims are often thin on evidence from the historical 
record. Historians of the region have yet to fill this gap, arguably because excavating subaltern 
agency has seemed more pressing than the excavation of concepts. Pairing genealogy and 
historiography, and linking the legal, social, and political spheres, this dissertation pushes the 
analysis of secularism and religion in Egypt further. It shows how a set of liberal-secular 
concepts that had become normative within international law and the laws of states accumulated 
a particular set of meanings in colonial-national Egypt.  
Finally, as a history of legal concepts, this dissertation makes two further contributions. 
First, it adds to intellectual histories of the transmission of ideas across geographical space.25 
Whereas for the colonial world such transmission has often been described in terms of 
engagement or reception, which implies the coming together of two consenting parties in a kind 
																																																						
2005); Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic 
Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, 
Robart A. Yelle, and Mateo Taussif-Rubbo, eds., After Secular Law (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2011); and Saba Mahmood, Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority 
Report (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
24 Hussein Ali Agrama, Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in 
Modern Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
25 For a summation of this very broad literature, see Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, eds., 
Global Intellectual History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 
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of negotiation, this inquiry is framed in terms of what Talal Asad has described as conscription—
the idea that, at a certain point, the concepts under study become indispensable to political 
thought and practice in Egypt, though the forms that they took were fluid and unpredictable 
rather than fixed and stable.26 Second, this study adds to recent literature on the imbrication of 
international law with colonialism. It emphasizes less the perpetuation of unequal relations of 
sovereign or quasi-sovereign formations than the contingent process of how concepts became 
locally intelligible and put into action in the colonial world.27 In an era in which reputedly 
universal ideas such as democracy and human rights have been rendered global ethical standards, 
and have authorized imperial intervention and violence, this research highlights the 
complications involved in their mapping onto local contexts. 
 
Sources and Structure 
To carry out this analysis, I have drawn on British state archival records, sources from the Egypt 
General Mission, and Egyptian periodicals, legal compendia, laws, and parliamentary transcripts. 
Though I conducted research in the Egyptian National Archives (Dar al-Watha’iq) and have 
incorporated Egyptian state material into the analysis, this portion of my research produced 
limited yields due to problems of accessibility during a period of dramatic political change in 
Egypt from 2012 to 2014. Collectively, the sources that I have gathered allowed me to analyze 
the messy and staggered process of constructing the law in Egypt, changes to the law over a span 
																																																						
26 Talal Asad, “Conscripts of Western Civilization,” in Dialectical Anthropology: Essays in 
Honor of Stanley Diamond, vol. 1, Civilization in Crisis, ed. Christine Gailey (Gainesville, FL: 
University Press of Florida, 1992), 333–51.  
27 On the colonial origins of international law and their perpetuation of an unequal global system, 
see Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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of decades, and legal cases bearing on my areas of interest; diverse social encounters involving 
locals and foreigners in a range of public settings and from a variety of perspectives; and 
political discourse and process, both in and outside of parliament.  
 The dissertation is divided into two sections. The first section, comprising two chapters, 
discusses “Concepts of Expectation,” namely religious freedom and public interest. As described 
earlier, Koselleck observed that modern sociopolitical concepts often contain a sense of 
temporality and movement. Religious freedom and public interest, as ambiguous ideals, both 
establish an imperfect present space of experience and a horizon of expectation. As we will see, 
Egyptian articulations of religious freedom were grounded in experiences of moral injury at the 
hands of missionaries, a problem needing a solution, an expectation that conditions would 
improve, a movement toward greater freedom. By contrast, the notion of blasphemy in classical 
Islamic law which it displaced (or rearranged and incorporated into modern law) was premised 
on preserving a moral community in the present based on a past model. 
Coming under the domain of criminal law and bound up with issues of national security, 
public interest in Egypt was intended to produce a society of obedient law-abiding subjects in the 
future through the threat of punishment. This secular notion of public interest, which entered the 
law in 1904, contrasts with an older notion of public interest, or the public social good. Rather 
than a secure future, this older notion was defined in terms of a model past, the perfect society 
inaugurated by the Prophet Muhammad to which the community continuously sought to return.      
The second section, also made up of two chapters, focuses on the emergence of 
“Categories of Classification and Political Identification,” namely nationality and the minority. I 
show how these categories, part and parcel to the emergence of a homogenous nation-state, were 
critical to producing an Egyptian population that was identifiable and governable through the 
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regulative capacities of the law.28 Through dynamic interactions with subjects on the ground, 
these categories displaced older concepts and categories to reconstitute subjectivities and social 
worlds. To help us understand the complex relationships between legal-political categories and 
subjects, I draw on philosopher Ian Hacking’s discussion of the “looping effect” in articulating 
his notion of dynamic nominalism, a development of Michel Foucault’s concept of 
subjectification.29 Focused on the human and social sciences, Hacking shows how categories of 
people—the criminal, the homosexual, the psychopath, and others—which are dependent on 
spaces of possibility particular to given times and places, and the people they describe are 
mutually constitutive and transforming through time.30 Thus, for example, the proposed US 
census category “Middle Eastern” and “Middle Easterner” as a kind of person, or a primary site 
of identification, may appear simultaneously, rearranging prior identifications, followed by 
Middle Easterners resignifying the category, the formal definition being transformed in response, 
and so on and so forth. 
The emergence of the Egyptian national as a political-legal category in Egypt in the late 
nineteenth century reconfigured historical definitions of the Egyptian (al-misri), just as those 
who became “Egyptian nationals” reconfigured what this category signified. The actualization of 
the national idea also transformed religious groups (e.g., Jews and Armenians) into racialized 
nations whose loyalty was in question and often believed to belong elsewhere. Similarly, the 
																																																						
28 See Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter 
Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality with Two Lections by and an 
Interview with Michel Foucault (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87-104. 
29 On subjectification, see Michel Foucault, “Objectification, Subjectification, and the Human 
Sciences,” in Michel Foucault, revised ed., ed. Barry Smart (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
30 Ian Hacking, “The Looping Effects of Human Kinds,” in Causal Cognition: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach, D. Sperberet et al. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
351–61. 
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category of the minority, first claimed in Egypt in 1910 as part of an attempt by Copts to claim 
rights based on their religious identification, displaced the ta’ifa (community), politicizing 
religious identification and placing non-Muslim groups along a grid of exclusion.    
Together, the two sections describe the crafting of a national society in Egypt between 
the 1880s and the 1930s. In Chapter 2, “‘The Shari‘a Must Go’: Seduction, Moral Injury, and 
Religious Freedom,” I examine how religious freedom accumulated meaning in Egypt after 
World War I, when it became an international legal standard under the League of Nations 
minority rights protection regime. Foreign and local missionaries in Egypt advocated religious 
freedom as the right to proselytize and the right of Egyptians to convert to Protestantism. For 
many Egyptians, by contrast, it came to mean the right to protect one’s religion from a perceived 
missionary attack (ta‘n). The chapter follows the contingent formation of this paradox in the 
legal, political, and social realms. Drawing on recent theorizations of seduction and moral injury, 
I show how Egyptians articulated notions of religious freedom through a local ethical vernacular 
around blasphemy that, while embedded within the Islamic tradition, crossed religious divides. 
The Egyptian state gradually translated these sensibilities into its expanding public law in the 
name of a majority-defined public order, thus making protection of religion a legal issue with 
punitive power rather than a moral issue. 
Chapter 3, “Whose Public Interest? Translations of Libel and the Elders of 
Zion,” analyzes the concept “public interest.” Recent literature in anthropology and history of the 
Middle East has described the translation and actualization of the related, though significantly 
different, concept of public order within religious law in the colonial Middle East, particularly 
Egypt, beginning in the late nineteenth century. By contrast, public interest, a vague secular legal 
concept that manifests differently across liberal states but often authorizes judicial or executive 
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power to implement a “common good” when it conflicts with other laws, entered into Egypt’s 
public law in 1904 and was intimately linked to issues of national security. Focused on the 
translation of the blood libel accusation in Egypt, and the campaign by the Jewish reformer 
Murad Farag and his reformist colleagues to dismantle its logic, I trace how this secular notion of 
public interest displaced a prior Islamic notion of the public social good that extended across 
religious divides. As the Egyptian nation-state took form, and Arab and Jewish identifications 
came to be seen as incompatible, secular public interest was critical to transforming Jewishness 
in Egypt into a private interest detrimental to the good of the nation. This proved an important 
element in the exclusion of Egyptian Jewry during the 1940s–1960s. 
Chapter 4, “Ordering the ‘Land of Paradox’: The Fashioning of Nationality, Religion, 
and Political Loyalty,” provides a genealogy of the “Egyptian national,” a definition of which 
was initially established and put into effect by Egypt’s 1929 Nationality Law. Although the word 
“Egyptian” long had complex and varied meanings in the social realm, the British-dominated 
colonial administration was the first to use it to designate a juridical category, which it drew on 
as part of ruling Egypt. This category was transformed within a colonial context, but also by new 
international modes of governance focused on populations as homogenous and sovereign, ethnic, 
religious, and/or national units. After tracing the emergence of Egyptian nationality, the chapter 
explores Egypt’s implementation of a nationality regime. I examine how nationality, with its 
many constituent categories, reinscribed religious groups into racialized national categories. 
Thus, this chapter charts the gradual homogenization of Egypt’s population through processes of 
regulation and classification, with Muslims emerging as a national majority, Copts a minority, 
and other Christian and Jewish groups potentially disloyal and suspicious outsiders. 
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In Chapter 5, “‘Between the Devil and the Deep Sea’: Constructing the ‘Minority,’” I 
focus on the concept of the minority in Egypt. Scholars have claimed that this category of 
political identification first appeared in Egypt and in the region with the establishment of nation-
states after World War I. This timing would coincide with the appearance of the League of 
Nations and its rendering the minority a legal category. Analyzing a period of heightened 
sectarianism between Copts and Muslims from 1908 to 1911, as the Egyptian nationalist 
movement began to challenge colonial rule, I show that the category emerged approximately a 
decade earlier when Copts began to link their religious identification to this category, just as 
Muslims attached themselves to the majority label (akthariyya or aghlabiyya). However, the 
1923 Egyptian Constitution did not mention minorities at all, let alone afford them rights, and 
Egypt did not fall under the League of Nations minority rights regime. While communal 
structures remained in place through personal status laws, newly constructed minority 
communities were left without avenues of collective political participation. I argue that the 
establishment of a constitutional monarchy was not the onset of minority politics in Egypt, but 
was its culmination, establishing the contours of minority–majority dynamics and the makeup of 
Egyptian society. 
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In January 2016, the Egyptian writer Fatima Na‘ut was sentenced to three years in prison and 
fined LE20,000 for having remarked on her Facebook page that the tradition of slaughtering 
sheep during Eid al-Adha is the “‘greatest massacre committed by human beings.’” The charge, 
based on a law dating to 1982 in Egypt’s penal code, was “contempt of religion” (izdira’ al-din), 
which the state has increasingly put to use since the 2011 uprising.1 Through Na‘ut’s and similar 
cases, the state has regulated speech acts under the rubric of protecting religion. Whether and 
how to limit speech around religion are contested questions not only in Egypt but around the 
globe, including in Europe and North America where speech deriding Islam has sparked debate 
over where to draw the line between free speech and incitement. In the case of Egypt, the state’s 
use of izdira’ al-din, while sometimes assumed to be a medieval holdover signaling an 
incomplete or failed project of secularism, has a genealogy traceable to the secularization of 
Egyptian law in the liberal period, which stretched from 1922 until the 1952 Free Officers’ 
Revolt. 
 This chapter explores that genealogy. I begin by describing two related incidents that 
occurred in the second quarter of the twentieth century. In April 1928, an American Protestant 
missionary of Dutch descent, Samuel Zwemer, entered al-Azhar Mosque with a small group of 
visitors and distributed a missionary pamphlet. The pamphlet, titled “Return to the Old Qibla,” 
described Muhammad’s decision to redirect prayer from Jerusalem to Mecca, which Zwemer 
saw as an antagonistic break with Judaism and Christianity that set a path to enmity. It invited 
Muslims to return to the “original” qibla of Jerusalem and to seek Christ.2 After a shaykh 
																																																						
1 El-Sayed Gamal El-Din, “Egyptian Writer Fatima Naoot Sentenced to 3 Years in Jail for 
‘Contempt of Religion,’” ahramonline, 26 January 2016, accessed 5 May 2017, 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/185963.aspx.  
2 The pamphlet, or a version of it, was later published in the journal he founded and long edited: 
Samuel Zwemer, “Return to the Old Qibla,” The Moslem World 27 (1) (1937): 13–19. 
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confronted Zwemer, one student in the shaykh’s entourage hollered “down with evangelism” and 
a stir ensued. Three thousand Azhar students soon initiated a strike, and protests spread to the 
parliament (majlis al-nuwwab) in Cairo where the incident was debated.3 “Did the foreign 
minister hear what the American missionary association did, igniting the fire of discord [fitna] all 
over the country by distributing books and pamphlets all of which are a loathsome attack [ta‘n4] 
on Islam?” one minister asked. Continuing, he exclaimed, “does he know how [Zwemer] arrived 
to such shamelessness and insolence to dare to insult Muslims and wound their honor by 
attacking Islam, and in the largest and most holy Islamic institution”? In reply, the interior 
minister claimed that the government was taking steps to ensure such an incident did not repeat 
itself, and applauded the Azhar students and the nation for their “composed and wise” stance 
against this “act that stirs one’s feelings”—a stance that exemplified the Egyptian people’s 
“desire for public security” (al-amn al-‘amm).5 The encounter caused outrage at missionaries and 
the Capitulations, a set of treaties dating to the Ottoman period that guaranteed fiscal and legal 
privileges to certain foreign nationals and protected subjects, missionaries often among them.6 
 The incident resembles another that occurred eleven years later, with one significant 
difference. In 1939, a Protestant-converted Copt missionary, Hakim Wasif, was likewise 
																																																						
3 Beth Baron, The Orphan Scandal: Christian Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 144–45. See also Tariq al-Bishri, 
al-Muslimun wa-l-Aqbat fi Itar al-Jama‘a al-Wataniyya (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2004), 572–73. 
4 Ta‘n can mean “to attack with words,” “wound someone’s reputation,” or “divert from the right 
path,” but also “to pierce, thrust, or stab (someone).” The action of ta‘n can thus induce what in a 
post-Cartesian world are often considered two separate sensations of pain—psychological and 
physical. Thus, I translate the word as “attack” rather than the more common “defamation,” 
which connotes harm to one’s reputation through the written or spoken word. 
5 Majlis al-Nuwwab: Majmu‘at Mudabit Dawr al-In‘iqad (Cairo: al-Matba‘a al-Amriyya, 1928), 
Jalasa 50, 23 April 1928, 762. 
6 The Capitulations were a set of treaties dating to the Ottoman period that guaranteed fiscal and 
legal privileges to certain foreign nationals and protected subjects. 
	 22	
distributing Christian missionary material in public, though on the streets of Cairo rather than in 
a mosque, and a short story rather than a tract. Titled La fleur de la forêt (The Flower of the 
Forest), the story described a female prostitute who has been saved by Christianity.7 The 
publication sparked public outcry because many understood the protagonist’s name—Fatima 
Zohra—to refer to the Prophet Muhammad’s daughter Fatima al-Zahra’. The implication seemed 
to be that Islam led women to licentiousness from which Christianity offered salvation.8 Unlike 
Zwemer, who was a protected foreigner, Wasif, a local subject, was swiftly arrested.9 
 In contrast to the Zwemer incident, the discord sparked by Wasif’s actions was quickly 
contained. By 1939, the Egyptian state, having gained greater sovereignty through the Anglo-
Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Montreux Convention of 1937 phasing out the Capitulations, 
had written protection from moral injury into law, banning anyone from “damaging, violating, 
injuring, or desecrating religious practice” (kull man kharrab au kassar au atlaf au dannas … 
sha‘a’ir al-din). Though neither the author nor the publisher of La fleur de la forêt, Wasif was 
sentenced to one year’s imprisonment with labor based on Article 161 of the 1937 penal code, 
which covered “misdemeanors related to religion.” By distributing this book, the court said, he 
had not only desecrated Islam through the figure of Fatima, but he had also “intentionally 
																																																						
7 A. E. Theobald, La fleur de la forêt (Assiut and Cairo: Nile Mission Press, 1928). The version 
that I accessed was in French, but presumably the distributed version was in Arabic. An English-
language version may have been published as well. FO 371/23365. 
8 FO 371/23365, “Memorandus on the Case of Hakim Effendi Wasef.”  
9 It is unclear whether Wasif was arrested in Cairo or Assuit, but he had been working at one of 
the main offices of the Nile Mission Press, which were located in these two cities.  
	 23	
alter[ed] part of this text [the Qur’an] from its intended meaning,”10 for La fleur de la forêt 
allegedly misquoted the Qur’an and cited invented Qur’anic passages.11  
This chapter traces how such perceived attacks (ta‘n) on religion came to be banned as 
punishable crimes in modern Egyptian law. I show that this new legal proscription reputedly 
protecting religion emerged through a contingent process whereby local communities, 
missionaries, and the Egyptian state under the shadow of colonial rule claimed and articulated 
the concept of religious freedom in ways that advanced their respective interests. A product of 
sectarian conflict and the rise of the modern state in Western Europe, this secular concept came 
to accumulate particular meanings in Egyptian public discourse and law. Historians have 
observed that Protestant missionaries in Egypt long justified their attempts to convert local 
Muslims through religious freedom, and that Egyptian Muslims drew on it as the right to protect 
their religion.12 This chapter historicizes this interpretive divide and explores its consequences 
for Egyptian society. Consistent with liberal doctrine in their home countries, Protestant 
missionaries in Egypt equated religious freedom with the right to proselytize and the right of 
autonomous individuals to change religion, for they felt that local law did not protect converts 
from Islam. In addition to their proselytization efforts, missionaries focused on transforming 
Egyptian law by reducing the jurisdiction of the shari‘a, perceived as the main obstacle to 
conversion, and shaping and empowering Egypt’s modern, rights-based legal system. After 
																																																						
10 For the Arabic version of the penal code, see Mohami Online, accessed 25 January 2016, 
http://mohamionline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=72%3Aclassic-
style-and-google-fonts&catid=36%3A2011-12-22-07-17-08&Itemid=89. For the French, see 
Code Pénal (Cairo: Imprimerie nationale, 1937). 
11 FO 371/23365, “Memorandus on the Case of Hakim Effendi Wasef.” 
12 Heather Sharkey, American Evangelicals in Egypt: Missionary Encounters in an Age of 
Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), esp. chap. 4; and Baron, The Orphan 
Scandal, 54. 
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Egypt gained nominal independence in 1922, by which time religious freedom had become an 
international legal standard, missionaries pressured British authorities to ensure that religious 
freedom guarantees explicitly protecting conversion were introduced into Egypt’s first 
Constitution. 
By contrast, the Egyptian legislators tasked with drafting this Constitution sought to 
avoid explicit guarantees of religious freedom (hurriyyat al-‘itiqad al-dini) because they saw it 
as a critical tool of missionary proselytism which in the past had repeatedly torn the social fabric. 
During the late 1920s and 1930s, as a series of conversion crises rocked Egypt, Egyptians widely 
came to articulate religious freedom not as the individual’s ability to choose her religion but as 
the right of protection from moral injury produced by a perceived missionary assault on the 
Egyptian nation, defined constitutionally as Islamic. Protection from such feelings had long been 
the preserve of communal authorities in their role as upholders of the communal moral order. 
However, I show that as part of the expansion of positivist law (i.e., “neutral,” or free of 
“subjective” moral judgment) in the 1920s and 1930s, part and parcel of the emergence of a 
sovereign state assuming regulative capacities over the population, the Egyptian state proscribed 
offense to religion within criminal law, transforming what was once a moral issue into a modern 
legal one carrying punitive consequences of the kind faced by Wasif and Na‘ut. Through the 
1937 Penal Code and its successors, the Egyptian state authorized itself to define and police 
offense to religion as part of preserving public order, that “‘active principle’ of secular power” 
which authorizes the state to decide what counts as religious and what role it should play in 
social life.13   
																																																						
13 Hussein Ali Agrama, Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in 
Modern Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 30–31. 
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To help us understand why Egyptians tended to consider proselytism so deeply 
threatening, I draw on the notion of seduction. Seduction refers to the manipulation of another’s 
desire, though not in the limited sexual sense with which the word is most often associated today. 
The verb “to seduce” (Fr. séduire), as Jean Baudrillard observed, has its etymological roots in 
Latin, with the word se-ducere meaning “to take aside, to divert from one’s path.”14 Thus, to 
seduce can mean “to lead the other from his/her truth,” and to be seduced “to be turned from 
one’s truth.”15 According to Baudrillard, seduction is coercive because the seducer captures the 
other without her consent by either performing as object of desire or letting the other believe 
herself to be the subject of desire.16 As an intersubjective relationship, seduction involves the 
play of power, with the seducer setting the trap and the seduced walking into it believing herself 
to be pursuing her own desires. The Latin understanding of seduction described by Baudrillard is 
strikingly different from the modern liberal version, which is associated with adept persuasion, 
consent, and choice. As Talal Asad has shown, in liberal societies, from which missionaries 
hailed, seduction is valued positively, especially in the marketplace, as a sign of individual 
freedom because it is seen to involve reasoned choice. By contrast, coercion is illegal because, 
rather than consent, it involves compulsion through the threat of or actual harm to another’s 
property (including the body).  
In Islamic theology, seduction, glossed in Arabic with terms such as fatana (to subject to 
temptations, and the root of fitna, meaning captivation or, more often, disorder), rawada (to 
entice, tempt, lure away, in a sexual sense), and gharra (to mislead, beguile, or make desire what 
																																																						
14 Jean Baudrillard, Seduction, trans. Brian Singer (Montréal: New World Perspectives, 2001 
[1979]), 22. 
15 Ibid., 86. 
16 Ibid., 91. 
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is false, and the root of the noun ighra’, or to attract someone, often in a way that undermines 
self-control), has been viewed with serious consternation due to how it combines coercive 
inducement of desire with disorder or social unrest. As Talal Asad points out, “Muslim 
theologians and jurists assumed that seduction in all its forms was necessarily dangerous, not 
only for the individual (because it indicated a loss of self-control) but for the social order too (it 
could lead to violence and civil discord).”17 Diverting one from the true path toward the pursuit 
of individual pleasures and desires beyond the limits of self-control could produce anxiety and 
peril seen to undermine the common social good (al-maslaha al-‘amma), the basis for a 
righteous community.  
As Egypt transitioned to the nation-state form, Egyptians across religious divides often 
experienced missionary seduction, attempts to divert one from her truth into Protestantism, as an 
attack (ta‘n) on the collective body that, despite its limited success, caused moral injury on the 
communal level. Moral injury involves degrading the standing or status of an individual or 
community, not in the law but in terms of moral being, value, and dignity, which in its most 
radical form is actuated through bodily harm. Though moral injury is universal and 
transhistorical, its form is linked to socially and historically conditioned moral experience, as is 
the response to it.18 In the face of particularly aggressive forms of proselytism, Egyptians tended 
																																																						
17 Talal Asad, “Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism,” in Is Critique Secular? 
Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, The Townsend Papers in the Humanities, no. 2, by Talal 
Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood (Berkeley, CA: The Townsend Center 
for the Humanities, 2009), 37–38. 
18 Discussing the Danish Cartoon Controversy, Mahmood asserts that the cartoons caused some 
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Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?,” in Is Critique Secular?, 66–67. This argument, 
while challenging essentialist readings of Muslim responses to the cartoons, may construct an 
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to express moral injury in a local ethical vernacular around blasphemy that, though embedded 
within the Islamic tradition, was broadly shared. The experience of moral injury propelled novel 
articulations of religious freedom as protection from moral injury (and thus protection of 
religion). Yet the eventual entry of religious freedom defined as such into Egyptian public law 
did not mean that moral injury became intelligible within Egypt’s legal system. Through 
religious freedom, the state has sought to regulate public order rather than maintain the common 
social good, ultimately producing rather than resolving religious divides. 
This chapter intervenes in the historical scholarship on mission in Egypt and in recent 
literature in anthropology on secularism.19 In terms of the literature on missionaries, it makes 
three main contributions. First it focuses on the Egypt General Mission (EGM). Though it 
became the second largest mission active in Egypt after its founding in 1898,20 it has yet to 
receive a great deal of scholarly attention.21 I concentrate on the EGM due to its substantial 
influence, leading the International Missionary Council formed in 1921, and its focus on Egypt’s 
Muslim majority, making it an important participant in debates over religious freedom. However, 
the chapter’s findings are generalizable to many of the other Protestant missionary groups that 
																																																						
undifferentiated and timeless pious Muslim who has remained immune from Protestant semiotic 
ideology. In this chapter, I discuss moral injury less in terms of semiotic ideology—though this 
remains a feature of the analysis—than in terms of the violation of the social fabric through 
proselytization. For a recent discussion of moral injury from which my definition was adapted, 
see J. M. Bernstein, Torture and Dignity: An Essay on Moral Injury (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2015), esp. 3 and 123. 
19 Principally, Sharkey, American Evangelicals; Paul Sedra, From Mission to Modernity: 
Evangelicals, Reformers and Education in Nineteenth-Century Egypt (London: I.B.Tauris, 
2011); and Baron, The Orphan Scandal. 
20 Earl Edgar Elder, Vindicating a Vision: The Story of the American Mission in Egypt, 1854–
1954 (Philadelphia, PA: Board of Foreign Missions of the United Presbyterian Church of North 
America, 1958), 163.  
21 For a new study on European missions in Egypt, including the EGM, see Samir Boulos, 
European Evangelicals in Egypt (1900–1956): Cultural Entanglements and Missionary Spaces 
(Leiden: Brill, 2016). See also Baron, The Orphan Scandal, chap. 5. 
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were active in Egypt. Though focused on different populations, Protestant missions in Egypt 
generally sought to convert who they could and worked in concert toward this end, each claiming 
a territory and careful not to step on another’s toes.22 Second, this is the first study on mission in 
Egypt to apply a genealogical approach. Third, the chapter shows the important role missionaries 
played in shaping secularism in Egypt.23 In this respect, and by offering a detailed account of 
religious freedom’s formation that ties together the legal, political, and social realms, the chapter 
also adds to recent anthropological literature on secularism that uses Egypt as a case study, 
which has provided important analytical frameworks that inform this discussion.24  
 
Constituting Religious Freedom 
Prior to the emergence of the Egyptian nation-state, religious freedom (unlike other forms of 
freedom, including of the press) was far from the minds of most Egyptians, who tended to view 
as foreign the kind of sectarian discord and violence that gave rise to religious freedom as a 
feature of modern governance.25 This was true even as Protestant missionaries had been framing 
their proselytization efforts and conversion of locals in terms of religious freedom since the 
nineteenth century. As early as 1861, missionaries from the American United Presbyterian 
Church invoked religious liberty when one of their representatives in Egypt, a Syrian convert and 
																																																						
22 Baron, The Orphan Scandal, 36. 
23 Sharkey, American Evangelicals; Baron, The Orphan Scandal. 
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Stanford University Press, 2003); Agrama, Questioning Secularism; Saba Mahmood, Religious 
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25 Many Egyptian intellectuals and authors claimed that the sectarianism (al-ta‘assub al-dini) 
that occurred between Copts and Muslims between 1908 and 1911(see Chapter 5), for example, 
was unprecedented and incomparable to the kinds of religious discord witnessed in Europe. See, 
e.g., Tawfiq Habib, Tidhkar al-Mu’tamar al-Qibti al-Awwal: Majmu‘a Rasa’il Musawwira 
(Matba‘a al-Akhbar li-Misr, 1911). 
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lawyer by the name of Faris al-Hakim, was beaten in an Islamic court in Assiut and imprisoned. 
Al-Hakim had been defending a Coptic woman whom he had converted to Protestantism and 
attempted to marry to a Christian man some five years after she had converted to Islam, married 
a Muslim, and given birth to a baby girl. The qadi, concerned less with al-Hakim’s internal 
beliefs than with their effects, accused al-Hakim of having “deceived her, and enticed her from 
her religion,” and then of “attacking the Mohammeden religion” in court and “causing 
skepticism among the common people.” After coming under physical attack in the courtroom for 
allegedly cursing Islam as an “infidelity,” he was placed in a prison cell only to be released 
through the intervention of the US government and Abraham Lincoln himself who was 
concerned about Faris’ “religious liberty.” Throughout the case, neither al-Hakim nor the qadi, 
no less other locals involved, engaged with such language.26  
This pattern would continue into the early twentieth century. In 1908, a missionary from 
the Protestant Church Mission Society named Miss Elverson returned to Jerusalem from 
“holiday” in Port Said to find out that the family of a missing young Muslim woman named 
‘Ayisha sought to speak with her and had apparently threatened violence. It took the involvement 
of the British consul in Jerusalem, Edward C. Blech, for her to admit that she had taken the 
young woman to Port Said and deposited her at the Anglo-American orphanage. According to 
Miss Elverton, ‘Ayisha had apparently converted at age five and been ill-treated by her family. It 
is conceivable that, at least a decade later, her status as a Christian—assuming she did indeed 
convert—had been in jeopardy, and Miss Elverton, with or without the young woman’s 
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involvement, made plans to move her from Jerusalem. Hearing the news, ‘Ayisha’s brother 
traveled straight away to Port Said to retrieve her. Likely encountering resistance from the 
orphanage, and possibly ‘Ayisha, the brother appealed to the Port Said governorate, which 
served as arbiter. ‘Ayisha’s fate hinged on her age. The governorate consulted two doctors who 
determined she was seventeen—under the age of majority in civil law—and should be returned 
to her family. However, Miss Lyons, in whose care she was, consulted two different doctors who 
determined she was twenty-two or twenty-three, and thus an adult.27 The case eventually made 
its way to the shari‘a courts, where a qadi ruled, on the basis of Islamic law, that ‘Ayisha was not 
“of age” (musinna) and must return to her family in Jerusalem.28 Unlike very similar cases that 
occurred in the 1920s, what does not appear to have been raised, neither by the missionaries, the 
British authorities, ‘Ayisha, or the shari‘a court, is the issue of religious freedom. 
 In one last example from 1911, word spread that two Muslim boys living in an orphanage 
in Shibin al-Qanatir run by the EGM, had converted to Christianity. The ‘Urwa al-Wuthqa 
society, a branch of the masonic lodge originally established by the Muslim intellectual Jamal al-
Din al-Afghani, was able to intervene and extract twenty-one students, including the two boys, 
from the orphanage.29 While outraged by the “forced” conversion of young children, the ‘Urwa 
al-Wuthqa society did not contest it through the idiom of religious freedom. 
																																																						
27 For a discussion of the case, see Baron, The Orphan Scandal, 83–84. The role of medical 
experts in legal proceedings around conversion is notable but beyond the scope of this chapter. 
See Khaled Fahmy, “The Anatomy of Justice: Forensic Medicine and Criminal Law in 
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Like the social realm, religious freedom was absent from the political and intellectual 
realms as well. When a group of largely Protestant Egyptian Coptic elites organized a Coptic 
Congress in 1911 to make demands of the colonial state on behalf of the Coptic community, 
including several related to religious practice, they framed their claims not in terms of religious 
freedom but in terms of the liberal principle of equality.30 Similarly, in his writings on freedom 
prior to World War I, the intellectual giant of liberalism in Egypt, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, had 
little to say about this concept. In a 1912 article theorizing freedom, he addressed political 
freedom and personal freedom, but not religious freedom.31 Nor did he address it in other articles 
from the period.32 
Absence gave way to presence with the global extension of the nation-state system after 
World War I, which rendered religious freedom an essential component of the laws of states. 
Part of the broader notion of protection of (religious) minorities, religious freedom became an 
instrument with which the newly established League of Nations, dominated by the “Great 
Powers,” could regulate states and national societies through law. For these new states, religious 
freedom was perceived as an obstacle to full sovereignty, and thus an enticing terrain for 
attempting to expand state authority through the regulation of religion. The minority rights 
regime also enticed missionaries. With the specter of political independence threatening the 
continuation of their work, missionaries embraced the banner of religious rights. In religious 
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freedom, the interests of the League of Nations and missionary societies converged.33 Given this 
background, when Egyptian legislators drafted Egypt’s first Constitution in the early 1920s, the 
question was not whether but how to engage with religious freedom, answers to which were 
powerfully shaped by Egypt’s encounter with Protestant missionaries. It was precisely in the 
process of drafting Egypt’s first Constitution, introduced in 1923, that religious freedom first 
came to be contested. 
 In 1921, as Egypt’s Constitutional Committee debated the contours of a new 
constitutional order, the EGM petitioned the British High Commission to advance missionary 
objectives. The petition initiated the language of religious freedom, a concept that would be 
central to the EGM’s political program during the 1920s and early 1930s and become 
increasingly available to Egyptians to make their own claims to religious rights. Realizing that 
“the institutions of Egypt [were] being remodeled,” the EGM sought to expand the domain of 
civil law and confine that of shari‘a.34 In the view of missionaries, whereas the new Constitution 
would likely protect religious freedom, understood as the ability to proselytize and to convert 
from Islam, the shari‘a clearly violated it. Believing firmly in law’s power to transform human 
sensibilities, the missionaries insisted that empowering modern law, premised on the 
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autonomous citizen, would also defuse the perceived irrational responses that their proselytism 
inspired—what Egyptian Muslims understood as the expression of legitimate outrage.  
Missionary objectives divided into three categories: the situation of Egypt’s Christians, 
matters of conversion, and the ability to continue missionary work unimpeded.35 We will focus 
on the first two. In regard to Christians in Egypt, the EGM demanded that “liberty be accorded to 
all men to rest and to worship on the day prescribed by their several faiths,” and that 
appointments and promotions in employment be based on merit rather than religious affiliation. 
These objectives were intended to open a space for Egyptian Christians to claim religious rights 
before the state. The EGM also demanded that legal procedures in which one or both sides were 
non-Muslims be barred from taking place in the shari‘a courts. The parties involved, the EGM 
argued, should have the liberty of agreeing on a mutually acceptable communal court, and if they 
could not, their case should be settled not by a Muslim qadi (as had been common practice) but 
in the Mixed Courts. The purpose of this objective was clearly to undermine the authority of 
Islamic law.36 As William Paton, a British Presbyterian missionary who served as secretary of 
the International Missionary Council, bluntly put it, “it was said to me in the Near East, not only 
by missionaries but by foreign officials and other observers of different kinds, that ‘the Shariat 
must go.’”37 
 In terms of conversion, the EGM demanded that “steps be taken in the new Constitution 
to secure to all Egyptian subjects freedom in regard to change of faith, so that one who desires to 
change from Islam to Christianity may not be liable to injury in person, family or estate.” The 
																																																						
35 Archives and Special Collections, SOAS Library (hereafter SOAS) JCRL/ 09/03, “Bishop of 
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36 Ibid., 1–2. 
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EGM saw the ability to convert as the litmus test of religious freedom. While a 1913 law had 
established a state infrastructure for registering conversions, it assumed that conversions were 
unidirectional, into Islam.38 Conversion cases from the period show how conversion out of Islam 
was not illegal per se (as the EGM suggested) but unsustainable in an Islamic legal setting.39 
Such cases, especially when involving girls and women, landed in the shari‘a courts as the 
tribunal de droit commun (court of common law), with converts usually returned to their families 
and Islam. Thus, the EGM sought an “official and departmental method … by which a 
Mohammedian who becomes a Christian can have the fact noted and registered.” Put differently, 
this organization, whose members worked to convert souls often with legal impunity under the 
Capitulations, sought to empower a modern legal system to facilitate Muslim conversion to 
Christianity in a Muslim-majority and nominally sovereign country defining itself as Islamic. For 
this reason, some began to associate secular law with Christianization and the violation of the 
national body. 
 Yet the missionaries also sought more. The EGM demanded that Muslims be able to 
convert with security—and not only physical but also financial. “When the family property is in 
the normal course being divided,” they urged, “the change of faith of one member should not per 
se prevent him from inheriting his share, and … in signing he should not be forced to sign 
exclusively his former Moslem name, thus forcing on him a virtual profession of a return to 
Islam.” Exempting waqf inheritance, which they sought to eliminate, and a father’s own decision 
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to “cut off his son with or without a shilling,” Muslim converts to Christianity, they argued, 
should have the right to inherit as Christians. This right, they pointed out, had already been made 
available in India through the 1832 Bengal Code. Although the EGM acknowledged that 
granting inheritance rights to converts from Islam in Egypt would inspire Muslim opposition, in 
India, it claimed, such opposition had been overcome by the “patent justice of reform.”40  
 The missionaries’ understanding of just reform, then, was an expansion of civil law that, 
deaf to moral injury of Egyptians, enabled “freedom,” or an individual’s ability to choose a 
religion. This understanding presumed both a normative understanding of religion based on the 
individual’s cognitive choice to believe, and an ideal human, the autonomous citizen whose 
inalienable property included not only his body, but also his belief, free speech (to profess), and 
material possessions. On this basis, the missionaries concluded that shari‘a and the shari‘a courts 
were impediments to freedom, forming a binary that, incidentally, has persisted until today.41 
Their proposals for enshrining freedom in law represented a direct challenge to Egypt’s national 
majority. 
 Egypt’s 1923 Constitution promised religious freedom, but not quite in the ways the 
missionaries had advocated. Decided upon by a Constitutional Committee made up of Jewish, 
Christian, and Muslim Egyptian members with the “input” of British advisors, it included five 
clauses touching on religious freedom. We will discuss two that center on the regulation of 
religious practice: Article 12, stating that “freedom of conviction is absolute” (hurriyyat al-
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i‘tiqad mutlaqa); and Article 13, declaring that the state protects the use of religious and creedal 
slogans “according to customary practice in Egypt so long as that does not disturb public order 
[al-nizam al-‘amm] or contradict morals [adab].”42 The first thing to note about these clauses is 
that they did not guarantee what the missionaries had sought, and what the British had thought 
the better of advocating—principally, the freedom to convert from Islam. In fact, they did not 
make explicit guarantees of religious freedom at all. Article 12 guaranteed the protection of what 
was vaguely termed “freedom of conviction” (hurriyyat al-i‘tiqad). This formulation was the 
outcome of a debate within the Constitutional Committee. The clause’s original phrasing, based 
on George Curzon’s articulation and combined with what became Article 13,43 was slightly 
different:  
 
freedom of religious conviction [hurriyyat al-i‘tiqad al-dini] is absolute [emphasis mine]. 
All residents of Egypt have the right to use with complete freedom, in public or in 
private, the slogans of any community [milla], religion [din], or creed [‘aqida], so long as 
these slogans do not contradict public order or general morals [al-adab al-‘umumiyya].44  
 
The word “religious” was expunged because, as committee member Muhammad Khayrat Radi 
pointed out, otherwise “it would be permitted for every person to leave his religion and embrace 
another religion without bearing responsibility for that through civil or noncivil penalty, despite 
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that there is no dispute that important outcomes related to inheritance, etc., result from it.”45 In 
other words, instituting religious freedom would have enabled the conversions sought by 
missionaries, which had proven so disruptive to the social fabric. The issue of religion was left to 
the second part of the clause—a version of which later became Article 13—which stated that the 
expression of religious slogans was protected but that the state could exclude religious speech 
that “contradicts public order or general morals.” Whereas religious communal authority had 
historically regulated the boundaries of acceptable speech acts as part of upholding a righteous 
community, that power now belonged to the state, guided by its own conception of public 
morality and the exigencies of public order.  
Yet religious freedom was dangerous for other reasons too. For some, such as the Islamic 
reformer Muhammad Bakhyat al-Muti‘i, the clause that would become Article 13 was too open 
in its definition of religion itself. “I request that the text be limited to recognized religions, 
whether heavenly or not heavenly,” the shaykh stated, “so as not to permit the creation of a new 
religion, such as a person claiming, for example, that he is the mahdi and bringing a new 
revelation.” Bishop Anba Yu’annis, the Coptic Church’s representative on the committee, shared 
Bakhyat al-Muti‘i’s view, providing a specific example of what was at stake. A certain “Sirjiyus, 
well-known to you all [committee members], left religion and truth in establishing a new 
religion, and requested from the government authorization for that and was refused. This is 
evidence that it is not possible to authorize unrecognized religions.”46 The Sirjiyus to whom the 
bishop referred had not established a new religion; he was a Coptic Christian who had become an 
early adherent of Baha’ism in Egypt, a religion that claimed to succeed (or encompass) 
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Christianity and Islam and still is not recognized by the Egyptian state. Due to such concerns, in 
the final version of the Constitution, the freedom to express “slogans of any community, religion, 
and creed” was modified to the freedom to express “slogans of religions and creeds according to 
customary practice [my emphasis].”47  
This case conveys how boundaries of free speech tend to be drawn to accommodate 
majoritarian populations within nation-states rather than minorities, who though they may draw 
on the same legal instruments as majorities to prevent harmful speech acts, rarely meet with 
success.48 With the formation of the Egyptian nation-state, Muslims became a majority 
(akthariyya or aghlabiyya, though the latter term, connoting domination rather than numerical 
superiority, eventually won out), with Islam the state religion, and Copts a minority (aqalliyya), 
though some prominent Copts such as the Wafdist Wisa Wasif contested this label on the basis 
that Copts were the “original Egyptians” rather than a separate group like Jews in Europe 
deprived of national rights.49 However, majority and minority could easily coalesce into a 
majoritarian front when it came to certain shared interests such as determining the legal 
boundaries of religion, excluding other minorities (also aqalliyyas, though here “outsiders” to the 
nation) such as Baha’is. The introduction of religious freedom into Egypt did not open space for 
“free” religious thought, speech, and practice, which everywhere is no more than an ideal. 
Rather, it propelled the legal codification of the boundaries of “legitimate” religious practice. 
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 “Strange Stories” of Converted Muslims 
The complex and contingent translation of religious freedom into Egyptian law made this 
concept more readily available to Egyptians. Egyptians came to articulate religious freedom 
through a local ethical vernacular around moral injury, a statist project of public order, or both, 
as a defense against missionary proselytism and conversion of locals, which were seen to 
threaten the social fabric. Historians who have broached the subject of religious freedom in 
Egypt have shed light on at least four cases involving conversion and polemical speech acts 
about Islam that occurred in the early 1930s.50 While they are important, I focus on an earlier set 
of cases because they have yet to be analyzed in detail (and not at all in English) and because 
they provide important context for their successors.  
In April 1926, a young woman named Zakiya Ahmad Salih from Alexandria entered the 
EGM hospital in the Nile Delta region of Shibin al-Qanatir “of her own free will and at the desire 
of her family” to be trained as a nurse. During the previous few years, Zakiya had attended an 
EGM missionary school in Anfushi.51 Her father had passed away in 1924 and perhaps she and 
her remaining family—her mother and two brothers—sought additional income. There are 
conflicting reports of what occurred at the hospital. According to Zakiya’s younger brother 
Yunus, about two years into Zakiya’s training, when she was about sixteen or seventeen years 
old,52 she wrote to her family begging them to take her home. Responding to her plea, Yunus 
arrived at the hospital to find that the staff would not permit her to leave. Worse still, “they [had] 
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obliged her to change her religion to be a Christian.” The missionaries in charge, Yunus 
explained, “feared she may return to her original religion” if they allowed her to rejoin her 
family. By his account, when he insisted on taking his sister home to his mother, who was 
“suffering … sorrow,” they forcibly removed him from the school. In a letter in broken English 
to British authorities, Yunus pleaded for intervention, explaining that he had contacted the police 
but they lacked the power to help him.53 The EGM, a British Protestant mission, was allegedly 
hiding her under the cover of the Capitulations.54 
 The EGM described matters differently. In its telling, Zakiya’s family was intimately 
familiar with the hospital, her cousin having already trained there and her mother having stayed 
as a guest. In 1926, Zakiya had supposedly had a fight with a female coworker and wrote a letter 
to her brother asking him to bring her home, which he did. On arriving, however, he admonished 
her for leaving “‘good employment’” in “‘a good place.’” Zakiya soon returned to the hospital. 
Then, in the spring of 1928, Zakiya is said to have written again to her brother, this time to 
inform him of her “preference for Christianity, especially for Christian home-life.”55 After 
receiving this letter, Yunus traveled to Shibin al-Qanatir intent on retrieving his sister, but Zakiya 
refused to leave.56 
 According to an EGM memorandum, Yunus, frustrated by his sister’s intransigence, 
lodged a complaint with the Interior Ministry. He also opened a case in the shari‘a court. In the 
meantime, her other brother Muhammad and his mother reached out to the ma’mur (provincial 
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subgovernor) for aid. The ma’mur, who was also contacted separately by Yunus, argued that 
Zakiya was old enough to decide for herself what to do. On 5 May, Zakiya received a visit at the 
hospital from the wakil al-niyaba (public prosecutor) who questioned the girl to ascertain her 
true wishes. The wakil also called in Muhammad and told him “to do what he could to persuade 
her to come with him.” With Zakiya still refusing to leave, the ma’mur concluded that his only 
option was to consent to her remaining at the hospital.57 
 Just when the matter seemed settled, on 14 May the shari‘a court, where Yunus had 
opened a case, ordered Zakiya to be returned home. The EGM hospital, outraged by the ruling 
and arguing that it was based on false testimony, demanded postponement of its execution and an 
appeal, both of which were granted. As word of the delay spread, the Wafdist deputy, Mahjub 
Thabit, raised in the Chamber of Deputies the issue of Zakiya’s conversion and “the negligence 
committed by the ma’mur” to Interior Minister (and future prime minister) Mustafa al-Nahas, 
whose responsibility it was to execute judicial rulings.58 After communicating with British 
authorities, and with the approval of the Coptic minister of foreign affairs Wassif Ghali and 
Shaykh al-Azhar Mustafa al-Maraghi,59 al-Nahas ordered the shari‘a court’s judgment to be 
implemented the following morning.60 Embracing the ruling, Mahjub Thabit explained that it 
was guided by religious freedom, particularly Article 13 of the Egyptian Constitution protecting 
religious slogans according to customary practice unless they disrupt public order or contradict 
morals.61 Thabit invoked painful memories of missionaries having violated the public order and 
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morality, including a particularly memorable case from 1911 mentioned earlier. “It is necessary 
that the missionaries know,” Thabit argued, “that Egypt’s Muslims, Christians, and Jews, are but 
different birds on the same one tree … they live in perfect harmony and do not take at all to that 
which puts this serenity into trouble.” Concluding his remarks with hope that such incidents 
would not repeat themselves, Mahjub Thabit received applause from the chamber.62  
 Al-Nahas and the Interior Ministry articulated a notion of religious freedom guided by 
the logic of public order and protecting the social fabric from the dangers of seduction. This 
notion contrasted with that expressed by the EGM in its memoranda “defending” Zakiya, which 
privileged individual choice (and thus consent) protected by the Constitution. EGM Secretary 
George Swan, in his own comments, recognized the legal indeterminacy of the case, where 
constitutional protection of the individual’s religious freedom contradicted shari‘a. However, he 
argued that it was constitutional law that should take precedence. “In the passage of a country 
from the mediaeval political conception to the modern democratic conception, which the 
Egyptians are now professing,” Swan suggested, “there will inevitably be difficulties, and that in 
the meeting of them it is precisely the Shariat which will always rise up in the path.” The shari‘a 
was an obstacle to be dismantled, not through its abrogation, “which is theoretically impossible,” 
but through “the quiet substitution of civil statutes for its canon laws on the part of the State, 
coupled with the staying of execution of such judgments as conflict with those civil statutes.”63 
Swan and the EGM toed a secularist line in embracing modern law and seeking to fold 
“religious” law into it, thus transforming religious law’s content—its conception of ethics.64  
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 Yet in its memorandum the EGM also tried to defend Zakiya’s conversion in terms of 
shari‘a in an effort to undermine the ruling. The EGM asserted that Abu Hanifa, the founder of 
the Hanafi branch of fiqh, taught that “a girl not having previously shown the ordinary signs of 
womanhood was to be declared [an] adult at the age of 17.” And Zakiya, as an adult (though her 
exact age at the time is unknown), was in charge of her own personhood with the full rights of an 
adult, and, by extension, could choose her religion.65 One writer (likely a missionary) who 
contributed an editorial on the issue to the Egyptian Gazette under the penname “Old Fashioned 
Liberal” added that, according to Article 499 of Egypt’s Muslim personal status code, if a female 
arrives at the age of adulthood and “is a virgin … and has both prudence and purity or is a non-
virgin to be trusted with herself none of her governors can take her to himself.”66 If this were not 
enough, the Qur’an states clearly, the memorandum went on, that “‘there shall be no compulsion 
in religion,’” and it was clear that Yunus was guilty of the “crudest and cruelest compulsion” 
toward his sister.67 To this liberal, compulsion—though not seduction—clearly violated Islamic 
law. 
 This reading of Islamic law is indicative of what Islamic law had generally come to mean 
not only to missionaries, but also to the British administrators who shaped Egyptian law and 
politics. On the one hand, Islamic law, similar to Canon law, belonged to a dark era that had been 
superseded by rational enlightenment and, more particularly, liberalism, with the autonomous 
individual at its heart. The liberty of the individual was the “mark of true liberalism; it indicates 
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the highest degree of civilization and the triumph of moral ideas.”68 On the other hand, Islamic 
law could not be completely dissolved, for it represented the true character of “Mohammedans,” 
a mark of colonial difference.69 And it was the shari‘a courts that were tasked with upholding 
that character. In part for this reason, Egypt’s (British) Office of the Judicial Advisor, made up of 
legal positivists rather than evangelists, could push back against the EGM after the mission had 
reached out to it for clarification, advising that “there is no doubt whatever that under the Sharia 
Law a girl of the age of 17 can be made to reside with the person who exercises paternal power 
over her.”70  
 Having ordered the execution of the shari‘a court’s judgment, parliament demanded that 
missionaries respect the Constitution and its protection of the “sanctity of religions.”71 On 30 
May Yunus accompanied Zakiya to Alexandria, where the police were instructed to ensure that 
“no harm was done to her.”72 The EGM, though discouraged by British authorities who feared 
public outcry and disturbances, pursued an appeal, but the initial ruling was eventually upheld.73 
Zakiya would remain in the custody of her family. 
The EGM missionaries felt bewildered by this outcome, but they knew one thing for 
certain: Zakiya’s case had inspired others in Shibin al-Qanatir to act against the mission. Central 
to this effort was a shadowy figure—a leitmotif in missionary discourse concerning Egypt’s 
antimissionary movement74— the “well-to-do” local merchant ‘Uthman Fakhir, who was 
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outraged by conversion cases in Egypt and nearby Palestine. According to George Swan, when 
Zakiya “was handed over to her younger brother Othman Fakhr openly showed his triumph and 
had a great celebration in his house.” Swan maintained that he had helped to “stir up bad 
feelings” through the press, which followed Zakiya’s case closely. And now Fakhir refused to 
rest “until he has made it [the hospital] close its doors.”75 He was part of an emerging movement 
outraged by conversion cases that would lead to the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood.76 
 In July 1928, as Zakiya’s case waited appeal, ‘Aziza Taha ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Hadi, 
a twenty-one-year-old woman who had spent four years working in the hospital in Shibin al-
Qanatir, apparently with her father’s consent, received notice that the shari‘a court had issued a 
judgment restoring her to his care. The qadi, possibly the same judge who was involved in 
Zakiya’s case, had determined that the hospital “is a morally dangerous place for a young girl.” 
About six months prior, ‘Aziza had been baptized—also with her father’s consent. She adopted 
the name Phoebe, under which she registered in the Egyptian Protestant community’s al-Majlis 
al-Milli (Millet Council). But now ‘Aziza’s father sought to remove her from the hospital, 
apparently at the prodding of ‘Uthman Fakhir, the “menace to public security.”77 The EGM, 
which oversaw the hospital, reacted by refusing to handover ‘Aziza to police authorities, and 
launched an appeal. As with the judgment in Zakiya’s case, this one had been carried out without 
prior notice to the young woman in question.78 The appeal was seen by some foreign legal 
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onlookers as a test case pitting the Constitution’s apparent protection of conversion against the 
shari‘a’s denial of it to Muslims.79 
 In the meantime, the missionaries considered trying to transfer the girl’s custody to the 
“relations of another young girl,” but, given that before her baptism ‘Aziza had been married, 
divorced, and finally remarried (to a convert), the involved legal obstacles seemed 
insurmountable. Instead, they attempted to meet with the high commissioner to explore steps for 
securing “the liberties of the Constitution” to converts.80 For their part, British authorities tried to 
“defend” ‘Aziza as well. Searching for a legal rationale for reversing the judgment, they sought 
and received several adjournments of the appeal. They had considered challenging the case on 
the grounds that the twenty-one-year-old had legitimately converted and, as an adult, was subject 
not to Muslim personal status law (and thus the shari‘a courts), but to that of the Egyptian 
Protestant community, which enjoyed state recognition since the nineteenth century. However, 
‘Aziza’s father had based his case in the shari‘a court on his daughter being a minor. Absent a 
birth certificate establishing her age, it was the father who had the advantage because any legal 
indeterminacy between religious courts meant deferral to the shari‘a courts. Another option that 
the British explored was to interpret Muslim personal status laws in a way that paternal custody 
(puissance paternelle) ceased at puberty or at latest when one is competent to handle property. 
But after the judicial advisor, who “very carefully” explored legal questions involved in the case, 
consulted Shaykh of al-Azhar al-Maraghi, he concluded that this argument would never stand in 
court.81 With all avenues blocked, the British agreed not to oppose the execution of the shari‘a 
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court’s judgment so long as arrangements were made for ‘Aziza to be placed in a government 
hospital or institution, “where she should have the best chance of being free from molestation or 
ill-treatment” by her family.82 In different ways, both the missionaries and British authorities had 
sought ‘Aziza’s freedom from coercion and pain, whether spiritual or physical, even as 
missionary attempts at seduction, often under the protective watch of British authorities, had 
been a cause of collective moral injury. 
 Another kind of pain was at work in late 1928, in a case that recalled the Zwemer affair. 
Rather than in Cairo, this case occurred in Isma‘iliyya where the Muslim Brotherhood was 
beginning to take form; but like the case in Cairo, it involved what the local community saw as 
the provocative distribution of missionary literature. As elsewhere, missionaries in Isma‘iliyya 
routinely distributed bibles and pamphlets. Lately, however, they had “started to attack the 
Mohammeden Religion openly and severely,” as Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, a judge in the 
Isma‘iliyya shari‘a court, pointed out. “They go about with pamphlets and books containing 
bitter criticism of the Moslem Faith,” he explained, “which no Mohammeden would tolerate.”83 
The sting of this bitter criticism was worsened by a recent incident involving sixteen-year-old 
Muhammad ‘Ali, who worked as a fireman with the Egyptian State Railways. For about a year, 
Muhammad had been considering conversion to Christianity, until it was arranged that he would 
be baptized publicly in the Church of Isma‘iliya.84 According to a complaint handed to the judge 
of the Isma‘iliyya shari‘a court, Muhammad had also fallen in love with a local girl, the daughter 
of an EGM preacher. The preacher was unwilling to allow him to marry his daughter unless he 
publicly embraced Christianity. The demand that the embrace be public, if true, was likely an 
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attempt to ensure that Muhammad’s conversion was genuine. With his baptism scheduled, 
Muhammad notified the Ismai‘iliyya government of his intention to convert, notification that 
was forwarded to the Ministry of Justice in Cairo.85  
As the conversion date approached, word spread and outrage grew, as did the anxiety of 
the local Isma‘iliyya government.86 In his complaint to the Shaykh of al-Azhar, the judge Ahmad 
Muhammad Shakir wrote that “they intended to celebrate the occasion in a manner which would 
have infuriated the peaceful Moslem population of Ismailia.”87 However, on the day of the 
conversion, Muhammad’s family “kept him in the house by force so the public baptism never 
took place.”88 According to the judge, Muslim notables and authorities had intervened.89 Though 
a public ceremony had been avoided, Muhammad was apparently baptized outside the city at a 
later date. Unlike Zakiya and ‘Aziza, this young man continued to live openly as a Christian, 
reflecting the different discursive, ideological, and material entanglements that Egyptian men 
and women experienced in their encounters with missionaries.90  
As with the other two cases, this affair involved and reproduced divergent visions of 
religious freedom. The missionaries advocated Muhammad’s “right” to change his religion based 
on the Constitution. Judge Ahmad Muhammad Shakir and the Shaykh of al-Azhar al-Maraghi 
felt differently. The judge emphasized not only the “indignation” and “infuriation” of local 
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Muslims at the notion of the public conversion, but also the missionaries’ “disregard of our 
feelings” and “attack on our religion and on the Koran.” The Shaykh of al-Azhar also 
complained of the attitude of the missionaries, which “enrages the masses and hurts their 
feelings.” Invoking the discourse of religious freedom directly, he argued that “it is not right, 
from the point of view of freedom of conviction, that persons who tempt simple-minded people 
and minors should be allowed to spread their teachings in a manner which offends the feelings of 
the public.”91 Freedom of religion meant freedom from the pain caused by seduction, which both 
the judge and the shaykh associated with coercion rather than consent. We now turn to how this 
notion of religious freedom was embedded within and expressed through a local ethical grammar 
around blasphemy.  
  
Attack and Injury  
The late 1920s and especially the early 1930s witnessed similar local–missionary encounters, 
largely in the Delta region, that expanded the debate over religious freedom. These cases also 
involved accusations of ta‘n (attack, here on Islam). Appearing in the Qur’an, ta‘n is one of 
several words in the Islamic textual tradition associated with blasphemy, including sabb, which 
also connotes injury.92 Without delving into that tradition, I would like to make two general 
observations. First, prior to the rise of the modern state, the role of legal proscriptions regarding 
blasphemy was less to maintain public order through the threat of punishment than to embody 
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the ethics of a community and maintain the common social good.93 In other words, Islamic 
jurisprudence regulating blasphemy, which was fluid and complex across time and space, should 
not be confused with blasphemy laws of the modern state—even one that defines itself as 
Islamic. Second, the language around blasphemy, such as the word ta‘n, though embedded 
within the Islamic textual tradition, was used widely in early twentieth-century Egypt (and 
elsewhere) to mean a serious accusation of attack on one’s religion. Thus, the Copts who 
organized a congress in 1911 to demand rights based on a Coptic identity, complained of an 
“attack [ta‘n] on the Christian religion and its people [i.e., Copts]” by certain Muslim-run 
periodicals.94  
By the mid-1920s, it was increasingly the state that made this charge. However, the state 
linked ta‘n not to violation of the common social good but to violation of the public order, thus 
transforming it from a moral offense into a criminal one punishable by law. The state’s target 
tended to be another threat to what had recently become Egypt’s state religion, namely positivist 
intellectuals. In 1926, with the encouragement of the palace, groups of ‘ulama’ associated with 
al-Azhar, an institution long in the process of incorporation under the state umbrella, famously 
charged the jurist ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq and the intellectual Taha Husayn with blasphemy for their 
respective, recent publications. In his book Fi al-Shi‘r al-Jahili (On Pre-Islamic Poetry), for 
example, Husayn had questioned the authenticity of much of the pre-Islamic poetry from which 
the early Islamic tradition had differentiated itself, arguing it was fabricated by Muslims at a later 
																																																						
93 See, e.g., Intisar Rabb, “Society and Propriety: The Cultural Construction of Defamation and 
Blasphemy as Crimes in Islamic Law,” in Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A Diachronic 
Perspective on Takfir, ed. Camilia Adang, Hassan Ansar, Maribel Fierro, and Sabine Schmidtke 
(Leiden: Brill, 2016). 
94 Habib, Tidhkar al-Mu’tamar, 257. In Judaism, like in Islam, blasphemy could be associated 
with pain, offense, and even mourning. For an example, see Mishnah Sanhedrin 56a.  
	 51	
date, and analyzed the Qur’an as a literary work. In response, the ‘ulama’ claimed he had 
“seriously denied … the Qur’an, and attacked [ta‘na] the Prophet … and his noble lineage, and 
in so doing incited the fury of the pious [al-mutadayyinin] and perpetrated what violates public 
order and invites people to chaos [al-fawda], and it was requested to take successful effective 
legal means against this attack on the official state religion.”95 Husayn’s alleged attempt to 
seduce the pious had caused injury and chaos that threatened public order and demanded 
criminal punishment. 
Before long parliament chimed in. It debated not whether Husayn was in the wrong but 
rather the extent of parliament’s ability to punish him. The main advocate for punitive action was 
the ‘alim Mustafa al-Qayati, who put into question Husayn’s loyalty to the nation. Noting that 
Husayn, as dean of Cairo University, received his salary from the public treasury, al-Qayati 
exclaimed that “no one would have ever thought that the beneficence of the nation to him would 
be met with this recalcitrance to the extent that he struck it [the nation] with a blow to the 
religion of Islam, the religion of the majority.”96 Worse still, Husayn was disseminating his  
 
denial of the truth of the Qur’an, ascription to the prophet … of deceptiveness, and 
serious fabrication of history [among students]. I want to say to folks who … claim that 
… we cannot limit the freedom of people to their opinions—I say to them that we are not 
limiting their freedom to their convictions but we are limiting opinions dictated to our 
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children and disseminated among members of the nation … [which are] inviting error and 
iniquity.97  
 
In other words, he took issue less with Husayn’s internal convictions than with the effects of 
their public expression, a position consistent with stipulations around disbelief in the classical 
law. Al-Qayati elaborated: 
 
If I did not spend the night among you enumerating the statements contained in this book 
and recalling the heinous words that indicate nothing but disbelief, it is because I do not 
want to inject sadness into your hearts and because I do not wish to see your tears flow in 
anguish over your religion and the honor of your country.  
 
We are not talking about anything here but the motive to uphold religion, and that is 
something important not to Muslims alone, for the honor of all of the religions should be 
upheld.98    
 
Moral injury expressed in parliament became an injunction for the state to define religion and 
limit speech seen to undermine it. Husayn was eventually stripped of his position as dean (he 
was later reinstated) and his book was censored. However, the chief prosecutor in his case, 
Muhammad Nur, eventually acquitted him of all charges. In a long decision in which he 
challenged substantively many of Husayn’s claims, Nur focused on intent rather than social 
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consequences, concluding that though Husayn’s methods and ideas were erroneous and 
misguided, his motive was not to attack Islam or divert Muslims to false ideas but rather to 
pursue scientific research.99 Nevertheless, in subsequent such cases, including the well-known 
1995 trial of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, the state would draw on al-Qayati’s logic in determining 
apostasy, folding this Islamic notion into the regulation of public order.100  
Despite the many accusations of ta‘n during the 1920s and early 1930s, and in part due to 
their accumulation, bans on seduction and offense to religion entered into modern law only in 
1937, when the Egyptian state expanded its sovereignty. As we will see, the Montreux 
Convention effectively proscribed missionary seduction and advanced efforts to prevent 
seduction between Egyptian Christians and Muslims. Meanwhile, translating offense to religion 
into the neutral language of modern law, Articles 160 and 161 of the 1937 penal code authorized 
the state to determine what constituted offense to religion, partly by discerning “the intended 
meaning” of the holy books, and to regulate it as part of preserving the public order.  
 
Sovereignty, the League of Nations, Sectarianism 
The Anglo-Egyptian negotiations of 1929–30 inaugurated the specter of complete Egyptian 
sovereignty. Though they failed in the short term, negotiations would eventually resume and lead 
to the political settlement of 1936 that increased Egyptian sovereignty.101 The International 
Mission Council, originally formed in 1921 to coordinate the efforts of Protestant missions in 
Egypt, saw the negotiations as an opportunity to achieve its long-standing objective of codifying 
																																																						
99 See Shalabi, Muhakimat Taha Husayn.  
100 Asad, “Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism,” 40–43. 
101 For the negotiations of 1929-30, see, Muhammad Mahmud, Exposé des négociations de 1929 
qui ont abouti au projet de traite anglo–égyptien (Cairo: Government Press, 1929). 
	 54	
religious freedom, as the missionaries understood it, in Egyptian law.102 As the Council’s 
president, missionary Charles R. Watson, concisely put it, “religious liberty to become effective 
must be codified.”103 At the onset of negotiations, the council sought to persuade the Office of 
the High Commission that if the British were to cede sovereignty, particularly protection of 
minorities (one of the four reserved points in Britain’s 1922 unilateral declaration of Egyptian 
independence), the Egyptian government should make a legally binding guarantee to protect 
religious freedom (the aspect of minority protection of most interest to these missionaries).104 
When it became clear in late 1930 that negotiations would falter, the International Mission 
Council, understanding that these negotiations would serve as the basis for future talks, requested 
that British negotiators, who had already formally acknowledged that protection of minorities 
would in future be the exclusive concern of Egypt (as a sovereign state), put two points on the 
record: first, that Britain was ceding protection of minorities on the assumption that Egypt will 
ensure full religious freedom; and second, that the Egyptian government should provide “in its 
codified laws” a more “exact and effective safeguarding of religious liberty in the fullest sense of 
the word.” The “fullest sense” involved state protection of a converted Christian’s right to 
inheritance, state recognition of conversion from Islam, and the ability of Muslim women to “act 
as an independent and free personality in regard to her religious attachments.”105  
 The council was not alone in its demand for codification and its plan for realizing it. In a 
widely cited letter to The Times of London, British lawyer and politician Robert Cecil, who had 
been a major figure in the formation of the League of Nations, pointed to the discrepancy 
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between Egypt’s protection of “freedom of conscience” in the Constitution, “which all civilized 
States today regard as essential,” and how this guarantee was interpreted in Egypt. Like the 
missionaries, Robert Cecil found it particularly anomalous that religious freedom in Egypt did 
not protect conversion from Islam. “I understand,” he wrote, “that, by the law prevailing in 
Egypt at the present time, an unmarried [Muslim] woman who is converted to Christianity may 
be forcibly taken from any position she holds and restored to her Moslem parents, who may then 
practically insist on a Moslem husband for her.” Cecil contrasted this obstruction of agency with 
common practice in “Western nations.” “Is it too much to suggest to Egyptians,” he asked, “that 
political freedom does not accord with the denial of the liberty to individuals in so vital a matter 
as religion, and to hope that the Egyptian Government will, before Egypt takes her place in the 
community of nations, remove this archaic blot from her legal system?”106 Egypt’s attainment of 
sovereignty and acceptance into the community of nations (and, as I will show, the League of 
Nations) was to be partly contingent on its acceptance of a certain normative arrangement of 
public law and religion that was seen to threaten its majority religion and target in particular 
young Muslim women. 
 As we have seen, the International Mission Council and Robert Cecil were correct to 
suggest that Egyptians generally understood religious freedom differently than they did. Amid 
the conversion crises that rocked Egypt in the early 1930s, two representatives of the 
International Mission Council sat down with Egypt’s prime minister Isma‘il Sidqi, who was 
accompanied by Coptic politicians Tawfiq Duss and Kamil Bulus, to convince him that press 
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accusations directed at missionaries were unfounded. Isma‘il Sidqi reportedly defended 
Egyptians for their outrage, pointing out that Egypt defined Islam as the state religion, was home 
to the leading Islamic institution of learning in al-Azhar, and for many centuries played a leading 
role in the Islamic world. “While evangelistic work might be in place in primitive countries like 
Tanganyika [now part of Tanzania],” he argued, “it was not suitable in a Moslem country like 
Egypt, especially as Egypt is firmly attached to a religion of its own, and is civilized.” Sidqi went 
on to differentiate between two conceptions of religious freedom: the right to attack another’s 
religion, which is unjustifiable, and the right of individuals to maintain and practice their own 
religion, which was “the true conception of religious liberty.” Whereas the missionaries extended 
this latter right to include the ability to change religion, Sidqi contended that such conversions in 
Egypt were invalid because they occurred only among the “lowest classes” and as a result of 
“ulterior motives.”107 He thus combined the widely shared feeling that Islam was under attack, 
which he felt to be unjustified given Egypt’s place within a colonial civilizational hierarchy, with 
the challenge that missionary conversions of souls were based on coercion not consent. 
 But many felt that the conversion controversies of the early 1930s demanded more from 
the state than verbal critique. Egyptians already widely viewed the state to be sluggish in its 
response.108 To spur action, the League for the Defense of Islam (al-Lajna li-l-Difa‘a ‘an al-
Islam), in which Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna participated, was formed in June 
1933. The league’s founding document does not mention religious freedom, but its invocation of 
“defense” in its title, its desire to protect the “weak” and the young, and its stated purpose to 
“appeal to the government to prevent missionary attacks on Islam” were the products of a decade 
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of the politics of religious freedom.109 Unable to ban missionaries from Egypt, in 1934 the 
Egyptian government, and particularly Interior Minister Mahmud Fahmy al-Nuqrashi, pursued 
legislative action by producing a “Draft Law on Religious Propaganda.” The proposed law—
never itself implemented—would have banned “religious proselytization,” including the 
distribution of pamphlets and books and the hanging of posters, in “institutions assigned to 
humane purposes” if such institutions accepted persons of different “creeds or religion,” and in 
the homes, places, and institutions of people belonging to a different creed or religion. 
Propaganda of this kind would henceforth require Interior Ministry permission. Moreover, 
educational institutions in which there were students of various creeds and religions had to 
guarantee “freedom and respect of faith” to all. In part, this meant that in schools with religion in 
their curriculum, religious instruction could only be given to students in their own religion. “It is 
forbidden to cause students to take part in prayers or sermons contrary to their creed,” the draft 
law went on, “and it is likewise forbidden to distribute to them books or pamphlets containing 
religious controversies or any criticism of their religion or creed.” The draft law also forbade 
inducing with money, service, or “any other means of trickery,” including bribery and threats, a 
person to attend a prayer or sermon contrary to that person’s creed or religion or to induce one to 
renounce his faith. Contravention of the law could result in imprisonment.110  
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 In 1936 Anglo–Egyptian negotiations resumed. With Egyptian sovereignty seeming 
inevitable, Protestant missionary groups increasingly understood that Britain’s negotiating 
leverage was relatively weak and that it would be unable to gain the kinds of concessions they 
had sought earlier. The British administration was as unwilling as ever to entertain missionary 
policy schemes, which seemed unreasonable and potentially costly to its other military and 
geopolitical goals.111 The missionaries thus adapted in several ways. First, they began to 
emphasize minority rights and the supposedly worsening situation of Egyptian Christians (no 
longer just converts) since the conversion crises of 1932–33; second, and relatedly, they called 
for making Egypt’s entrance into the League of Nations contingent on it declaring on the 
international stage that it guaranteed protection of minorities and religious freedom. In a meeting 
with the British high commissioner Miles Lampson, Charles Watson of the Inter-Mission 
Council (and the American University in Cairo) advocated this strategy, citing the Mandate 
states of Palestine and Iraq as precedents. The high commissioner was “increasingly struck” by 
the possibilities these presented.112 While Egypt was not a Mandate, “under the four reserved 
points the United Kingdom arrogated to itself … an obligation to see to the protection of 
religious minorities in Egypt.” In doing so, Lampson suggested, “his Majesty’s Government 
have … virtually constituted themselves a mandatory.”113 
 But what may have been possible only a year earlier seemed in vain in spring of 1936, by 
which time Italy had invaded Ethiopia and Germany had occupied the Rhineland. British 
administrators and the Inter-Mission Council both conceded this point. “The countries which 
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have [minority] treaty obligations … are becoming increasingly restless,” said Lampson. “The 
policy of imposing permanent servitudes on sovereign states is not proving conspicuously 
successful,” he went on, “and it seems wise … to avoid the creation of new ones [treaty 
obligations].”114 Some in the Inter-Mission Council wondered, with good reason it turns out, 
whether the League of Nations would even continue to exist.115 This skepticism notwithstanding, 
the British opted to warn then-prime minister Mustafa al-Nahas that the issues of religious 
freedom and equality were likely to be raised when Egypt was elected into the League of Nations 
in Geneva. They hoped this warning would prompt him to guarantee publicly to uphold these 
principles, thus providing “a locus standi for the Council to take the matter up” should Egypt fall 
short of its promise.116 At the request of the high commissioner, the Inter-Missionary Council 
even drew up a draft statement declaring, among other things, that “the citizen will enjoy 
complete freedom in the choice of his religious affiliation.”117 
 On 26 May 1937, Egypt became the last state to join the League of Nations. Although al-
Nahas initially agreed to make a variation of the statement desired by the British administration 
and the Inter-Mission Council at Egypt’s League election,118 reportedly at the last minute he 
chose to reverse course because, as missionary William Paton explained it, “any such statement 
on their part would mean that they admitted the right of other bodies to enquire into what was for 
them a matter of purely domestic policy.” Moreover, al-Nahas felt that Egypt already upheld 
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religious freedom, rendering the statement unnecessary.119 With the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 
already signed (1936) and the League of Nations increasingly powerless, al-Nahas likely felt 
little pressure to cow to Britain’s or the missionaries’ demands. 
 Quite the contrary, al-Nahas was positioned to strike a fatal blow to missionary 
institutions in the country and to concretize in law Egyptian conceptions of religious freedom. 
Heather Sharkey has suggested that the Montreux Convention of 1937, which promised to phase 
out the Capitulations over twelve years, was the death knell of missionizing in Egypt because it 
removed tax exemptions and placed obstacles in the path of missionizing. Just prior to the 
agreement, in January 1937, the liberal jurist ‘Abd al-Hamid Badawi made an exchange of notes 
(i.e., an agreement) with the British Foreign Office’s legal advisor, William Eric Beckett, 
concerning the future of missionary institutions, which was the basis for an additional exchange 
of notes at Montreaux. The two agreed that missionary institutions would be permitted to 
continue functioning in Egypt, subject to certain conditions, but that henceforth proselytization 
would be illegal. Several months later, an Egyptian delegation led by al-Nahas signed, as part of 
the Montreux Convention, multilateral agreements with several countries, including Britain, 
France, and the United States, stipulating that foreign “charitable institutions” existing in Egypt 
on the date of signing would be free to continue their activities subject to one qualification: 
“within the limits of the customs recognised in Egypt regarding religions other than the state 
religion, freedom of worship shall continue to be assured to all religious institutions … on 
condition that there is no offence against public order or morale.”120 Interestingly, it was the 
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Coptic delegate Makram ‘Ubayd who was said to have most vociferously rejected any statement 
regarding minorities or religious freedom (as he had during the debates over the 1923 
Constitution) and any notion that Egypt would allow proselytization.121 The British tended to 
dismiss his position as a way for him (and the Copts) to avoid appearing as if seeking foreign 
protection. Even if true, it is likely that he objected to this missionary practice, which was critical 
to the terms of the Montreux Convention.  
 The missionaries from the International Mission Council may have been caught off guard 
by this series of events in 1937. Though they tried to undermine the Egyptian position—at one 
point arguing that they and the Egyptians had very different understandings of what constituted 
proselytism122—their protests were directed at a British administration increasingly guided by 
realpolitik and the prospect of dismantlement, even as it itself may not have realized it had 
agreed to render proselytization illegal. “We seem at Montreux to have accepted the position … 
that strictly speaking all proselytism in Egypt was illegal,” one legal advisor stated in response to 
a missionary complaint to the high commissioner. He concluded that “it is difficult to see what 
more precise instructions could be given on this point.”123  
 
Conclusion 
The banning of proselytism through the Montreux Convention, and of attacks on and offense to 
religion in the 1937 penal code, established in law the state’s reading of religious freedom. As 
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positivist modern law expanded at the expense of shari‘a, local notions of moral injury and 
offense were channeled toward a state effort to maintain public order from the top-down. The 
late 1930s and 1940s saw a slew of draft laws for expanding the state’s co-optation of these 
sentiments. Only two years after the Montreux Convention, in 1939, the Egyptian senate (Majlis 
al-Shuyukh) considered a new law drafted by ‘Abd al-Khalik Salim regulating “propaganda 
susceptible to influence the religious conviction of adolescents.” The draft law was aimed at 
“certain institutions having humanitarian and charitable appearances” that seek to divert the 
religious convictions of children and adolescents. Justified with reference to Article 13 of the 
Constitution, the law was deemed necessary for protecting not only Egypt’s youth, but also 
public order.124 
Though this draft law was shelved, the Egyptian senate discussed a new version in 1940 
whose first article stipulated that religious proselytizing was permissible only in places intended 
for such proselytizing (e.g., a church). The second clause proscribed anyone from proselytizing 
to anyone other than the adherents of one’s own religion, including in schools and even with the 
permission of a student’s guardians.125 The International Mission Council, feeling threatened, 
proposed a “conscience clause” that would exempt students whose Muslim parents had chosen to 
allow their children to receive Christian instruction. Such a clause was said to have worked in 
India.126 But before this proposition went very far, the new draft law, like its predecessor, was 
blocked. As parliamentarian Tawfiq Duss pointed out, it would have rendered illegal the call to 
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prayer, not to mention the common practice of Muslims entering churches to visit or congratulate 
Christian friends. The law, he felt, would contribute to sectarianism (al-ta‘assub al-dini).127  
Despite Duss’ reservations, eight years later, in 1948, law number 38, combining 
elements of each draft law, was passed and enacted, contributing to sectarianism in Egypt. Thus, 
in a sense, the trail to the charge of izdira’ al-din discussed at the start of this chapter can be 
traced back to the conditions that gave rise to the 1937 penal code and the article used to convict 
Hakim Wasif for distributing La fleur de la forêt. It was this article that in 1982, soon after the 
assassination of Anwar al-Sadat by an Islamist militant, was slightly revised to introduce the 
notion of izdara’ al-din that further expanded the Egyptian state’s ability to regulate religion 
under the rubric of public order. In the final analysis, Egypt cannot be said to have a deficit of 
religious freedom as much as a particular trajectory of it, forged through a contingent process 
involving missionaries, local communities, and the Egyptian state under the shadow of colonial 
rule. As in other postcolonial contexts, this concept’s entangled history has helped to define and 
delimit Egypt’s ethical and religious imaginaries. We will now turn from religious freedom, a 
tactic of public order, to a related concept of expectation with its own particular genealogy—
public interest. 
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In 1890, an obscure Egyptian Christian named Habib Faris introduced his newly published 
translation of a European text titled Les crimes rituels des Juifs by “affirming publicly” that “the 
single purpose of the appearance of this book is to bring to light truths before the eyes not of a 
nation or government only but of all without respect to national or doctrinal difference or to class 
or rank distinction.” Faris had provided the first Arabic translation of this French work, which 
only recently had been published in France. The original work gathered in encyclopedic fashion 
the incidents of blood libel (al-dhaba’ih al-bashariyya, or tuhmat al-dam) claimed to have 
occurred in both East and West. These included the recent alleged slaughter in Damascus of a 
six-year-old boy named Henry ‘Abd al-Nur at the hands of a group of Jews said to have drained 
his blood to mix it in the dough they used to make ritual bread (matzoh) for the Jewish holiday of 
Passover. As Faris explained, “we clutched our hands on the only copy of this book in the world 
and decided to translate it into the Arabic language.” What called him to this task, he pointed out, 
was less an ancient form of fanaticism toward Jews, which many associated with the blood libel 
accusation, than the spirit of reform: “if there was discovered among the religious groups 
[tawa’if] and nations [umam] residing in the Ottoman Empire an evil commanding the 
elimination or incineration of [justice], in this glorious age we must bring it to light in any way 
possible.”1 In Faris’ view, it was Jews—or some of them anyhow—who had refused to leave old 
habits behind. 
Not coincidentally, about a decade later, in 1902, an actual blood libel accusation 
occurred in Port Said, Egypt. The blood libel charge had a long history in Christian Europe, but 
this incident was the most recent in a string of such charges in the Ottoman Empire that began 
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only in the early nineteenth century. The accused, a twenty-six-year-old Jewish man named 
Hayyim Daud Kahana, was convicted in court and then acquitted in appeal, largely thanks to the 
skilled defense of his lawyer, the Egyptian Jewish reformer and intellectual Murad Farag. During 
and after the affair, Farag countered the charge against Kahana and ridiculed the blood libel in 
the press. Like Faris, he sought to reach a broad audience, and like Faris he made his case 
invoking a new age of enlightenment and justice. But Farag offered a vision of the common good 
that extended well beyond the boundaries of his community, encompassing even Kahana’s 
accusers: “we have bias toward nothing but the truth, so [bias] is not stamped in our hearts by 
religion and our vision is not clouded just to defend Jews [bani isra’il]—our … community gains 
no benefit without humanity, zeal for the truth, and rejection of falsehood, slander, and 
lethargy.”2 
This chapter deals with the emergence of the secular concept of public interest in colonial 
Egypt and its displacement of prior conceptions of the public good. Recent literature in 
anthropology and history of the Middle East has described the translation and actualization of the 
related, though significantly different, concept of public order within religious law in the colonial 
Middle East, particularly Egypt, beginning in the late nineteenth century.3 Public order has 
worked along the fissure between the public and the private, authorizing the state to intervene in 
the seemingly sacrosanct realm of the private when and wherever it deems such intervention 
necessary. One outcome was and continues to be the state’s increasing ability to regulate religion 
especially when particular practices seem to transgress the perceived sensibilities of an assumed 
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majority. As Hussein Agrama has observed, though “public order … is to apply equally to all 
citizens … it expresses the sentiments and the values of the majority, even if they are rooted in 
religion, so long as they have become integral to the cohesiveness of society.”4 Premised on a 
unified national community whose features are defined in law, public order regulates and 
displaces older forms and structures to facilitate governance in the nation-state. 
By contrast, public interest, a vague secular legal concept that manifests differently 
across liberal states but often authorizes judicial or executive power to implement a “common 
good” when it conflicts with other laws, entered into Egypt’s public law in such a way that it was 
intimately linked to issues of national security. This chapter explores public interest through a 
focus on Egyptian Jews, who represent a logical case for two reasons. First, during the colonial 
period Jews were the second largest non-Muslim religious group in Egypt numerically after the 
Copts. And unlike the latter group, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, were included 
among the nation’s elements (‘anasir), Egypt’s Jews were eventually excluded during the 
1940s–1960s under the guise of national security. Second and relatedly, by the time Egypt 
approached sovereignty in 1936–37, and especially over the ensuing three decades, Jews were 
increasingly portrayed and identified as one of the main threats to public interest due to the 
perception that their loyalty was to foreign capital and foreign powers rather than the Egyptian 
nation.  
To pursue this enquiry, the chapter traces in particular the translation of a set of texts and 
related accusations often bundled together under the umbrella of anti-Semitism. The texts 
include translations of western European works on the blood libel, which represent the tail end of 
a very old form of anti-Jewish Christian polemics, and the paradigmatic anti-Semitic text, the 
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fabricated The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The appearance of these works in Egypt and in 
the Arabic language for the first time coincided with and inspired, in the former case, a string of 
public accusations between the 1870s and 1920s that Jews murdered Christians for ritual 
purposes, and in the latter case, the notion that the Jews sought to take over the main organs of 
state to channel them toward their own interest (maslaha) and achieve world domination. Blood 
libel accusations, almost unheard of in the Ottoman world prior to imperial intervention and the 
expansion of Christian mission in the nineteenth-century, and almost exclusively leveled by 
authors identifying as Christian, contended that Jews (al-ta’ifa al-isra’iliyya), allegedly guided 
by Talmudic prescriptions, sought to drink Christian blood or to siphon it to make Passover 
matzoh. Though in Europe this charge was often leveled in terms of Christian doctrine especially 
in regard to Jews and Judaism, in fin-de-siècle Egypt it was lodged on the profane level in the 
name of enlightenment, truth, and progress. The charge was born of suspicion, but in its textual 
manifestation it tended to probe rather than state definitively, and did not impute essential 
characteristics as it did in Europe. In addition to its consequences for Jewish individuals, who 
could be imprisoned or worse, and for Jewish communities, the blood libel accusation often led 
to a breakdown of communal relations and the actual spilling of blood.  
Given their grave consequences, blood libel accusations attracted scrutiny and ultimately 
scorn by some in Egypt. I focus on the efforts of the Jewish reformer Murad Farag to counter 
them in both the courtroom and the press. Standing within his Jewish tradition, Farag dismantled 
the logic of the blood libel by explaining Judaism and expounding moral Jewish subjecthood.5 
As a modern lawyer, he drew on secular logic and the cultivation of empathy to successfully 
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defend an accused co-religionist in the National Courts, where he encountered like minds. And 
as a translator of modern legal knowledge, he presented a vision of public interest (al-maslaha 
al-‘amma) marked by inclusiveness and sincerity (ikhlas). His efforts on all these fronts 
coincided closely with the reform projects of many of his Jewish and non-Jewish peers, some of 
whom addressed the ritual murder charge directly. Yet I show how their intersecting vision of 
public interest, characterized by the cultivation of good morals through embodied practices, was 
jettisoned by the implementation of secular public interest beginning in 1904. This latter project 
sought to prevent mass violence and shedding of blood, but, through the logic of national 
security, helped to render the local Jew (al-isra’ili) an undifferentiated universal Jew (al-yahudi) 
whose interests were deemed suspicious and threatening to the national order. In conjunction 
with the expansion of the Zionist project in Palestine, this Jew, gendered male, could be viewed 
as a disease that was corrupting the national body and must be excluded. I use a translation of 
The Protocols into Arabic from the late liberal period, when Arab nationalism was on the rise, to 
illustrate the paradoxical operation of public interest and how it reconfigures modes of 
identification, with Jews coming to be defined in essentialist terms. Although taking us 
somewhat beyond the dissertation’s period of study, the work well encapsulates the distinction 
between the common social good as a bottom-up cultivation of the moral community and secular 
public interest as a top-down conception that is suspicious of the private and regulates it through 
law.  
Thus, in addressing the introduction of public interest in Egypt, this chapter also 
addresses to some extent the contested issue of anti-Semitism in the Arab world. Broadly 
speaking, this subject has been discussed in one of two ways. The first has understood anti-
Semitism as primordial to traditions of Islam, often channeling it toward a polemical defense of 
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Zionism and Israel.6 The second has viewed it as a modern European phenomenon that is 
transplanted to the Ottoman world and the Middle East.7 Though this chapter takes the latter 
perspective, it also contends that in both strands of literature anti-Semitism is presumed a stable 
universal concept that stands outside of history, precipitating a Kantian categorical imperative. In 
other words, anti-Semitism in Europe is anti-Semitism in the Middle East is anti-Semitism 
anywhere, demanding in all cases an equal moral response. Assuming a distinction between anti-
Judaism and anti-Semitism, this chapter analyzes these concepts as objects of translation, similar 
to public interest and the other concepts that are the focus of this dissertation.8 My intention is 
not to dilute the seriousness of the forms of anti-Semitism we will encounter, for they had severe 
consequences, but rather to suggest that they are indelibly shaped by the contexts in which they 
accumulated meaning. If the emergence of anti-Semitism in Europe was inseparable from the 
rise of the nation-state, in the Middle East it was also inseparable from both colonial 
intervention, which enabled certain materialities of its translation, missionary discourse, as well 
as Zionist and Israeli politics.     
																																																						
6 See, for example, Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel, trans. Misha Louvish 
(Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1974 [1972]; Bernard Lewis, Semites and Anti-Semites: An 
Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999 [1986]); and, 
most recently, Jeffrey Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (New Haven, CN: Yale 
University Press, 2009).  
7 This group includes much of the voluminous historical literature on Jews in the Middle East. 
For a general study, see Norman Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times 
(Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1991). On Egypt, see, for example, Gudrun 
Krämer, The Jews in Modern Egypt, 1914–1952 (London: I.B.Tauris, 1989); and Joel Beinin, 
The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics, and the Formation of a Modern Diaspora 
(Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 1998). 
8 I define anti-Judaism here as hatred of Jews premised on religious difference, though often 
involving factors other than religion, and anti-Semitism as a secular ideology that, inseparable 
from the emergence of the nation-state, had no precedent prior to the 1870s. By adopting a 
distinction between them, I do not intend to trivialize anti-Judaism or its consequences. For more 
on this distinction, see, among many others, Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1973 [1951]), vi–xvi. 
	 71	
 
Translating the Blood Libel  
Habib Faris’ choice to translate an anti-Semitic French text into Arabic was perhaps not as 
serendipitous as he suggests. His recognition of the book and interest in it were likely 
conditioned by news he had recently heard of the blood libel accusation in Damascus. Even 
before he began curiously flipping through the pages of Les crimes rituels des Juifs, he had likely 
known that the 1890 affair was only the latest such case to have occurred within his Ottoman 
scale. The most well known of these is what has come to be known as the Damascus Affair of 
1840. In February of that year, the monks of a Capuchin monastery in Damascus accused local 
Jews of kidnapping and murdering their friar Father Thomas, an Italian who had long lived in the 
city, and his local aid Ibrahim ‘Ammara when the pair went missing. According to the monks, 
the Jews had killed the father in order to siphon his blood for use in the making of matzoh. The 
French consul Ratti-Menton led a joint investigation with the Ottoman governor-general Sharif 
Badi‘a that, through the forced “confession” of a local Jewish barber, produced a group of 
unsuspecting Jewish culprits. Though their fate of imprisonment and in a few cases death had 
already been decided, the discovery of bones in a sewer in the Jewish quarter of Damascus that 
the monks believed to belong to the friar, and then of more bones thought to belong to the aid, 
did not help their cause, even as a local Italian doctor who conducted a forensic examination 
refused to identify the bones as human. Ultimately, however, those accused who had survived 
imprisonment and torture were released (without formal exoneration), in part through the 
intervention of prominent British and French Jewish figures such as the banker and 
philanthropist Moses Montefiore and the lawyer and statesman Adolphe Crémieux. Seeing in the 
affair the haunting specter of a medieval European past, they traveled as a delegation to Egypt to 
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plead with its viceroy Mehmet Ali to transfer the investigation to Alexandria or to the 
jurisdiction of European judges.9 When Mehmet Ali agreed only to free the accused without an 
acknowledgement of innocence, the delegation embarked for Istanbul to request of 
Sultan Abdülmecid I a firman declaring blood libels spurious and banning them as a basis of 
accusations. This he did shortly thereafter through the Tanzimat rubric of protection, though the 
firman did not prevent the accusation from resurfacing.10 
In what is often considered the most authoritative historical account of the affair, 
Jonathan Frankel highlights its consequences for late nineteenth-century European and Jewish 
politics. On the one hand, the incident revealed the persistence of anti-Jewish sentiment in two of 
Europe’s most liberal states, Britain and France, where belief in the veracity of the accusation 
was widespread. It was Klemens von Metternich of Austria and Nicholas I of Russia rather than 
their Western European counterparts who expressed doubt that Jews in Damascus had a role in 
the disappearance of the father and his aid. On the other hand, Frankel sees the affair, 
particularly the intervention of Montefiore and Cremieux, as precipitating Jewish cross-
communal connectivity and solidarity that, in turn, made possible the Alliance Israélite 
Universelle (AIU) and, later, perhaps even Zionism.11  
What Frankel does not address is the consequences of the affair for Damascus, Egypt, or 
the Ottoman Empire generally. One way to view this incident is as an act of translation, with 
European Christian anti-Judaism being encoded into local intercommunal politics and 
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vernaculars at a time when these were being reconfigured along modern lines. It was Western 
European Catholic monks who launched the accusation against Damascus’ Jews, stoking fear of 
Jews throughout a city that was already experiencing heightened intercommunal rivalry due to 
the Egyptian occupation and the prospect of religious equality’s implementation throughout the 
empire. It was also the Catholics who, in response to the investigation, unshelved a text by the 
eighteenth-century canonist of the Franciscan Order Lucius Ferraris titled La prompta 
bibliotheca, which described Jews’ supposed murderous hatred of Christians, and shared it with 
the French consul in Damascus. According to the Austrian consul Merlato, a witness to the 
events in Damascus, the French consul in turn “made public an Arabic translation of some 
execrable doctrines imputed to the Jews and drawn from a Latin book, entitled Prompta 
Bibliotheca,” which was “furnished through the zeal of our Christian missionaries of the Holy 
Land.”12 A copy of the text, perhaps the first translation of what might be called the “blood libel 
genre” into a language of the empire, was also forwarded to Syria’s Egyptian governor Ibrahim 
Pasha.13  
The Damascus Affair was in many respects a local, small-scale event, but one that 
attracted a global audience. Occurring about one year after the announcement of the Gülhane 
Hatt-ı Şerif (Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber, 1839), and almost simultaneous to another 
blood libel accusation directed at Jews in Rhodes, it produced a sense of crisis in a moment of 
expectation in the Ottoman Empire and in Western Europe—and in both over the dismantling of 
religious communities and the binding of subjects to the sovereign state as equals. Damascus and 
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Rhodes produced an explanatory logic that, due to the attention they received in the new age of 
print, was quickly adopted elsewhere.  
The first ritual murder accusation to occur in Egypt happened roughly three decades after 
Father Thomas’ death. In 1870, an elderly Jew was arrested in Alexandria and rumors spread, 
particularly within the Maltese community, that he had intended to kill a young Christian boy 
and use his blood to make matzoh. In response, the Jewish community appealed to the then 
British consul-general.14 This was followed by another accusation in Damanhur in 1878 
involving an Italian child, and then yet another in Alexandria in 1881 involving a young Greek 
boy, both activating local police, state authorities, and foreign consulates.15 In 1882, a “Greek” 
woman in Port Said witnessed her daughter wander into the home of an “Ottoman Jewish 
family” (i.e., Ottoman subjects), and the door shut behind her. The mother notified passers-by 
and riots broke out among “Greeks and Arabs.” The father of the house, an elderly man, was 
allegedly dragged from his home and trampled to death. Sixty Jews in Port Said, who were 
“citizens of various countries,” signed a petition addressed to Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi and British 
Consul-General Evelyn Baring in which they demanded, among other things, that the consul-
general ensure those responsible be punished.16 And, in 1902, a Greek family in Port Said 
accused Hayyim Kahana of the attempted kidnapping and ritual murder of a young daughter in 
their household. In contrast to the prior cases, however, the Jewish community involved in this 
one appealed not to Baring, who was still Egypt’s consul-general, but to an emerging star of 
Egypt’s legal profession, Murad Farag. The case conveys how by the turn of the twentieth 
																																																						
14 The event was described by British officials in Egypt. Reprinted in Jacob Landau, Middle 
Eastern Themes: Papers in History and Politics, 1st ed. (Oxon: Routledge, 1973), 105.  
15 On these cases, see Archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (hereafter AIU), Egypte I C 
o1; and AIU Egypte I C 03. 
16 Landau, Middle Eastern Themes, 105.  
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century many Jews had been absorbed into Egypt’s nascent National Courts and, by extension, 
into Egypt as a polity in formation under colonial rule.17 The ritual murder case, rather than 
sunder Jews from Egypt, was part of the process of binding them to the colonial state. And 
Murad Farag, in his role as a producer and disseminator of legal knowledge and an employee of 
the courts, was critical to this process. 
 
Murad Farag and Colonial Law 
Born in Egypt in 1866, Murad Farag lived a life that spanned ninety years during which his natal 
Ottoman province became British-occupied territory, a British protectorate, and finally a semi-
sovereign and—just before his death in 1956—a sovereign nation-state. Farag’s intellectual and 
professional trajectory bears the marks of Egypt’s shifting cultural, political, and social terrain. 
Having graduated from the Khedival Law School in 1889—the first Jew to do so—he served as a 
lawyer in the National Court of Appeals and wrote a series of manuals on Egyptian law.18 Farag 
was thus the product of a key colonial legal institution and in the state’s employ, disseminating 
legal knowledge. In fact, after gaining notoriety as a lawyer, he worked directly for Khedive 
‘Abbas Hilmi as a legal advisor. By the early 1900s, Farag had been drawn to the linguistic, 
literary, and cultural revival of the nahda, and in its spirit established the Karaite reform journal 
al-Tahdhib (Edification). Farag was a dayan on the Karaite bayt din in Cairo, and helped codify 
																																																						
17 The Arabic phrase for these courts is al-mahakim al-ahliyya, which is often translated as 
“National Courts.” The British referred to these courts as “native” or “indigenous” courts.  
18 A list of graduates categorized by religion is printed in al-Mu’tamar al-Misri al-Awwal: 
Majmu‘a A‘mal al-Mu’tamar al-Misri al-Awwal al-Mun‘aqid bi-Hiliubulis (min Dawahi al-
Qahira) (Cairo: al-Matba‘a al-Amiriyya bi-Misr, 1911), 12. Farag appears to have been the only 
Jewish (isra’ili) graduate until 1912. 
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Egyptian Jewry’s personal status laws as part of the overall secularization of law.19 By 1908, he 
began to advocate patriotic ideals and constitutionalism in Egypt’s nationalist press, considering 
himself part of an emerging Egyptian nation.20  
After World War I Farag encountered the emergence of an Egyptian nation-state and the 
growing acceptance of a powerful European discourse coupling Jewishness with nationality, 
which raised suspicion about the loyalty of Jews to Egypt. In contrast, Farag saw Egypt’s Jews as 
an ethnic group (ta’ifa) within the Egyptian nation. In the 1920s and 1930s, he sought to bring 
Karaites and Rabbanites together and to highlight commonalities between Hebrew and Arabic 
and Jews’ place within Arab and Islamic culture and history.21 He also served on the committee 
that wrote Egypt’s first Constitution.22 In the 1940s and 1950s, Farag watched as the subjectivity 
and politics he had forged over a lifetime became increasingly foreclosed due to contingent 
circumstances and events in Egypt, in Palestine/Israel, and globally. Farag died several years 
after the Free Officers’ Revolution of 1952 that ended the monarchy. He was largely forgotten 
																																																						
19 On al-Tahdhib, see Lital Levy, “Edification between Sect and Nation: Murad Farag and al-
Tahdhib, 1901–1903,” in Intellectuals and Civil Society in the Middle East: Liberalism, 
Modernity and Politics Discourse, ed. Mohammed A. Bamyeh (London: I.B.Tauris, 2012). 
20 He published a series of articles in al-Jarida and al-Mu’ayyad, which was republished in 
collection of articles entitled Maqalat Murad (Murad’s Oeuvre) (Cairo: Matba‘at Kuhayn wa-
Ibrahim Ruzintal, 1912). 
21 See Murad Farag, Multaqal Lughatayn al-‘Ibriyya wa-l-‘Arabiyya (Cairo: al-Matba‘a al-
Rahmaniyya, 1930-37); and Farag, al-Shu‘ara’ al-Yahud al-‘Arab (Cairo: al-Matba‘a al-
Rahmaniyya, 1929). Karaites are a group within Judaism that rejects the authority of the Talmud 
and later rabbinic works, relying solely on the Hebrew Bible as a source of law, doctrine, and 
practice. In Egypt, Karaites were an Arabic-speaking autochthonous community claiming ancient 
presence, whereas the much larger and more diverse Sephardic community had arrived in Egypt 
from the eighteenth century. 
22 Sasson Somekh, “Participation of Egyptian Jews in Modern Arabic Culture, and the Case of 
Murad Faraj,” in The Jews of Egypt: A Mediterranean Society in Modern Times, ed. Shimon 
Shamir (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 138. Somekh was unable to confirm Farag’s 
membership in the Arabic Language Academy’s proceeding records. See p.140n37. 
	 77	
thereafter, for he fit into neither the logic nor the telos of Arab and Egyptian nationalism and 
Zionism.  
Farag approached adulthood at the time of Egypt’s colonization. In 1882, Britain 
established control over Egypt militarily; by 1883, the legal colonization of Egypt was 
underway, with British and Egyptian administrators and lawyers devising and implementing 
reforms to expand and empower positivist law, a codified set of abstract rules with no necessary 
relationship to morality that applied to all cases publicly and equally.23 The spread of positivist 
law vis-à-vis the newly established National Courts confined the shari‘a and the milli legal 
systems to the private domain (i.e., family law), transforming their content and, arguably, their 
conceptions of morality.24 Moreover, detaching subjects from these legal structures and 
subjecting them to colonial law meant refashioning their historical memories and temporal 
sensibilities to produce loyalty to the state over the religious community. The ideology of legal 
reform presupposed a past characterized by chaos and despotism, and a civilized present that 
progressed toward a future of justice and “rule of law” (always in the offing).25 Established soon 
after the National Courts, the Khedival Law School in which Farag was trained produced the first 
generation of lawyers who, equipped with fluency in the national codes, filled the National 
Courts. Embodiments of a new kind of legal expertise, these lawyers competed with legal 
practitioners of displaced traditions.26 It is no wonder that many of Egypt’s future nationalist 
																																																						
23 Esmeir, Juridical Humanity, chap. 1; Talal Asad, “Thinking about Law, Morality, and 
Religion in the Story of Egyptian Modernization,” JISMOR 1 (2006): 13. For a modern legal 
history of Egypt, see Nathan Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and 
the Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
24 Asad, “Thinking about Law.” 
25 Esmeir, Juridical Humanity, 21–23. 
26 See Amr Shalakany, “‘I Heard It All Before’: Egyptian Tales of Law and Development,” 
Third World Quarterly 27 (2006): 833–53. 
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leaders, including Mustafa Kamil and Sa‘d Zaghlul, were among those to attend the Khedival 
Law School.        
Three of Murad Farag’s works published between 1893 and 1901, or from his last days in 
law school until he established his communal journal al-Tahdhib, illustrate his entanglement 
with colonial law—an entanglement that his Christian and Muslim colleagues shared. These 
works were a drop in the bucket of a massive corpus of typeset and easily reproducible legal 
manuals published starting in 1883, the purpose of which was to explain the law—its origins, its 
raison d’etre, its content, its workings. In their structure and language, and in their endless 
repetition, they helped to produce the authority of the law and, by extension, the state.27   
The three works— Risala fi Sharh al-Amwal ‘ala al-Qanun al-Madani al-Ahli 
(Commentary on Property in National Civil Law), Kitab al-Majmu‘ fi Sharh al-Shuru‘ ‘ala al-
Qanun al-Misri al-Ahli (Collected Work on Explaining the Inception of Egyptian National Law), 
and Da‘awa Wada‘ al-Yad (Possessory Actions)—deal with various aspects of Egyptian law and 
engage with a legal corpus.28 The first two, as Farag points out, are based upon the works of 
jurists and legal theorists—largely French—to whom he had been exposed in law school. In the 
earlier work, Farag explains that he “drew upon among the most well-known French 
commentators.” The book, he goes on, “will be succeeded, God willing, by the publication of 
																																																						
27 On texts and the production of state authority, see Brinkley Messick, The Calligraphic State: 
Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1996).  
28 Murad Farag, Risala fi Sharh al-Amwal ‘ala al-Qanun al-Madani al-Ahli (Cairo: Matba‘at al-
Mahrusa, 1893); Farag, Kitab al-Majmu‘ fi Sharh al-Shuru‘ ‘ala al-Qanun al-Misri al-Ahli 
(Cairo: Matba‘a al-Mahrusa, 1894); Farag, Da‘awa Wada‘ al-Yad (Cairo: Matba‘at al-Ma‘arif, 
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many other theses prepared on various topics of law.”29 For Farag, Egyptian law is an open field 
of knowledge in need of explication. In his third book, by contrast, he suggests that a tradition of 
positivist law in Egypt had formed, for he engages not foreign works alone but also texts by 
jurists from Egypt’s National and Mixed Courts.30 Revealing his attachment to Egyptian law and 
to an emerging notion of the Egyptian nation, Farag refers to “our national law” when providing 
a genealogy of possessory actions (a proceeding to recover lost property), which he connects to 
the heavenly holy books.31 
Farag contributed to the hegemony of Egypt’s legal system in other ways too. On their 
introduction in 1883, Egypt’s National Courts claimed jurisdiction over all commercial and 
criminal cases, confining the shari‘a and milli courts to family law.32 In the early twentieth 
century, Egyptian nationalists saw the National Courts as a medium through which to forge a 
sovereign and unified Egypt. This involved abolishing the Mixed Courts (and the Capitulations), 
which were obstacles to Egyptian sovereignty, and, for some, integrating the hitherto 
autonomous “religious” courts into the National Courts. The shari‘a and milli courts survived 
until 1955, three years after the 1952 Free Officers’ Revolution (though communal personal 
status codes persisted within national law), but heated debates continued throughout the first half 
of the twentieth century over whether to regulate or abrogate them. Legal thinkers, intellectuals, 
																																																						
29 Farag, Risala fi Sharh al-Amwal, 2. The “commentators,” Boudreit (?), Désiré Dalloz, and 
Jean Charles Florent Demolomb, were 19th-century French jurists, whose works were part of the 
curriculum at the Khedival Law School. 
30 Establish in 1875, the Mixed Courts had jurisdiction over cases involving foreign nationals or 
a foreign national and an Ottoman or local subject.  
31 Farag, Da‘awa Wada‘ al-Yad, 2. 
32 For reading of the transformation of shari‘a during this period, particularly in terms of the 
question of religion and secularism, see Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, 
Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), chap. 7.  
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and the state, which had the power to approve non-Muslim communal codes, developed a keen 
interest in personal status law. 
In this context, Farag helped to found and participated on the Karaite communal council 
established in 1901, whose purpose was in part to organize and manage the community’s 
personal status affairs.33 In 1912, he translated Rabbi Mas‘ud Hay Bin Shim‘un’s compilation of 
the Rabanites’ personal status codes from Hebrew into Arabic.34 In 1917, Farag translated and 
commented upon personal status statutes in Elijah Bashyatchi’s fifteenth-/sixteenth-century 
codification of Karaite law, Aderet Eliyahu (The Mantle of Elijah).35 After the passing of the 
1923 Egyptian Constitution, as personal status law was again a focal point of debate, the Karaite 
rabbi Ibrahim Kuhayn commissioned Farag to codify the Karaites’ laws.36 The manuscript he 
produced could not be approved by the communal council due to some community members’ 
opposition to his reformist rendering of statutes on lineage and intermarriage between Jews of 
different sects. However, in 1935, the council reached out to Farag after Egypt’s Ministry of 
Justice requested the community’s still unpublished codes. Farag provided a copy, which was 
eventually approved by both the council and the Egyptian state.37 In this way, Farag played a 
critical role in the legal formation of the modern Egyptian nation. It is Farag’s location within 
																																																						
33 Murad Farag: Bi-Munasibat Dhikra Murur Khamsin ‘Aman ‘ala Wifatihi (n.p.: Albert Gamil  
and [HSJE] Historical Society of Jews from Egypt, 2007). See Landau, Jews in Nineteenth-
Century Egypt. 
34 See Mas‘ud Hay Bin Shim‘un, Kitab al-Ahwal al-Shar‘iyya fi al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya li-l-
Isra’iliyin (Cairo: Matba‘at Kuhayn wa-Ruzintal, 1912). 
35 Farag, Shi’ar al-Khidr: Adoret Eliyahu, Statut Personnel Israelite Caraite (Cairo: n.p., 1917). 
36 The work, eventually published in 1935, was titled al-Ahkam al-Shar‘iyya fi al-Ahwal al-
Shakhsiyya li-l-Isra’iliyin al-Qara’in (Personal Status Legal Statues of Karaite Jews). 
Apparently, attempt had already been made to compile the codes in Hebrew. See Mourad El-
Kodsi, The Karaite Jews of Egypt, 1862-1986 (n.p.: n.p., 2006), 77. 
37 See Murad Farag: Bi-Munasibat Dhikra Murur Khamsin ‘Aman.  
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both Jewish tradition and Egypt’s secularizing society that we will now explore through a 
dramatic court case from the early twentieth century. 
 
Blood and Resolve 
In December 1902, as Farag was hard at work in Cairo editing his communal reform journal al-
Tahdhib, he learned of the indictment of Hayyim Daud Kahana, a Rabbanite Jew living in Port 
Said, for attempted kidnapping. The family of a six-year-old Italian Catholic girl named Pépina 
Papassi had accused Kahana of trying to abduct her from the family home in order to use her 
blood to make Passover matzoh.38 According to the ruling of the Zaqaziq National Court where 
the case was assigned, on the afternoon of 2 October 1901 Kahana had appeared at the apartment 
of the child in the European district. He was already familiar with her due to his frequent visits to 
the shop of a Jewish watchmaker named Pinhas Albert that neighbored her father’s own shop. At 
the time of Kahana’s arrival, young Pépina was playing on the outside steps with other children 
her age. He approached the girl and attempted to lure her to his home by offering her sweets. 
Falling for the ruse, the girl began descending the stairwell toward him when a certain dame 
Marula, the family’s Greek governess (khadima) who lived in the same building and had been 
observing the scene from behind the front door window, opened the door abruptly and called the 
girl’s name. Frightened, Kahana quickly fled.39 Marula then told the mother about the incident, 
who screamed in horror.40 
																																																						
38 Sources describe her as “Italian”; she must have been a local subject, however, because the 
case was litigated in the Egyptian National Courts, which had jurisdiction over locals but not 
foreign nationals. 
39 AIU, Egypte XE 182, “Acte d’accusation”; AIU, Egypte XE 182, “Jugement du Tribunal 
indigéne de Zaqaziq.” 
40 Al-Tahdhib, 31 December 1902, “Hadithat Bur Sa‘id – Tuhmat al-Dam – Tab i‘a.”  
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 On 31 October, the Port Said Parquet, after recording depositions from Pépina and 
Marula, as well as the bawab (doorman) ‘Abduh Sulayman who confirmed their accounts, asked 
the Zaqaqiq court to convict the accused based on articles of the Egyptian Penal Code covering 
attempted kidnapping. Meanwhile, the Baghdad-born Jew Samuel Somekh, founder of an AIU 
school in Alexandria, was following events closely and kept the AIU abreast of developments. 
According to Somekh, Cairo’s chief rabbi had left for vacation in Lebanon amid the affair—an 
act that angered Somekh.41 In his absence, the community’s leaders sent Kahana to a son of the 
influential Mosseri family. The son could do no more than provide a lawyer, whom Somekh 
accused of neglecting the case.42 Though the court was supposed to convene a criminal hearing 
that November, it was delayed until September of 1902. When the hearing date arrived, the 
judges, ‘Abd al-Shahid and Muhammad Zaki, heard the testimony of the girl, her father, the 
Greek governess, and the bawab. They also heard the testimony of the watchmaker Pinhas 
Albert, though discounted his statements because he was Jewish (“relations d’amitie [lisez sa 
qualité de Juif]”) and sought “without hesitation” and with “what ingenuity” to exonerate his 
coreligionist. The judges reasoned that because Kahana had persisted in offering Pépina sweets, 
he had a premediated plan, and because he had her descend the stairwell, he intended to take her 
with him and perhaps to kill her for her blood. Only causes “independent of his will,” namely 
Marula, had prevented him from carrying out the act. The court declared Kahana guilty of 
																																																						
41 Somekh tended to be critical of Rabbanite Jews in Egypt and of Egyptian Jewry in general; his 
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attempted kidnapping, sentencing him to one year of hard labor and charging him for the cost of 
the court proceeding.43 Though an innocent person would have found the sentence harsh, the 
court seemed to be taking a middle position by not charging Kahana with attempted murder. 
Stunned by the ruling, Somekh decided to contact Murad Farag, the well-known Karaite 
lawyer. Farag took the case and the very next day brought it to the National Court of Appeals in 
Cairo where he was confident he could win an acquittal “so long as foreign pressure did not 
weigh on [the judge’s] judgment.”44 His confidence may signify, on the one hand, his familiarity 
with and investment in the National Courts—an institution critical to his vision of Egypt’s 
future—and on the other, his trust in relationships he had forged with fellow nahda reformers in 
Egypt. Farag had surely been aware that it was the influential Muslim social reformer Qasim 
Amin who headed (ra’is) the appeals court in Cairo. The two had likely met at the Khedival Law 
School from which they graduated at roughly the same time; in any case, they were aware of 
each other’s writings and saw each other as partners in reform.45 On 15 December 1902, only 
three months after the initial verdict, Qasim Amin and two judges, including eventual prime 
minster Ahmad Ziwar (r. 1924–26), would hear Farag’s defense of Kahana. 
The hearing underway, Farag dismantled the testimony of the three witnesses by 
exposing gaps in their stories. How was it, he asked, that on witnessing the incident Marula 
could call out indignantly to the bawab, as he had testified, that “a Jew was trying to take the 
girl,” when she had only had a quick look at him and couldn’t have determined his Jewishness 
(jinsiyyatuh)? Likewise, how could the servant of a neighbor to the Papassi’s, who had just 
																																																						
43 AIU, Egypte XE 182, “Jugement du Tribunal indigéne de Zaqaziq.” 
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witnessed the incident and rushed to the father’s store, have told Mr. Papassi, as the latter 
testified, that “a Jew wanted to take your daughter,” when he did not know this man no less his 
religion (dinuh)? And how could the governess claim that Kahana was foolish enough to return 
to the scene of the incident the next day and ask her whether there was an Italian (rumiyya) 
woman living in the house with young children, thus implying that he had sought the blood of 
Christians and especially Italians? It was this latter allegation that most offended Farag’s 
sensibilities, and the governess had backed it up in her initial testimony in Zaqaziq by pointing 
out that Kahana had married the rabbi’s daughter, suggesting he was pious, and that it is “a 
custom of Jews to take a Christian girl every year.”46 Thus, much of Farag’s defense of Kahana 
in appeal was to explain Judaism, the content of its sacred books, and the meaning of moral 
Jewish subjecthood within the secular space of an Egyptian courtroom that, it turns out, was 
receptive to his message. 
Indeed, the court’s judgment—signed by Qasim Amin himself—reflects Amin’s 
sympathy with Farag’s reasoning and representation of his tradition. To begin with, it found 
inadmissible the accounts of all witness testimony other than that of the bawab, the girl, and the 
governess. It concluded that the bawab had been playing backgammon nearby the family home 
and was unaware that anything was happening until Péppina’s mother screamed and he went to 
the house. The mother had raised her voice only when the governess had told her what happened 
to her daughter, by which time Kahana had long fled. In other words, the bawab’s testimony that 
he encountered Kahana on the stairs was inconceivable. Turning to Marula, the court, echoing 
Farag’s logic, concluded that her testimony was not dependable because the glimpse she had of 
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Kahana was insufficient for her to commit his features to memory and recognize him. And the 
young girl was probably seen to have been unduly influenced by her family and the governess.  
Attempting to reconstruct the likely course of events, the court suggested that a man other 
than Kahana had approached the girl to abduct her. The bawab, wanting to absolve himself of 
responsibility for not being on guard at the time and influenced by the ideas and opinions of the 
Papassi household (Marula in particular) and the neighbors, decided to declare that the person 
who approached the house was a Jew who wanted to kidnap Péppina and kill her as part of a 
“religious ceremony [hafla diniyya], as is rumored about the Jews.” Then the bawab “went on 
his way searching for a Jew, encountered the accused, and identified him.” When the bawab 
showed Kahana to Marula, “she thought that this is who she saw and she must have been 
influenced by the words of the bawab and was sure that he truly saw the accused just as the 
bawab had been influenced by her words, and it would not be surprising if this mutual influence 
happened without knowledge … and with good intentions.” On this basis, the court acquitted 
Kahana and ordered the state to reimburse him for his legal fees.47 Farag praised the decision, 
stating, “we can almost imagine a definitive general ruling against the lie of the [blood] 
accusation as [this decision] fills people with infallible and elevated understanding.”48 
Yet, rather than a conclusion, Kahana’s acquittal only opened a new chapter. Three 
months later, when Judah Aron Mecha, the son of a Jewish merchant from Aden, disembarked in 
Port Said to conduct business, a group of Greeks in the city reportedly sparked a rumor that he 
had come “with the sole aim of abducting a Greek child for the ritual needs of the Jews.” As 
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word spread “like wildfire,” according to an AIU report, Mecha was attacked, “first by Greek 
children and then by grown-ups, and put in a sad state.” Only through police intervention was he 
able to escape the onslaught. Meanwhile, as the afternoon went on, a crowd of over 3,000 
“natives and Greeks” gathered, forming themselves into bands to attack Jews in the streets. Some 
of these went to the Port Said synagogue to vandalize it, and several valuable Yemini Hebrew 
manuscripts went missing. As local and state government as well as the British and Greek 
consulates got involved, the police again intervened to disperse the rioters. A subsequent 
investigation turned up four culprits. The main perpetrator, a Greek subject named Poriazi, was 
tried in the Greek consulate and given a slap on the hand of twenty days in prison. The three 
other perpetrators were all local subjects, however, and like Kahana their fate was determined by 
the National Courts, which sentenced them to three months in prison. Meanwhile, the incident 
forced the Governor-General of the Suez Canal, Husayn Wassif, to resign.49 The accusation 
against Mecha and attack on the Port Said Jewish community, which preceded the much more 
well-known Kishnev pogrom in the Russian Empire by weeks, propelled Farag to level further 
critique of the blood libel in his journal. What he could not have known is that this would 
probably be the last such incident in Egypt’s history.50 Through the establishment of a new 
secular legal regime, the colonial state may have stopped the flow of blood—both imagined and 
real—associated with ritual murder accusations. But as we will see, this same regime would 
enable new and more pernicious danger to Egyptian Jewry in the decades ahead. 
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Like Minds against the Libel 
Seeing the blood libel accusation as a “contagion” that had spread from “ancestors to 
descendants,” and that suddenly had become so widespread that even Jews had begun to wonder 
whether they were true, Farag, though exacerbated, decided to take action. While “difficult to 
write letter after letter with [his] pen shaking so intensely,” he composed a series of editorials for 
his journal al-Tahdhib rejecting the blood libel and defending Jews and Judaism.51 Observing 
that it was almost always Greeks who leveled such accusations, Farag called them the “most 
hateful” because they “think they are the intended target in particular and that their blood is more 
suitable for the Jews than the blood of other Christians.” He attributed this hatred to an old form 
of Christian anti-Judaism. On the most general level, “it is sufficient for me to say one word by 
way of an answer to the first reason [for the accusation], which is that the Jews did not say that 
the messiah came … and that they are still not Christian.” More particularly, it was believed that 
Jews had been the ones to kill Christ. As for the accusation itself, Farag protested that “there is 
nothing uglier, more abominable, more repugnant, more far from reason, the imagination, and 
humanity generally than what’s been said [about us].” “What we are seeing,” he went on, “is old 
religious thinking inherited from some five thousand years ago.”52  
To correct the misinformation, Farag wrote from within his tradition, explaining Jewish 
law and practice. For example, in one article he played role reversal by adopting a Christian 
persona and turning his accusers into Jews so that he could instruct them morally on how to 
speak about his tradition respectfully while educating his readers: “if they were Jews they would 
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follow their Torah, pray to God for it, pray to our Master Moses who descended from heaven 
with the revelation in his hand … celebrate the holidays, circumcise, marry, divorce without sin 
… and in none of this is there murder or shedding blood.” Countering the logic of the libel, he 
went on to explain that the Torah is the mother of the Christian Bible, and according to the Bible 
one shouldn’t even kill a mosquito no less a child. Farag also clarified Jewish legal prescriptions 
around consumption of blood and the slaughter of animals, revealing the accusation to have no 
basis in Jewish law or custom.53 Yet in countering the rumors, Farag also sought to make the 
point that it was not just Jews who were their victims; the blood libel accusation caused damage 
to the moral society—characterized by enlightenment, decency, and refinement—that he and 
other reformers were working so hard to create and sustain.  
Some of these reformers joined him in publicly rejecting the blood accusation. The 
journal al-Hilal (The Crescent), edited by the reformer and intellectual Jurji Zaydan, had a 
history of denouncing it in its pages, with an editorial on the subject appearing in 1895 and 
another in 1896. Soon after the 1902–3 accusations, al-Hilal published a question and answer on 
the subject. In a letter to the editor, an individual from Alexandria by the name of Salim Effendi 
As‘ad—perhaps a penname of the editor—asked:  
 
The chatter has increased lately on the issue of the Greek child whom a Jewish man was 
accused of kidnapping, and I heard some say that the Jews kidnap Christian children and 
withdraw their blood in order to use it in bread for a religious purpose, so what do you 
say?  
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The editor sought to dispel such rumors:  
 
It’s not appropriate for us when we are in the age of enlightenment to believe something 
like this accusation. [This is] not because the Jews don’t kill anyone, for they do so just 
like people from other [religious] groups [tawa’if]. They kill a Christian or Muslim child 
just like some Christians and Muslims do, whether on purpose or out of ignorance or for 
other reasons that propel people to commit crimes.  
 
What Zaydan rejected was not the premise that Jews can commit the crime of murder, but that 
“Jews carry out that act as a religious injunction recorded in their books or spread among them 
through indoctrination [emphasis mine].” He suggested that, instead of textual or doctrinal 
injunctions, the blood libel accusation could be attributed to the writings of Jews who converted 
to Christianity and, wanting to ingratiate themselves among their new co-religionists and take 
revenge on their old tradition, invented scandalous stories. The effect of these stories, he 
suggested, was aggravated by people’s tendency to believe oddities and to gossip about them, 
made worse by “remaining grudges from the dark ages and ignorance that does not befit folks of 
this age.”54 
Al-Hilal’s dismantlement of the blood libel accusation and defense of Jews elicited some 
readers to respond with disapproval and to accuse the journal of apology, causing Zaydan to take 
up the issue again. In a 1905 editorial titled “al-Talmud wa-Tarjamatu ila al-‘Arabiyya” (The 
Talmud and Its Translation into Arabic) that again responded to a question from the same Salim 
Effendi As‘ad, the journal, observing that over the past ten years people in Egypt had been 
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chattering about “blood atrocities” (al-faza’i‘ al-damawiyya) attributed to the Jews and their 
attempts to hide their legal prescriptions, reiterated its earlier position. But it also went further. 
“It came to our mind … to transfer the Talmud into Arabic and abridge it, and its pages [would 
take up] not less than one thousand pages [published] in sections in al-Hilal.” The project was 
still in waiting when Zaydan met in the home of one of Egypt’s rabbis with the Moroccan Jewish 
author Shim‘un Moyal, who was in Egypt with his wife Esther al-Azhari Moyal—herself an 
author and editor of the women’s journal al-‘A’ila (The Family) in Egypt—studying medicine.55 
In the rabbi’s home Zaydan caught a glimpse of a copy of the Talmud in Hebrew in his book 
collection. Reminded of his translation project, he mentioned the idea to Moyal and proposed 
pursuing it together. Moyal eventually accepted the invitation and involved the rabbi as well. 
However, several days later Moyal informed Zaydan that he and the rabbi preferred to translate a 
complete rather than abridged Talmud, with side-by-side Arabic translation and Hebrew original. 
Zaydan was hardly disappointed, for “our original goal [was] the appearance of this book in 
Arabic after the Arabs remained aloof from it for 1,300 years.”56 The rabbi later backed out 
entirely for uncited reasons, but Moyal eventually published his translation from Palestine in 
1909, making it accessible to a public of modern subjects who he felt would read it and find it 
edifying.57 Zaydan’s idea to publish the first translation of the Talmud in Arabic to counter blood 
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libel rumors had come to fruition, and contrasts sharply with the impetus behind later translations 
of the Talmud into Arabic that we will encounter. 
In retrospect, Zaydan’s response to the blood libel charge proved ironic. Soon after the 
publication of Moyal’s translation, Zaydan found himself at the center of a contentious 
Christian–Muslim public dispute. The 1908 Coptic Congress, in which a group of elite Copts had 
demanded collective rights from the colonial state on behalf of their Coptic identity (see Chapter 
5), and the Muslim Congress organized in response to it, had inaugurated a period of volatile 
sectarianism that lasted through 1911. In 1910, the newly established Cairo University, whose 
development Zaydan contributed to, had invited Zaydan to teach a class on Islamic history and 
civilization, which he excitedly accepted. But, given the simmering tensions, Cairo University 
quickly began to reconsider its decision. The university council feared that the idea of a Greek 
Orthodox Christian, who though well-versed in the Islamic literary tradition was deeply 
influenced by Orientalist approaches to the Islamic past, teaching such a course might offend 
Muslims and cause unrest. His status as a member of a minority and link to colonial knowledge 
made him suspicious at best and disloyal at worst in the eyes of the majority. When the 
periodical al-Mu’ayyad (The Supported) reported on the story, it gave rise to widespread heated 
debate in the press over whether a Christian could teach the religion of a majority community. 
Taken by surprise, Zaydan withdrew from the role, and the university replaced him with the Dar 
al-‘Ulum graduate Muhammad al-Khudari.58  
 
Public Interest 
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Underlying Farag’s critique of the blood libel, his reform project generally, and Zaydan and 
other reformers’ defense of Jews was, I contend, a shared notion of public interest (al-maslaha 
al-‘amma, al-nafa‘ al-‘amm, and similar expressions) that persisted into the colonial period. 
Public interest is a concept within Islamic law intended to promote the common social welfare 
and, relatedly, the sustenance of a moral community. Modern Muslim reformists have found it a 
particularly useful tool because it is determined through reasoned judgment and not always 
directly from the revealed texts. In other words, deeds in the public interest, made in context, did 
not necessarily require legal justification. In her reinterpretation of Muhammad ‘Abduh’s project 
of reform, Samira Haj has shown how ‘Abduh, embedded within Islamic tradition rather than 
traditions of liberalism, sought to promote a modern Muslim subject “capable of being 
incorporated into the fabric of modern structures of power and governance,” but also, through 
habituated ritual and disciplinary practices, “fundamentally moral with a concern for the public 
good.”59 In this spirit, ‘Abduh sought to extend the individual obligation (fard ‘ayn) to determine 
public interest—previously the domain of the ulama’—to every educated member of the 
community, a possibility made available by the spread of modern education. The notion of public 
interest that he advanced was fundamentally different from utilitarian public interest, which he 
rejected.60 This utilitarian notion is premised on the happiness of self-possessing individuals as 
individuals, rather than the human as a moral subject within a communal setting, and the 
formation of national sensibilities rather than the cultivation of a moral community. The 
extension of fard ‘ayn, Haj points out, was “meant to promote and benefit the community as a 
collective, rather than advance the selfish interests of its individual members.” “As members of 
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the community,” she goes on, “individuals are accountable not only to themselves for their 
beliefs and actions … [but also] to others, while … putting others’ beliefs and actions into 
question.”61  
 In his journal, published during the years 1902 and 1903, Farag does not invoke maslaha 
per se, but his notion of reform was similarly centered on the construction of moral subjects, in 
his case Jewish, toward the achievement of a moral community and a moral society to which he 
and other Jews felt connected. In other words, in Farag’s writing the promotion of the moral 
subject is indivisible from that of the moral community, which is indivisible from that of the 
moral society. Some of Farag’s articles published half a decade later do contain the term maslaha 
and related terms. For example, in a 1908 essay titled “Harb al-Watan” (The Nation’s Struggle), 
written amid the Copt–Muslim sectarian crisis described earlier (see also Chapter 5), Farag 
describes the public interest of the Egyptian nation not in secular terms, but as prevention of 
moral injury (al-idha’ al-ma‘nawi) toward a sound national collective. Concerned about relations 
between Egypt’s religious groups, he advocates acts of sincerity (ikhlas) that will unravel coiled 
feelings.62 In 1909, in response to growing sectarianism and nationalist activity, Consul-General 
Eldon Gorst reinstated the 1881 Press Law restricting freedom of the press. In response Farag 
wrote a series of articles evaluating the role of the journalist and journalism in society.  In one 
Article titled “Fi al-Hurriyya Ma Hiyya” (On Defining Freedom), Farag articulates a notion of 
freedom that is bound to the moral subject as part of a community rather than the self-owning 
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individual: “the human’s freedom is confined if the diamond of excellent morals, upright 
conduct, and general rights, or mutual rights, are confined ... [this] damages the prisoner and 
others aside from him.”63 The role of the journalist was to cultivate such morals and conduct in 
society by speaking truth with equanimity, or in other words by focusing on the “public interest 
of the country” (al-maslaha al-‘amma li-l-balad).64  
Yet alongside this shared effort to sustain al-maslaha al-‘amma, another vision of public 
interest (also al-maslaha al-‘amma) rooted in the liberal tradition was being effectuated and 
would gradually displace it. As I eluded to in the introduction, Hussein Agrama has recently 
described how the notion of public order, which intersects with but is substantively different 
from public interest, was first introduced in Egypt in 1897 through sweeping reforms of shari‘a. 
In order to make space for the National Courts, these reforms restricted shari‘a to what was now 
defined as “family” issues. Thus, “religion” and “the family,” increasingly understood as a 
nuclear group tied together by intimate relationships, came to constitute a new private sphere. 
But since these reforms also required that shari‘a court hearings be public, they introduced a 
contradiction that the state was authorized to resolve. Through its definition of public order, the 
state possessed the power to regulate the boundary between public and private, and thus what 
constituted religious practice.65  
By contrast, in 1904 public interest was introduced for the first time as a separate branch 
of public law, part of a broader reorganization of the National Courts. In Egypt, public interest 
law was folded into criminal law (qanun al-‘uqubat) and tied to issues of security. Thus, in the 
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1904 penal code, public interest law was divided into two parts: offenses and crimes harmful to 
the security of the state from outside, and those harmful to the security of the government from 
inside (al-jinayat wa-l-junh al-mudarra bi-amn al-hukuma). The law authorized the state to 
determine what constituted harm to its security.66 Through the new code, public interest came to 
be associated with loyalty to the nation-state, while its opposite, al-maslaha al-khassa (private 
interest), became a cause for suspicion. This arrangement remained remarkably consistent over 
the course of Egypt’s twentieth-century legal reform.67 In sum, whereas the Islamic concept of 
al-maslaha al-‘amma, uncodified and open, was intended to cultivate practices generative of a 
moral society from the bottom-up, secular public interest, set down in law, was intended to 
cultivate obedience to the laws of the nation through the top-down threat of punishment. And 
whereas the former presumed no division between public and private, the latter was yet another 
component to that divide’s realization, with the private realm subject to the gaze of suspicion for 
the threat it posed to the common social good. 
As this legal architecture of the nation-state was put into place and modified over the first 
half of the twentieth century, Farag and his autochthonous Karaite community as well as some 
rabbanite Jews largely remained within a communitarian frame.68 As discussed in Chapter 3, 
Egyptian Jews, unlike Coptic Christians, never firmly associated themselves or were associated 
with the category of the minority after it was translated into Arabic in the early twentieth 
century. Instead, forces beyond their control worked to transform their communitarian 
identifications as isra’ilis into the undifferentiated and universal Jew (yahud), and local Jewish 
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ta’ifas into a homogenous enemy nation. In stark contrast to Farag’s vision of the relationship 
between Jewish moral reform and the moral society in Egypt, Jewishness was gradually 
constructed as a private interest that, especially after the 1948 war, was presumed to be 
threatening to public interest and particularly national security. This transformation was 
contingent, fluid, and gradual. We will thus analyze it in its starkest “late” form through the story 
of the 1951 translation of the paradigmatic anti-Semitic text, the fabricated The Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion. This will convey the stark difference between the notion of the common social 
good and that of secular public interest.  
 
The Elders in Egypt 
The first translation of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as a published volume in Arabic was 
Taymur Muhammad Khalifat al-Tunsi’s 1951 al-Khatar al-Yahudi: Brutukulat Hukama’ Sahyun 
(The Jewish Peril: Protocols of the Elders of Zion).69 The translator, al-Tunsi, was born in the 
village of Tunis in the muhafiza of Sohag in 1915. After completing his primary education in a 
religious institute in Asyut and his secondary education in a Dar al-‘Ulum preparatory school, he 
enrolled in Dar al-‘Ulum college in Cairo from which he graduated in 1939 and earned his 
graduate diploma in 1955, soon after completing al-Khatar al-Yahudi. Al-Tunsi was a disciple of 
the eminent Egyptian intellectual ‘Abbas Mahmud al-‘Aqqad, who embraced his translation 
project. In addition to this work, al-Tunsi composed books on philosophy and language, poetry, 
and short stories. He sustained an interest in Jews and Judaism throughout his intellectual career. 
In 1985, three years before his death in Kuwait, where he had been employed, he translated an 
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obscure 1925 work titled Treasures of the Talmud by British Jew Solomon Levy, describing the 
Talmud as a “holy book for the Jews” that occupies a “significant place in their hearts and 
minds.”70 His focus on the Talmud as a driver of nefarious Jewish acts reflected the persisting 
effects of the Christian anti-Jewish translation described earlier, though viewed in a wholly 
different context and serviced toward different ends.  
 The story of al-Tunsi’s translation of The Protocols, as told by al-Tunsi himself in his 
introduction to the work, is one of a Muslim lay scholar of Judaism refashioning an anti-Semitic 
idiom that had traveled to Egypt via pathways of British colonization. As the category of “the 
Jew” (al-isra’ili) was transformed from a marker of communal identification (al-ta’ifa al-
isra’iliyya) into a homogenizing national identification (al-yahud or al-sahyuniyun)—the result 
of both Zionist politics as well as the legal and conceptual shifts described in this dissertation—
al-Tunsi and other Egyptian intellectuals, needing to frame and explain a new enemy, found and 
adapted a European discourse on the Jew steeped in Christian eschatology but undoubtedly the 
product of processes of modernization across nineteenth-century Europe. Whereas it was largely 
Greek Orthodox Christians who thought to pursue blood libel accusations, this new profane 
secular discourse was available to both Christian and Muslim Egyptians.  
Al-Tunsi describes the shadowy origins of The Protocols in the vague terms typical of the 
genre: a French woman meets with a secret masonic cell in France, records some of their stated 
goals (the so-called protocols), and shares them with a large landowner in Russia named Alex 
Nikolai Niftish. Then, Niftish, “realizing their danger,” hands them over to the “revered Russian 
scholar” Sergei Nilus who he knew was positioned to publish them.71 In fact, Nilus, the Moscow-
																																																						
70 Salomon Levy, Treasures of the Talmud (London: R. Mazin & Co, 1925); S. Livi, Kunuz al-
Talmud (Kuwait: Maktabat Dar al-Bayan, 1985).  
71 Al-Tunsi, al-Khatar al-Yahudi, 8. 
	 98	
born son of a minor noble landowner, had been trained in law at the University of Moscow and 
had worked in the Russian judicial system, but he withdrew from this track well before working 
on The Protocols. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, saturated with the apocalyptic 
fervor that had set in across Russia especially among those left behind by state modernization 
schemes, Nilus forged his own brand of Orthodox mysticism, inspiring him to publish the 
teachings and apocalyptic prophecies of the popular saint Serafim of Sarov (1754–1830) in 1903. 
In the second edition of the work, published in 1905, Nilus included The Protocols. He framed 
this fabrication in terms of a cosmic struggle between the forces of Satan—Jews and 
freemasons—and those of the divine—the Russian Orthodox Church—that would culminate 
imminently in the second coming of Christ.72 Nilus’ belief in his own prophetic vision, 
embedded in Christian eschatology, was adapted by al-Tunsi, who saw him as presaging some of 
the “dangerous events” that would occur in the years ahead. These included the fall of the 
Islamic caliphate “at the hands of the Jews,” the fall of monarchies across Europe as a result of 
World War I, whose “spoils were seized only by the Jews,” and the return of the Jews to 
Palestine and the creation of Israel.73 
Al-Tunsi goes on to describe how in August 1906 a copy of the 1905 edition of Nilus’ 
work arrived in the British Museum in London, where it remained untouched until 1917. During 
that year, he explains, the book was accessed by a Russian reporter for the politically 
conservative London Morning Post. This reporter, Victor Marsden, also “realizing its danger,” 
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decided to translate it into English.74 It is no coincidence that Marsden made this decision on the 
heels of the 1917 Russian Revolution, which was widely attributed in England to Jewish 
machinations and inspired frenzied belief in an international Jewish conspiracy to control the 
world. In 1920, the Britons, an English nationalist anti-Semitic group that had stirred this fervor 
and supported the creation of a national homeland for Jews largely to rid England of its Jewish 
minority, published his text, which became the standard English-language version.75 Copies of a 
subsequent edition of Marsden’s book published in 1921 made their way to Cairo, likely in the 
hands of colonial officials.76 Because India was a main target of Bolshevik propaganda, which 
encouraged Indians to rise up against British colonial rule, many British politicians, journalists, 
and officials came to believe that a network of Jewish plotters was actively seeking to dismantle 
the British Empire. Thus, The Protocols, newly available in English, proved a popular read 
among British colonial officials, including in Egypt. For example, Zionist leader Chaim 
Weitzmann, who spent time in Egypt during World War I, reports that Wyndham Deedes, a 
Christian Zionist who served as brigadier general in Cairo during the war and later chief 
secretary of the high commissioner in Palestine, showed him a copy of the text and reported it 
was a common sight among British personnel in Egypt.77  
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Yet The Protocols did not appear in Arabic translation in Egypt until 1951, decades after 
the first copies had arrived in the country. According to al-Tunsi writing in the early 1950s, 
copies of the book at the time were “few, nay rare, nay rarer than rare.” The notion that The 
Protocols was scarcely available and nearly impossible to find tied into a trope paralleling the 
alleged secretive nature of the protocols themselves. In explaining the text’s history, al-Tunsi 
repeats time and again that the copies of each new edition, regardless of language or country, 
went missing under mysterious circumstances. He accused “the Jews” (al-yahud) of undertaking 
a campaign to buy up as many copies as possible and burn or otherwise destroy them, to kill their 
translators, and to shut down their publishers. Al-Tunsi’s narrative is contradicted, however, by 
Abbas al-‘Aqqad’s comments in his acknowledgment of the publication of the translation. In 
addition to al-Tunsi’s book, al-‘Aqqad had seen three versions with his own eyes. The first he 
had borrowed from “one of our military officers who pursue rare books on topics of war and 
strategies of invasion and conquest and the like.” The second he had bought secondhand and all 
cut up (marju‘ wa-maqtu‘), the seller having no knowledge of its title no less its meaning. He 
claims the copy was stolen from him along with other books and papers by employees in the 
National Library. The third, a copy of the 1921 Marsden version inscribed with the word souveni 
[sic] (gift), he found among the items left behind (mukhallifat) by a prominent doctor (tabib 
kabir).78 Clearly old copies of the text, brought to Egypt initially by British officials, were lying 
around in neglect among Egypt’s elite.     
According to al-Tunsi, initial attempts in Egypt at translation into Arabic began in 1947, 
about the time when the UN Partition Plan for Palestine was announced. He reports that the 
																																																						
78 ‘Abbas Mahmud al-‘Aqqad, “Taqdir Brutukulat Hukama’ Sahyun,” al-Asas, 23 November 
1951. See also Muhammad Khalifat al-Tunsi, al-Khatar al-Yahudi: Brutukulat Hukama’ Sahyun, 
4th ed. (Cairo: al-Kitab al-‘Arabi, 1961), 12. 
	 101	
Egyptian daily newspaper al-Asas (The Foundation) came across a copy of The Protocols and 
commissioned one of its editors, Anis Mansur, to translate it, but Mansur, after much 
consideration, declined out of fear of the potential consequences. As Mansur describes it,  
 
I began reading the book, and I discovered that those who translated it into English, 
French, Spanish, [or] Italian were killed, and the newspapers that published it were blown 
up … I hesitated a little … and then a lot … and I asked al-‘Aqqad about the veracity of 
these words, and he affirmed them laughing.79  
 
Between 1949 and 1950, al-Tunsi himself published translations of a number of the individual 
protocols in the newspaper al-Risala (The Message), and later in 1950 and in 1951 others of 
them in the newspaper Manbar al-Sharq (Pulpit of the East).80 Al-Tunsi reports that 
independently an Egyptian diplomat in one of the “Eastern regions” whom he knew informed 
him that he had purchased a used French copy of The Protocols in France “after much 
searching.”81 The popular periodical Ruz al-Yusuf reported of another Egyptian official who 
purchased a copy somewhere in “the East” for an extraordinarily hefty price: “he paid 500 
Egyptian pounds ... and the copy that this Egyptian official obtained is perhaps the only in the 
East and one of three copies in the world.”82 Later in 1951, al-Tunsi’s book was published, and 
over the next decade three editions would follow.83 While, as I have described, groups of 
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protocols had already been published in and outside Egypt, this was “the first complete, 
trustworthy Arabic translation” of the original.84  
The majority of al-Tunsi’s text is a translation of an English translation of a Russian anti-
Semitic text. In this respect alone it is ripe for analysis, particularly for what it tells us about anti-
Semitism. Here I will address the portion of the text that diverges from and frames the project of 
translation, al-Tunsi’s introduction. In somewhat generic terms, al-Tunsi describes the alleged 
danger of The Protocols, the elements of the “Zionist plot,” the meetings of the elders, the 
protocols that emerged from them, the story of how they spread, and Jewish attempts to prevent 
that spread—some of which we have already covered. But this conventional narrative builds to a 
crescendo when al-Tunsi, writing as an Egyptian Arab to an Arab audience, defines the Jew, 
explains the danger he poses, and appeals to readers to meet that threat.  
In contrast to the texts discussed earlier, including those that adapted Christian anti-
Judaism, al-Tunsi represents Jewish identity in unmistakably essentialist terms: “The Jew [al-
yahudi] is a Jew before everything else, regardless of his nationality or whether he adopted 
certain creeds or principles on the surface.”85 And what distinguishes the Jew, above and beyond 
his doctrinal commitments, is his exclusive claim to chosen status and superiority: “In ancient 
times, the Romans divided the world into two parts: Romans and barbarians, and the Arabs 
divided [the world] into two parts: Arabs and non-Arabs [‘ajm], and thirty-five centuries ago the 
Jews [al-yahud] divided [the world] into two parts: Jews and guyim or nations [umam], meaning 
non-Jews, and the meaning of guyim for them is pagans, infidels, beasts, and the impure.” As the 
																																																						
84 Al-Tunsi, al-Khatar al-Yahudi, title page. For the first partial translation, see al-Khuri Antun 
Yamin, al-Mu’amira al-Yahudiyya ‘ala al-Shu’ub: al-Muqarrarat al-Sahyuniyya au Mudabit al-
Jalasat al-Sirriyya li-Hukama’ Isra’il (n.p., n.p., 1925). Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was published 
in Palestine.  
85 Al-Tunsi, al-Khatar al-Yahudi, 35. 
	 103	
Torah and Talmud make clear, he goes on, “God gave them the human image in honor of them, 
whereas he created the non-Jew guyim from devilish or impure animal clay, and the guyim were 
created for nothing but to serve the Jews…. understanding between the ruling chosen group and 
the scorned slave group is not possible.” Yet the Jews are different from the Romans and Arabs 
in one important respect. These latter groups “preferred themselves over others in some mental 
and physical aspects, but they considered humanity to be of one origin and saw others as having 
rights that morally they must give them.” The Jews, by contrast, took the more radical step of 
“excluding [the guyim] from inclusion in the origins of creation and general human 
characteristics.”86 This mentality has persisted until the present. Al-Tunsi points out that “their 
conscience is the conscience of the Bedouin—it does not develop over the ages—and despite 
their contact with different civilizations their life is the life of the nomadic Bedouin tribe … and 
their clannish (milli) soul is the tribal Bedouin soul [that is] not able to relate to others and does 
not want to.”87 Though this Bedouin soul was rightly praised in Jahili poetry, he goes on, “the 
Jews lack the honor of the Arabs [i.e., the Bedouin], their courage, their fulfillment of promises, 
their good neighborliness, and their hospitality to their neighbor and guest.”88 
Having set out this essentialist and all-encompassing category of the Jew centered on the 
notions of internal unity and chosenness, al-Tunsi segues to the related and more pressing claim 
that the insular Jew invariably pursues Jewish interests (al-maslaha al-yahudiyya) exclusively 
rather than the interests of the society (al-maslaha al-‘amm) or humanity (al-insaniyya). Thus, in 
the national context, the Jew necessarily lacks the characteristic of loyalty to the nation essential 
to membership in the national body. As al-Tunsi puts it, “he may adopt any nationality and will 
																																																						
86 Ibid., 15–16. 
87 Ibid., 21–22. 
88 Ibid., 22n1. 
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even serve the nation but only as long as doing so is in Jewish interests [al-maslaha al-
yahudiyya]. Otherwise, the Jew will revert to some other nationality.” Moreover, against the 
universal ideals of brotherhood, freedom, and equality stands the Jew who puts his private 
interests above these aims, even attempting to sabotage them. In both cases, the Jew is cast as 
suspicious and a threat to public interest. Presenting Jews as a disease within the Arab body, he 
states: “the disease does not kill the strong body but weakens it … I advise [Arabs] to realize the 
danger they are living in … with speed and resolution … [and] to remove the danger from 
themselves before the passing of time.”89 Rather than spill the blood of the individual Christian, 
now the Jew enters into the blood stream of the nation as a disease that threatens the integrity of 
its collective body.  
 
Conclusion 
Al-Tunsi did not complete his translation in a bubble. As mentioned earlier, the work was 
supported and warmly embraced by the prominent Egyptian intellectual ‘Abbas al-‘Aqqad. It 
also enjoyed the support of Esther Fahmi Wisa, whom al-Tunsi thanked in his introduction to the 
fourth edition for assisting in the book’s production and dissemination.90 Wisa was the daughter 
of Akhnukh Fanus, a prominent Protestant-converted Copt who organized the Coptic Congress 
of 1911 (see Chapter 5), and herself a longtime supporter of the Wafd and women’s rights. 
Having made it through the censors, al-Tunsi’s translation likely had the tacit approval of the 
state as well. Yet even if it never reached the censor’s desk, we know that sometime during or 
after the 1948 war the Egyptian state began to sponsor anti-Semitic texts. In 1961, for example, a 
																																																						
89 Ibid., 23. 
90 Al-Tunsi, al-Khatar al-Yahudi: Brutukulat Hukama’ Sahyun, 4th ed., introduction to the new 
edition. For more on Esther Fahmi Wisa, see Baron, Egypt as a Woman, 174–77. 
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new edition of Habib Faris’ al-Dhaba’ih al-Bashariyya al-Talmudiyya, originally published in 
1890, boasted the state seal on its inside flap.91 Finally, we can assume that al-Tunsi’s book had 
the support of a readership, for it was reissued three times.  
If the translation of Christian anti-Judaism had largely been limited to Greek Orthodox 
Christians, the translation of anti-Semitism, made available by pathways of British colonization 
and inseparable from the emergence of Zionism and Zionist/Israeli politics, was a more general 
phenomenon. Once war broke out in 1948, it proved a powerful tool for transforming local Jews 
into a homogenized universal Jew whose private interests, casted as suspicious, could only be 
seen to conflict with the public interest of the Egyptian nation. Secular and profane public 
interest, intended to police sites of disloyalty to the nation, authorized the state to exclude such 
identifiable private interests through the law.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
91 Faris, al-Dhaba’ih al-Bashariyya al-Talmudiyya.  
PART 2: CATEGORIES OF CLASSIFICATION AND POLITCAL IDENTIFICATION 
 
Chapter 4 
Ordering the “Land of Paradox”: The Fashioning of Nationality, Religion, and Political 
Loyalty  
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Reflecting on his rule and the art of governance in colonial Egypt, former consul-general Lord 
Cromer posed ethnic, racial, and/or national difference as a problem: 
 
It might naturally be supposed that, as we are dealing with the country called Egypt, the 
inhabitants…would be Egyptians. Any one who is inclined to rush to this conclusion 
should remember that Egypt…is the Land of Paradox. If any one walks down one of the 
principal streets of London, Paris, or Berlin, nine out of ten of the people with whom he 
meets bear on their faces evidence…that they are Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Germans. 
But let any one who has a general acquaintance with the appearance and physiognomy of 
the principal Eastern races try if he can give a fair ethnological description of the first ten 
people he meets in one of the streets of Cairo…He will find it no easy matter.1 
 
Cromer’s remarks reflect the centrality of population to the political rationalities of what David 
Scott, expanding upon Michel Foucault’s Europe-centered theorization, calls “colonial 
governmentality,” a modern form of power “concerned above all with disabling old forms of life 
by systematically breaking down their conditions, and with constructing in their place new 
conditions so as to enable—indeed, so as to oblige—new forms of life to come into being.”2 In 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Egypt and elsewhere, the colonial refashioning of subjects and 
construction of political community involved the flattening of heterogeneous identifications and 
																																																						
1 Evelyn Baring, Modern Egypt, Volume II (New York: Macmillan, 1908), 126. 
2 David Scott, “Colonial Governmentality,” in Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, 
Governmentality, and Life Politics, ed. Jonathan Xavier Inda (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 
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affiliations toward a homogenous polity that, in a national context, demanded loyalty to the 
nation. For Cromer, Egypt is a “Land of Paradox,” with its different kinds of and differently 
affiliated people living in one bounded territory, only in contrast to Europe’s then-homogenizing 
and unitary nation-states. Egyptian subjects would adapt this normative view of political 
community, viewing nationality as, in one jurist’s words, having “simple, singular meanings that 
do not tolerate mixing or overlapping.”3 
 This chapter provides a genealogy of the “Egyptian national.”4 Drawing on periodicals, 
legal compendia, and British and Egyptian state records, I show how the “Egyptian” as a 
juridical category was initially established by the British-dominated colonial state as part of 
governing Egypt, and took form within the vestibule of colonial politics. I also show how the 
Egyptian national, first articulated in the 1920s, inherited prior definitions of Egyptian 
subjecthood. However, I argue that this category was also shaped by what Eric Weitz, referring 
to the Paris peace settlement of 1919–23, calls the “Paris System,” in which populations, 
conceived as racially, ethnically, and/or nationally homogenous units, became central to 
																																																						
3 Al-Muhama’, 1935–36, issue 1, 11. 
4 For prior studies of Egyptian nationality, see Shimon Shamir, “The Evolution of the Egyptian 
Nationality Laws and Their Application to the Jews in the Monarchy Period,” in The Jews of 
Egypt: A Mediterranean Society in Modern Times, ed. Shimon Shamir (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1987), 33-67; Mahmud Muhammad Sulayman, al-Ajanib fi Misr: Dirasa fi Ta’rikh Misr 
al-Ijtima‘i (Alexandria: al-Hay’a al-‘Amma li-Maktabat al-Iskandariya, 1996); Frederic 
Abecassis and Anne Le Gall-Kazazian, “L’identite au miroir du droit, le statut des personnes en 
Egypte (fin XIXe-debut XXE siècle),” Egypte – Monde Arabe 11 (1992): 11–38; and Will 
Hanley, Identifying with Nationality: Europeans, Ottomans, and Egyptians in Alexandria (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2017). For the period prior to World War I, I adopt Hanley’s 
use of the term “locals” for people from Egypt, which better captures Egypt’s location within an 
Ottoman orbit than the anachronistic national category “Egyptians.” See also Zainab Saleh, “On 
Iraqi Nationality: Law, Citizenship, and Exclusion,” Arab Studies Journal 21 (2013): 48–78; and 
Lale Can, “The Protection Question: Central Asians and Extraterritoriality in the Late Ottoman 
Empire,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 48 (2016): 679–99.  
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governance and were linked to sovereignty.5 After the British unilaterally granted Egypt limited 
independence in 1922, Egyptian legislators and British advisers, needing to devise nationality 
codes, adapted earlier colonial definitions of the Egyptian to an emergent global system of 
bounded national territories. Through the case of Egypt, a country that was not beholden to the 
settlement’s treaties but whose laws and public discourse reflected a translation and 
interiorization of their central concepts, this chapter points to the global scope of Paris’ 
capillaries. 
In telling this story, my focus is on religion as a category of identification, for the Paris 
System lent religion particular salience in the “Middle East,” a region that was just being 
consolidated in the minds of international policymakers. Scholars have traced the politicization 
of religion in Ottoman and post-Ottoman contexts, with outside Christian powers, missionaries, 
and Ottoman state reform efforts exacerbating religious difference by making religion the basis 
of politics.6 They have also shown how secularism as a political process less confined religion to 
a presumptive private sphere than rendered it a site of state intervention and control.7 But 
scholars have only begun to consider how religion was also shaped by modes of international 
governance that emerged after World War I and whose role was in part to transform colonies into 
“sovereign” (as we will see, the word struck upon different registers in colonial contexts than it 
did in Western Europe) states, which, managed by mandate regimes, might join the community 
																																																						
5 Eric Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled 
Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions,” The American 
Historical Review 113 (2008): 1313–43. 
6 See, for example, works by Bruce Masters, including Christians and Jews in the Arab Ottoman 
World: The Roots of Sectarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
7 See, e.g., Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2003). 
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of “civilized” nations.8 The creation of an international legal system coincided with the invention 
by European scholars of a new taxonomy of religion, a term increasingly used to refer to what 
they viewed as the world’s “great traditions”—Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, Islam, etc.—all 
understood to be fundamentally alike but also dissimilar in important ways. This taxonomy, part 
of a broader transformation of European identity in the nineteenth century, extolled the 
superiority of Christianity, with its supposed Aryan and Greek Hellenic origins, as the universal 
religion of freedom, in contrast to parochial, tribal, and static Islam, with its semitic origins.9 The 
postwar treaties could only have proceeded from these epistemic foundations.10 In Egypt, the 
treaties and Paris System thinking generally, grafted categories inherent to nation-state politics 
(i.e., majority and minority) onto religious groups and, in many cases, affixed these groups to 
outside, racialized nations.  
This reconfiguration of religion, its flattening out through a linkage to national categories, 
both entered Egyptian law and became meaningful to subjects. Thus, the chapter maps how the 
ascription of nationality in the postwar Middle East was, to use Michel Foucault’s phrasing, a 
process of subjectification, refracting prior religious identifications.11 Scholars have shown how 
nationality, as an “instrument and object of social closure” critical to the rise and sustenance of 
bounded nation-states, allowed for legal and social distinctions to be made between “insiders,” 
																																																						
8 On colonialism and international law, see Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
9 Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2005), xii. 
10 On religion and internationalism, see Nathaniel Berman, “‘The Sacred Conspiracy’: Religion, 
Nationalism, and the Crisis of Internationalism,” Leiden Journal of International Law 25 (2012): 
9–54. 
11 On subjectification and governmentality, see Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality with Two Lections by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, 
ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1991), 87–104. 
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“outsiders,” and those in between.12 Yet it also reordered individual and collective pasts, as well 
as the horizon of the future. In defining national subjecthood, nationality laws constructed the 
past of the nation and state, often before historians did so, in codified form, establishing a 
juridical-historical narrative that served as a basis and impetus for future nationality law and 
subjective practices. These subjective practices, never bound to the code, shaped, in turn, how 
the national was defined, a looping effect that helps to explain how the boundaries of national 
subjecthood, insider and outsider, remain always in flux.13  
 
The Ottoman Imperial Citizen  
Egyptian nationalism saw itself as a repudiation of Egypt’s Ottoman past. Yet the country’s first 
effectuated nationality law of 1929 laid overtop the Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869, applied in 
Ottoman Egypt. The two laws involved complex processes of translation and reflect uneven 
linguistic transformation, shedding light on the manifestation of nationality in Ottoman and post-
Ottoman contexts. For the French term nationalité, the 1869 Ottoman nationality law used the 
Arabic/Ottoman Turkish word tab‘iya/tabiiyet, related to the noun tabi‘/tabii, which means 
“follower,” and in an imperial legal context referred to a subject of the sultan or state.14 Use of 
this word, which coexisted with the term ra‘aya/raya, meaning “subjects” (again, of the sultan or 
state), particularly non-Muslims, arguably reflected a transfiguration of Ottoman political 
																																																						
12 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), 75. 
13 Ian Hacking, “The Looping Effects of Human Kinds,” in Causal Cognition: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. D. Sperberet et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 351–
61 
14 Will Hanley, “When Did Egyptians Stop Being Ottomans?: An Imperial Citizenship Case 
Study,” in Multilevel Citizenship, ed. Willem Maas (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2013), 93. 
	 112	
community defined in part by the vertical relationship between sultan and subject into a form of 
citizenship.15 The 1869 law was one of a number of Ottoman reforms concerned with state 
centralization and bureaucratization in the face of the interconnected problems of incipient 
nationalism and imperial encroachment. Reformers promoted a new ideology of Ottoman 
constitutionalism in which an undifferentiated Ottoman imperial citizen would supersede 
religious and/or ethnic difference, even as Islam continued to be the basis of state identity and a 
factor in naturalization after implementation of the law.16  
Among the Ottoman state’s aims in pronouncing the law was preventing loss of subjects 
to foreign powers, which could offer them privileges sanctioned by long-standing Capitulatory 
agreements (e.g., exemption from local courts, taxes, or conscription). Going forward, Ottoman 
men who married foreign women were unable to adopt foreign nationality, instead retaining 
Ottoman nationality. However, as part of fitting the empire into a world system of nationality, 
the 1869 law followed the idea upheld universally at the time that women follow the nationality 
of their husbands. This was a shift in the Ottoman province of Egypt as elsewhere, where women 
had always been legally referred to as daughters of fathers or mothers of sons (e.g., “Umm 
Muhammad,” or mother of Muhammad).17  
																																																						
15 Neither the 1863 publication of E. W. Lane’s An Arabic and English Lexicon (London: 
Williams & Norgate, 1863) nor the 1860 edition of Albert de Biberstein-Kazimirski’s 
Dictionnaire Arabe–Français, Tome Second (Paris: Maisonneuve et Cie, Éditeurs, 1860) 
includes the word tab‘iyya. However, J.G. Hava’s 1899 Arabic–English dictionary defines it as 
“nationality.” Hava, Arabic–English Dictionary for the Use of Students (Beirut: Catholic Press, 
1899), 54.  
16 Selim Derengil, Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 195. See also Karen Kern, Imperial Citizen: Marriage and 
Citizenship in the Ottoman Frontier Provinces of Iraq (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
2011), 89–90.  
17 Amira El Azhary Sonbol, The New Mamluks: Egyptian Society and Modern Feudalism 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 76. For an exception to this rule, see Kern, 
Imperial Citizen. 
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Thus, when Princess Saliha (later Diana) of the Egyptian royal family married Vladimir 
Yourkevitch, a Catholic-turned-Lutheran Russian who became a well-known shipbuilder, at a 
church in St. Petersburg in 1909, she became a Russian national. In fact, nationality law seems to 
have trumped personal status law in cases such as hers where a marriage violated Islamic law. 
Yourkevitch himself had originally been an Orthodox Christian but converted to Protestantism 
due to the Orthodox Church’s proscription of marriage between Christians and non-Christians. 
After the Grand Mufti of Egypt issued a fatwa nullifying the marriage, Yourkevitch converted to 
Islam and took the name ‘Abd al-Rahman Shaykh Jalal al-Din Muhammad. He then remarried 
the princess in an Islamic marriage in London. The couple had likely needed their marriage to be 
legally recognized in Egypt, perhaps for social reasons or to secure an inheritance.18 Princess 
Saliha was one of many Ottoman women who lost Ottoman nationality and gained foreign 
nationality through marriage.  
The articulation of nationality laws across nineteenth-century Europe was influenced by 
French nationality as defined in the 1804 Civil Code, which combined jus soli (rights by birth or 
residence on national territory) and jus sanguinis (rights by bloodline or filiation) but 
emphasized the latter.19 In the 1869 Ottoman law, the first article stipulated that individuals born 
to an Ottoman father and mother, or to an Ottoman father and foreign mother, were Ottoman 
subjects. Unlike in later Egyptian nationality laws, both father and mother were seen to confer 
																																																						
18 Journal du droit inernational privé (1914): 643–49. Yourkevitch eventually became a 
British subject. Although the marriage did not last, the couple bore several children in England, 
one of whom changed the family’s last name, going by Isma‘il Vladimir de York. 
19 Patrick Weil has shown that Rogers Brubaker’s contrast between an open French model of 
citizenship based on jus soli and an exclusive German model based on jus sanguinis is 
misleading. French nationality law actually favored jus sanguinis from 1804 to 1889, when it 
shifted to jus soli to naturalize large numbers of immigrants. Prussian and then German 
legislation followed the French example. Weil, How to Be French: Nationality in the Making 
since 1789 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).  
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nationality on children, even though the law’s privileging of the father strengthened notions of 
the patriarchal family in a context where, historically, women enjoyed relatively broad property 
rights.20 The 1869 law presumed everyone on its territory to be Ottoman unless demonstrated 
otherwise and was relatively liberal in terms of naturalization. Every individual born on Ottoman 
territory to foreign parents could acquire Ottoman nationality within three years of reaching 
majority. Further, foreign adults who resided five consecutive years in the empire could obtain 
nationality by applying to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in exceptional cases the 
latter could confer nationality sooner. While rendering acquisition of Ottoman nationality 
relatively easy, the law required Ottoman subjects wishing to naturalize abroad to first obtain 
Ottoman state permission, a caveat that later proved significant in Egypt.21 Thus, while it 
produced a new category of governance—the Ottoman imperial citizen—this category’s terms of 
inclusion/exclusion had less to do with perceived characteristics of populations than with 
geopolitics.    
The Arabic term for “nationality” used in later Egyptian codes and common today, 
jinsiyya, has a very different connotation that tab‘iya/tabiyet. This word was likely a neologism 
of the nineteenth century deriving from the word jins, itself an Arabization of the Greek genus 
that eventually became the Arabic trilateral root janasa, meaning “to make homogonous” or 
“classify.” Over time, jins has taken numerous meanings such as “kind,” “species,” “category,” 
“sex” (male, female), “gender” (in grammar), and, more recently, “race” and “nation.”22 In the 
																																																						
20 On this point in the context of Egypt, see Judith Tucker, Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
21 Dar al-Watha’iq al-Qawmiyya (Egyptian National Archives) (DW), Majlis al-Wuzara’ 
(Council of Ministers) 0075-018651, “Loi Sur La Nationalité Ottomane,” Le Caire Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1887. 
22 Arabic–English Dictionary: The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, 4th Edition, 
ed. J. M. Cowan (Ithaca, NY: Spoken Language Services, Inc., 1994), 167. I draw on Samia 
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mid-nineteenth century, jinsiyya referred to “common origin,” a meaning with flexibility to 
absorb various associations. Thus, in an 1879 speech in Alexandria, the Muslim intellectual 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani could refer to the jinsiyya of “Eastern peoples” as a shared civilizational 
origin that was being attenuated by the imperial division of Eastern lands into territorial units and 
by “backwardness.”23 In 1884, however, al-Afghani refers to jinsiyya in the sense of national 
origin and in contrast to cross-territorial Islamic unity.24 By the turn of the twentieth century, it 
still carried this meaning, sometimes in a national sense, but was overlaid with race, as racial 
theory was popularized in Egypt through scientific journals such as al-Muqtataf and its 
competitor al-Hilal (The Crescent).25 When the Egyptian colonial state sought to articulate a 
distinct political category of “Egyptian local subjects” in 1900 (see below) in order to more 
effectively govern, the word jinsiyya, rather than tab‘iya, was perhaps seen to best capture the 
political community it sought to produce. 
 
An “Internationalist Nationality”: The Egyptian Local Subject 
																																																						
Mehrez’s discussion of the word in Egypt’s Culture Wars: Politics and Practice (Cairo: 
American University in Cairo Press, 2008), 109. 
23 The speech was transcribed in the journal Misr under the title “Hakim al-Sharq” (Sage of the 
East), 24 May 1879. I draw on Nikki Keddie’s discussion of it in Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn “al-
Afghāni”: A Political Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 108–9. 
24 Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, “al-Jinsiyya wa-l-Diyana al-Islamiyya,” in Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: 
al-A‘mal al-Kamila, Part 2, al-Kitabat al-Siyasiyya, ed. Muhammad ‘Imara (Beirut: al-
Mu’assasa al-‘Arabiyya li-l-Dirasat wa-l-Nashr, 1981), 34–36. Nikki Keddie argues that al-
Afghani’s contradictory uses of the word were due to his catering to different audiences. Yet 
jinsiyya’s meaning may have shifted over time and/or have been unstable in a given moment. 
Nikki Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid 
Jamāl ad-Dīn “al-Afghāni” (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), 68.    
25 See Hava, Arabic-English Dictionary, 96. Race was critical to the British and Egyptian 
colonizing missions in the Sudan. Marwa Elshakry, Reading Darwin in Arabic 1860–1950 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 86–89.  
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The shift from Ottoman tab‘iya to Egyptian jinsiyya was precipitated in part by the British 
occupation of Egypt in 1882, which brought a shift of suzerainty over the province even as a 
veneer of Ottoman control and links between Egypt and the empire remained. Colonial 
governance in Egypt involved in part the reconstruction of Egypt’s legal system through the 
establishment of the National Courts in 1883.26 This new institution was accompanied by new 
governing structures and associated legal codes that first produced the legal category of the 
Egyptian local subject.27 Announced in the Egyptian government’s official journal, the 1883 
Organic Law replaced what had been the Council of Notables, established under Khedive 
Isma‘il, with a new, quasi-representative Legislative Council and General Assembly based on 
models from India.28 These bodies had a largely advisory role and little authority. According to 
then-British ambassador Lord Dufferin, who first proposed them, their purpose was to “erect 
some sort of barrier, however feeble, against the intolerable tyranny of the Turks.”29 The British 
also viewed them as pedagogical tools for self-governance, though they refrained from 
conferring real authority on them until politically expedient.  
																																																						
26 On colonialism and law in Egypt, see Samera Esmeir, Juridical Humanity: A Colonial History 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
27 It has been suggested that it was Khedive Isma‘il who, in forming a new Council of Ministers 
in 1879 under Sharif Pasha, first distinguished between the Ottoman and the Egyptian in the 
official political domain. Resisting increased European control over Egypt, the khedive had 
called for this cabinet to be made up of “truly Egyptian elements.” Abecassis and Le Gall-
Kazazian, “L’identite au miroir du droit,” 5. However, the khedive did not see “Egyptian 
elements” as exclusive of Ottomans, for he filled the cabinet with Turko-Circassian officials in 
Egypt long close to the Muhammad ‘Ali family. F. Robert Hunter, Egypt under the Khedives 
1805–1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy (Cairo: American University 
in Cairo Press, 1999), 219–20. 
28 Jacob Landau, Parliaments and Parties in Egypt (Tel Aviv: Israel Publishing House, 1953), 
41–42; ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Raf ‘i, Misr wa-l-Sudan fi Awa’il ‘Ahd al-Ihtilal, al-Tab‘a al-Rab‘a 
(Cario: Dar al-Ma‘arif, 1983), 53–55. 
29 Quoted by Evelyn Baring in Modern Egypt, Volume II, 274.  
	 117	
The deputies who were to fill these new governing structures would be elected according 
to the Electoral Law, which, announced on the same day as the Organic Law, stated that eligible 
voters were limited to “Egyptian local subjects.” This new category included male Ottoman 
subjects in Egypt at least twenty years of age, certain “undesirables” aside.30 The articulation of 
the Egyptian local subject was part of a colonial effort to render Egypt governable by defining 
and categorizing its territory and population, though without explicitly threatening Ottoman 
suzerainty, Capitulatory powers, or the international balance of power. The inclusiveness of the 
category—excepting gender—is indicative of the modus operandi of the colonial state, which 
was intent on appending all subjects to itself.31 Lord Cromer echoed this purpose when he 
asserted repeatedly that Egypt contained an assortment of peoples who should be fused into what 
he paradoxically termed an “internationalist nationality.”32 
In the 1890s, this first articulation of the Egyptian local subject would be followed by 
others delineating eligibility for service in government posts and the national courts. These 
decrees introduced a new condition excluding any male Ottoman subjects who had lived in 
Egypt for less than fifteen years.33 The exclusion of newcomers was intended to assuage local 
outrage over British favoritism toward “Syrians,” who received a disproportionate number of 
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32 Quoted in Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From Its Origins 
to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972), 301. 
33 Iskandar Assabghy Bey, La Nationalite Egyptienne: Etude Historique et Critique (Paris: 
Société Orientale de Publicité, 1950), 4. They can also be found in al-Waqa’i‘ al-Misriyya. 
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high government positions.34 This largely Christian group from Ottoman Syria was one of many 
Ottoman and non-Ottoman groups to arrive in Egypt in the second half of the nineteenth century 
seeking economic opportunities and/or refuge from state repression, and some Syrians came to 
play important roles in Egyptian society.  
As the category of the Egyptian local subject expanded from the electoral to other 
domains of eligibility, subjects began to claim and adapt it, widening the new divisions it had 
introduced. One example involves a group of six Syrian Effendis (middle-class professionals) 
residing in Egypt who in 1898 applied to the Cairo Governorate (muhafizat misr) to register their 
names on the electoral roll to vote. On 2 June 1898, the head of the National Court of Appeals in 
Cairo, Ahmad ‘Afifi, and two judges, considered their application in court. The Syrians based 
their claim to Egyptian local subjecthood not only on their continued residence in Egypt, but also 
on their payment of taxes to the Egyptian government and their subjection to local Egyptian law 
and courts. Further, it was clear to them that the Egyptian government defined the term (lafza) 
“Egyptian local subject” in the Electoral Law so as to include all Ottomans residing in Egypt (a 
definition that, conveniently, had been adopted in the 1886 Conscription Law). If they reside in 
Egypt, pay taxes, are subject to Egyptian law and courts (unlike many Europeans), and can be 
																																																						
34 Locals in Egypt referred to this largely Christian population of Greek Catholics, Greek 
Orthodox, and Maronites originating from Ottoman Syria as a composite whole, whether with 
the descriptor “Syrians” or, in the case of the nationalist Mustafa Kamil, with pejorative terms 
such as dukhala’ (intruders). Neither of these descriptors need be understood in a territorial 
nationalist sense. These groups remained largely within their respective communal frames, and 
the unity they may have come to feel was an outcome of their interactions with locals. For 
simplicity, I refer to them as “Syrians.” Thomas Philipp, The Syrians in Egypt, 1725–1975 
(London: Steiner, 1985), 149–52.  
	 119	
conscripted, this groups of Syrians reasoned, how could they be excluded from Egyptian local 
subjecthood?35   
‘Afifi, who seems to have been a liberal Egyptian protonationalist, refuted the Syrians’ 
claims by arguing that residence, taxes, and subjection to law and courts each represents its own 
legal domain and has little to do with Egyptian local subjecthood, a legal category he viewed as a 
nationality and critical to public law. Further, he maintained that Egypt, though still under the 
suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire to which it pays tribute, is independent in its internal affairs 
(he did not mention the British occupation). In his view, this independence was initially achieved 
in 1841 by Egypt’s rebellious viceroy Mehmet Ali, who extracted a firman from the Ottoman 
sultan granting him and his male bloodline right of rule over Egypt. Because any independent 
nation must have its own nationality, ‘Afifi reasoned, Egyptian nationality, even if unrealized in 
law, existed and was distinct from Ottoman nationality. In the context of local–“nonlocal” 
competition under colonial governance, ‘Afifi defined Egyptian nationality by adapting earlier 
definitions of the Egyptian local subject, now including only residents of Egypt since 1841.36 
Thus, he established an origin point for the birth of the modern Egyptian nation and inscribed 
Muhammad ‘Ali as its “father,” well before Egyptian royalist historians did so in the 1920s.37 
This early “nationalist” reading of Egyptian nationality would be repackaged by later jurists. 
																																																						
35 The ruling appeared in Al-Ahram, 16 June 1898 in the voice of ‘Afifi. Interestingly, he uses the 
word lafza rather than kalima (both meaning “word”) in association with misri (Egyptian), 
implying that it still had more of a spoken than a textual connotation. I thank Will Hanley for 
sharing this source. Reference to the case is also made in Pierre Arminjon, Étrangers et Protégés 
dans l’Empire Ottoman (Paris: A. Chevalier-Marescq, 1926), 181–82. 
36 Al-Ahram, 16 June 1898. 
37 On Egyptian royalist historians, See Yoav Di Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians 
and History Writing in Twentieth-Century Egypt (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2009).  
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Further, within the category of the Egyptian, ‘Afifi Bek distinguished between natives 
(al-ahali al-asliyyin) and those who arrived in Egypt with the “late resident of paradise 
Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha” (i.e., prior to 1841). In his words, the Egyptian includes  
 
the bishop, the archbishop, the saint, the priest, the rabbi, and the legislator … and 
[included] among the Egyptians is the Orthodox, the Jew [isra’ili], the Catholic, and the 
Protestant, and these religions [adyan] and denominations [madhahib] are not particular 
to non-Egyptian Ottomans … because the Egyptian is not confined to the native Egyptian 
but includes others who … became attached to [the Egyptians] in the period of the late 
Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha.38  
 
This divide between “native” and “non-native” Egyptians would become increasingly operative 
in the social realm during the years ahead.  
The colonial administration issued a new Electoral Law on 29 June 1900 that seems to 
have been a response to lack of clarity and confusion over how to define the Egyptian local 
subject. The new law’s preamble stated that it was concerned with attribution of “Egyptian 
nationality” to diverse categories of persons. Although this was the first law to invoke Egyptian 
nationality, its clauses were confined to voter eligibility and it in no way replaced Ottoman 
nationality. Egyptian voters now included Ottoman subjects settled and habitually residing in 
Egypt since 1848 (chosen because it was the year of the first country-wide census, illustrating the 
importance of the census to nation-building even in the minds of nation builders themselves39); 
																																																						
38 Al-Ahram, 16 June 1898. 
39 Al-Muhama’, issue 1, 1935–36, 15. On this census and later censuses in Egypt, see Kenneth 
M. Cuno and Michael J. Reimer, “The Census Registers of Nineteenth-Century Egypt: A New 
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those born in Egypt whose parents settled and resided there, as well as those who performed 
military service or paid the exemption tax; and orphans with unknown parents. Male Ottoman 
subjects having resided in Egypt for at least fifteen years now had to declare their desire to be 
Egyptian local subjects to local officials and to have completed military service to be eligible.40 
This decree law was followed by a myriad of others—e.g., a civil employment law in 1901, a 
conscription law in 1902, and the 1904 Penal Code—each defining the “Egyptian local subject” 
according to the needs of its issuing office. In short, this category had no singular definition, and 
related to eligibility rather than nationality.  
 In a final installment of the Egyptian local subject, Herbert Kitchener, a successor to Lord 
Cromer as consul-general, issued a new Organic Law and Electoral Law in July 1913 in attempt 
to enhance the authority of Egypt’s legislative bodies to appease Egyptian nationalists and check 
the power of then-khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi II. The Organic Law replaced the Legislative Council 
and General Assembly with a Legislative Assembly comprising the Council of Ministers (itself 
part of the executive branch), sixty-six elected members, and seventeen government-nominated 
members. The Electoral Law determined election procedures and voter eligibility, this time 
making no mention of Egyptian nationality. Voters were limited to male Egyptian local subjects 
as defined by the 1900 decree law (according to British officials, this amounted to roughly one 
million potential voters out of a population of seven million), a tiny minority of whom would 
actually vote.41 Meanwhile, the seventeen government-nominated members had to be, according 
																																																						
Source for Social Historians,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 24 (1997): 193–216. On 
the census and the nation-state, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 2nd ed. 
(London: Verso, 2006), chap. 10. 
40 For the 1900 law, see al-Waqa’i’ al-Misriyya, 4 July 1900. 
41 The law also used the term misriyin (Egyptians), but one jurist of the 1920s explains that its 
authors understood this term as commensurate with “Egyptian local subjects.” For the laws, see 
J.-A. Wathelet and R.- G. Brunton, Codes égyptiens et lois usuelles en vigeur en Égypte 
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to the Organic Law, from underrepresented social and professional groups, including Bedouin, 
doctors, engineers, as well as educational and municipal employees, along with one religious 
community, the Copts.42 
 The inclusion of Copts, but no other religious group, partially relates to the emergence of 
Coptic minority politics several years earlier.43 Often considered by the British and themselves to 
be “original Egyptians,” the Copts were Egypt’s only potential minority that could not be 
associated with a nation/ethnicity elsewhere. In Europe, this association was the best protection 
minorities had from majority-ruled nation-states when the League of Nations proved inept at 
enforcing minority protection treaties, and thus groups such as Armenians and Jews, which 
nowhere formed a majority, were vulnerable to becoming refugees and/or stateless.44 In Egypt, 
where the nation-state took form under the shadow of colonial rule, the opposite was true. As we 
will see, during and after World War I, Christians from Ottoman Syria and others became linked 
																																																						
(Bruxelles: Veueve F. Larcier, 1919–20), 371–89; and al-Waqa’i‘ al-Misriyya, 1 June 1913. On 
terminology, see ‘Ali al-Zayni, al-Qanun al-Dawli al-Khass al-Misri wa-l-Muqarin, al-Juz’ al-
Awwal (al-Qahira: al-Matba‘a al-Rahmaniyya bi-Misr, 1930), 232. On the voter count, see TNA 
FO 78/3555, “Etat Général des Electeurs dans la Basse et la Haute Egypte,” n.d. 
42 Landau, Parliaments and Parties, 55–57. The inclusion of Bedouin is notable, but beyond the 
scope of this chapter. 
43 Seteney Shami and Saba Mahmood have argued that the Arabic word for “minority,” 
aqalliyya, was not used in the Egyptian press until the early 1920s, in the context of debates over 
whether the 1923 Constitution should guarantee minority rights (which it did not). However, as I 
point out in Chapter 5, the term actually appeared much earlier. Seteney Shami, 
“Aqalliyya/Minority in Modern Egypt Discourse,” in Words in Motion: Towards a Global 
Lexicon, ed. Carol Gluck and Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2009), 153; Mahmood, Religious Difference. For the conference, see Tidhkar al-Mu’tamir al-
Qibti al-Awwal: Majmu‘at Risa’il Musawwira (Cairo: Matba‘at al-Akhbar bi-Misr, 1911). See 
also C.A. Bayly, “Representing Copts and Muhammadans: Empire, Nation, and Community in 
Egypt and India, 1880–1914,” in Modernity & Culture: From the Mediterranean to the Indian 
Ocean, ed. Leila Tarazi Fawaz and C.A. Bayly (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 
158–203; and Tariq al-Bishri, al-Muslimun wa-l-Aqbat fi Atar al-Jama‘a al-Wataniyya (Cairo: 
Dar al-Shuruq, 1982). 
44 Hanna Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Orlando: Harcourt Brace, 1979), 289. 
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to new racialized nation-states that the British and French carved out of the Ottoman Empire, 
largely writing them out of Egyptian nationality, whereas the status of Armenians (whose 
numbers were small) and Jews would remain as nebulous as that of the Armenian and Jewish 
national projects.45       
 
Protected Nationals, Foreign Ottomans 
Britain’s announcement of a Protectorate over Egypt in November 1914, after the Ottoman 
entrance into World War I, formalized Egypt’s separation from the Ottoman Empire, raising 
thorny legal questions around sovereignty, jurisdiction, and nationality. Egypt became an 
independent, nonsovereign state, a shift that required “Egyptian local subjects” to become 
“Egyptians.” The Protectorate state considered all inhabitants—men, women, and children—of 
what was now a distinct national territory to be Egyptian nationals unless demonstrated 
otherwise, though while abroad they were British-protected persons. Ironically, however, until 
Egyptian nationality laws could be written and effectuated, the 1869 Ottoman law remained in 
use, as reflected in a range of Mixed Courts cases.46 The split between “Egyptians” and 
“Ottomans” in the political-legal realm would soon become axiomatic, shaping subjectivities and 
conceptions of national community. 
In theory, Egypt’s national formation meant that “Ottomans” could be classified as 
foreigners, or, given the war’s battle lines, enemy foreigners. The question of who was an 
																																																						
45 According to the 1917 census, there were 12,854 Armenians and 59,581 Jews in Egypt at the 
time. See Ministry of Finance, The Census of Egypt Taken in 1917 (Cairo: Government Press, 
1920–21). 
46 ‘Abd al-Hamid Abu al-Hayf, al-Qanun al-Dawli al-Khass fi Uruba wa-fi Misr, al-Majmu‘ al-
Awwal (al-Qahira: Matba‘a al-Sa‘ada, 1927), 110–11. For details of the cases, see al-Zayni, al-
Qanun al-Dawli al-Khass al-Misri, 226. 
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Ottoman remained unclear and complex, and the category became available to subjects to claim 
or disclaim. Legal debates during the war focused on whether the Mixed Courts, historically 
reserved for disputes between litigants of different nationalities, were now competent in cases 
between Egyptians and Ottomans. In a 22 February 1916 Mixed Courts case, a judge ruled in the 
affirmative because, “Egypt, being independent now, is no longer part of Turkey, and, in 
consequence, there is a difference in nationality between an Ottoman subject and a local 
subject.”47 In 1917, a different judge ruled oppositely when a certain Georges Farah demanded a 
sum of money from Wahid al-Fahakni, who denied the Mixed Courts were competent in the case 
because, “my adversary, like my humble self, has the honor of being a local subject.” According 
to reports, Farah responded indignantly that he was a Greek subject and could prove it. 
Moreover, he claimed that if his evidence should be deemed insufficient, he had originally been 
an Ottoman subject, making him a foreigner in Egypt since the announcement of the 
Protectorate. The court rejected his evidence and refused to classify him or other “Ottomans” as 
foreigners.48 Ultimately such subjects would remain under the jurisdiction of the National Courts 
but became foreigners by law. A conceptual wedge had been inserted between the Ottoman and 
the Egyptian. This wedge reverberated in the social realm when, for example, a group of Syrian 
Jews in Egypt petitioned the British to treat them as “friendly aliens,” a new category to appear 
in wartime Egypt.49 
																																																						
47 Gazette de Tribunaux Mixtes d’Egypte, 10 November 1916, 3. 
48 La Bourse Egyptienne, “Chronique Judiciare: de la Situation Juridique des Sujets Ottomans,” 
30 May 1917. A number of similar cases occurred between 1914 and 1926, when Egypt 
pronounced its first nationality law, with most concluding there was no legal distinction between 
local subjects and Ottomans.  
49 The National Archives in Britain (TNA), FO 141/530/2, “Treatment of Syrians, Ottoman 
Greeks, Armenians, etc., in Allied Countries and in Egypt (During the War).” The British never 
declared Ottomans to be enemies under martial law, as they had Austro-Hungarians and 
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With the start of the Protectorate, the British Office of the Judicial Advisor in Egypt’s 
Ministry of Justice set out to draft a law establishing the Egyptian subject/national as an 
internationally recognized legal subject, producing at least four draft decrees during the war. The 
task was critical not only to confirming Egypt’s independent status and thus forcing foreign 
powers to recognize the Protectorate, but also to ordering a nationally heterogeneous population 
along a grid of “friend” and “foe.” In fact, the two drafts on which I focus reflect a gradual shift 
toward a concern with loyalty, a concept that would be central to the postwar Paris project to 
expand the nation-state system globally. The first, stamped 25 November 1914, was by British 
Judicial Advisor William E. Brunyate, a trained lawyer who would have a major hand in postwar 
Egyptian legal transformation. Although the draft was titled “Draft Law Defining Those Who 
Are Entitled to Egyptian Status” (rather than Egyptian nationality), it acknowledged in its first 
line the end of Ottoman suzerainty. On a copy of it in the British National Archives, the last two 
words of the title are crossed out in pencil and replaced with “Egyptian Nationality.”50 British 
legal experts and administrators were hesitant to call this a “nationality law,” exposing the 
paradox of establishing a nation-state under a Protectorate.  
In a similar vein, Brunyate’s draft preserved the language of subjecthood used in prewar 
decrees, invoking the “Egyptian subject” rather than the “Egyptian national.” Brunyate’s 
definition of this subject mirrored earlier definitions of the Egyptian local subject in its 
inclusivity. For him, “Egyptian subjects” included Ottomans previously recognized as Egyptian 
local subjects or domiciled in Egypt and maintaining residency. However, for the first time 
																																																						
Germans, for whom special courts were set up. They instead saw them as “harmless subjects of a 
technically enemy state.” 
50 TNA FO 141/552/3, “Projet du Loi définissant les personnes qui ont droit aux status 
d’Egyptien,” c. 25 November 1914. 
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Egyptian status now implied “allegiance to the khedive” (and soon, the British-installed sultan 
Husayn Kamil). Unlike the Ottoman Nationality Law, Brunyate’s proposal also explicitly limited 
the transmission of nationality to men, contributing to a shift toward the notion that national 
belonging, though it could be represented as a woman, was essentially bequeathed by men.51 The 
draft was eventually sent to the Egyptian Council of Ministers, which despite the Protectorate 
still had to review new legislation. On receiving the proposal, the council, made up of Egyptian 
nationalists, lawyers, and landowners, rejected it, reportedly because its members opposed 
granting Egyptian nationality to “Syrians and other Ottomans” in Egypt, whom they viewed as 
competitors.52 Colonial politics had again shaped the boundaries of the Egyptian as a legal 
category. 
The second draft was released by the Office of the Judicial Advisor on 29 December 
1918. After the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the British felt new urgency to define Egyptian 
nationality so as to mitigate ambiguities over national status after the pending breakup of the 
Ottoman Empire into new states. Based on suggestions by Albert Balfour, best known for the 
1917 Balfour Declaration, the draft was the first to refer to the “Egyptian” in a national sense, 
opposite to the “alien.”53 It regarded all Ottoman subjects residing in Egypt on 5 December 1914, 
the date when the Protectorate was declared, as Egyptians. But unlike prior decrees and draft 
laws, this one stipulated that Ottoman subjects who repudiated Egyptian nationality would have 
to leave Egyptian territory within an unspecified period of time. This innovation was consistent 
with the logic of collective plebiscites and individual options emerging out of the concurrent 
negotiations at Versailles, which would reorder the populations of Central and Eastern Europe 
																																																						
51 Ibid.; Baron, Egypt as a Woman. 
52 TNA FO 141/552/3, “Viscount Grey of Fallodon K.G. to the Residency,” 21 August 1916.  
53 TNA FO 608/212/12, “Draft Nationality Law: 3rd Draft,” 29 December 1918. 
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along lines of national loyalty. According to then-high commissioner Edmund Allenby, who 
would later be involved in drafting the Egyptian Constitution, the new provision was directed at 
those in Egypt with strong Ottoman sympathies, “whose presence … might be politically 
embarrassing.”54 These included members of the family of ‘Abbas Hilmi II, the former khedive 
whom the British deposed and banned from returning to Egypt.55 
Aiming for homogeneity, the British also wished to avoid the presence of permanent 
foreign residents, particularly Syrians and Armenians, on Egyptian soil. As George Lloyd, 
Allenby’s eventual successor as high commissioner, pointed out: “Our object is to set up an 
independent Syria and Armenia and not independent Syrians or Armenians elsewhere. If Syrians 
or Armenians in Egypt want to adopt the nationality of their mother country, should they not be 
required to leave and qualify by residence?”56 Lloyd’s use of the phrase “mother country” is 
reflective of how, given that a Syrian nation-state had yet to be formally established and the 
Armenian nation-state had only just emerged, religion in the region had come to be linked to 
sovereignty and territory. Hence, Brunyate, the author of the 1914 draft law, would state in 1919 
that,  
 
My impression … is that an Armenian will always regard himself as an Armenian, 
although habitually resident in Egypt, and that if an Armenian state is erected he would 
desire Armenian subjection. So, too, to a certain extent with the Syrian—and I should 
																																																						
54 TNA FO 608/212/12, “Decypher of Telegram from Field-Marshal Allenby, Bacoaramreh, 
Addressed to Astoria and Repeated to Foreign Office, No. 1239,” 15 August 1919. 
55 ‘Abbas Hilmi II lived the rest of his life abroad, dying in Switzerland. However, the Egyptian 
government never allowed him to naturalize elsewhere, so he remained an Egyptian until his 
death. DW, ‘Abdin Files (0069-025328), “Nationality of the Ex-Khedive.” 
56 TNA FO 608/246/5, “Copy of Minutes from Paper No. 1555/W/16: Nationality of Ottoman 
Subjects Resident in Egypt,” 4 January 1919. 
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suppose with the Hedjaz Arab. To a considerable extent the feeling is the same as our 
own when we live in a foreign country, and, to adopt legal terminology, I believe that 
there is often a much realer animus revertendi than one would at first sight suppose.57  
 
By the end of 1918, British administrators saw Armenians and Syrians not as part of a patchwork 
that would congeal into modern Egypt, as prior British administrators had, but rather as tied to 
outside, sovereign, and racialized nations. This shift of perception was reflected in the 1917 
census, the first to introduce national/racial categories, all of which were deemed “foreign.”58  
It should thus come as no surprise, then, that the 1918 draft was also the first to 
emphasize jus sanguinis through the father’s line in defining Egyptian nationality, even as the 
basis of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914 was jus soli. Given the 
preponderance of British nationals and subjects in Egypt, and of “Europeans” generally whom 
the British sought to protect, defining the Egyptian this way allowed control over the attribution 
of Egyptian nationality. The idea was seconded by Alfred Milner’s Special Mission of 1920, 
which London had dispatched to Egypt to report on the situation there after the 1919 revolt.59 
The definition would reappear in the eventual Egyptian nationality law. 
Paradoxically, the understanding of peoples as sovereign and racialized did not preclude 
“non-Egyptians” from becoming Egyptian. After all, the 1918 draft presumed Ottomans to be 
Egyptians in the first instance. This was partly attributable to the endurance of an old colonial 
strategy of sponsorship in a new age. Thus, one British official suggested that Christian Syrians 
																																																						
57 TNA FO 141/552/II, “Brunyate to Hurst,” 15 June 1919.  
58 See Ministry of Finance, The Census of Egypt Taken in 1917. 
59 Alfred Milner, Report of the Special Mission to Egypt, no. 1 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 
1921), 5. 
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who became Egyptians could “exercise a moderating influence, and as they will be able to 
continue to enter Government Service as at present, they will by their superior intelligence and 
hard work play a very important role and will … secretly favour Great Britain as against the 
more extreme and antiforeign Egyptian Moslems with whom they can never really coalesce.” 
Similar ideas were held about “semi-European” Jews.60 But some viewed assimilation as 
possible. Despite his assertions about the national sympathies of Armenians and Syrians in 
Egypt, Brunyate maintained his earlier position that Ottomans residing in Egypt should be 
Egyptian, for “in any case, a change will come in the next generation.”61 At issue was not 
whether homogeneity was desirable, but rather how it should be achieved.    
British officials suspected that, as with the 1915 proposal, Egyptian ministers would 
likely view the 1918 draft, or a slightly revised version of it that was produced in 1919, as “too 
liberal to Syrians and other Ottoman Christians whose immigration and competition is feared.”62 
In frustration, George Lloyd wrote, “We cannot create Egyptian subjects and then refuse to admit 
bona fide residents of non-Egyptian birth.”63 To allay these fears, Allenby suggested inclusion of 
a caveat that attribution of Egyptian nationality to Ottomans did not confer political rights absent 
certain conditions, an idea which reappeared in the eventual Egyptian nationality law.64 Other 
Ottomans could be subject to a different kind of exception. A different Allenby proposal was to 
																																																						
60 TNA FO 141/552, “Greg to Furness,” 24 February 1921. 
61 On Syrians, see TNA FO 141/552/2, “Brunyate to Hurst,” 15 June 1919. In terms of Jews, the 
idea was to grant them British nationality but have them form a colony in Egypt through which 
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addressed to Astoria and repeated to Foreign Office, No. 1239,” 15 August 1919. 
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64 TNA FO 608/212/12, “Decypher of telegram from Field-Marshal Allenby, Bacoaramreh, 
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afford special authority to certain Ottomans, such as Nubar Pasha, the influential Armenian 
statesman who played a major role in the founding of the Mixed Courts, or Faris Nimr, the 
Syrian editor of the pro-British daily al-Muqattam—both of whom, it was thought, could 
potentially opt for Egyptian nationality, the nationality of the new states of Armenia and Syria, 
respectively, or even British nationality—to remain in the country.65  
A final innovation of the 1918 draft was the idea that children of “illegitimate birth” 
followed the nationality of the mother, unless the child became legitimate during his or her 
minority, in which case the child would follow the father’s nationality. If, as we saw previously, 
defining the Egyptian national could be productive of certain hierarchies within the family, this 
draft differentiated between “pure” and “impure” Egyptian families, depending on “licit” or 
“illicit” relations. Further, if the authors of the draft meant to produce Egyptians who were loyal 
to the state (we saw how “disloyal” Ottomans were to be excluded), the draft law granted the 
state the ability to deny some “Egyptians” nationality: those born in Egypt but living abroad on 
the law’s date of publication would have a year to return and acquire nationality, but the 
Egyptian government reserved the ability to rescind that right.66 In short, the state would have 
the power to include or exclude based on loyalty to its nation. 
The revised draft was put to the Consultative Committee for Legislation made up of 
British administrators in Egypt, which reviewed the text in April 1920. This committee made 
further revisions, some incorporating principles that were emerging out of the concurrent Allied–
Ottoman settlement negotiations in Sevres, France, including the notion that anyone who 
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renounces the nationality of a new state must leave it within six months.67 Swept aside 
temporarily by postwar treaties and events as well as the specter of Egyptian independence, the 
draft never became law, but it foreshadowed how international postwar treaties, law, and 
institutions would shape Egyptian nationality. 
 
Sovereignty, Imperial Politics, and the Paris System 
The British unilaterally declared Egypt independent in 1922, initiating a struggle over the 
boundary between British control and Egyptian sovereignty, one site of which was nationality.68 
The British retained authority over, among other domains, “foreign interests” and “protection of 
minorities” at about the time when the minority was rendered a legal subject by the new, postwar 
international legal order. Locals in Egypt had long associated “foreigners” (ajanib)—correctly or 
incorrectly—with imperial politics, and groups that now could be identified as minorities shared 
this dubious distinction, only they did not necessarily enjoy access to privileges such as legal 
immunity that had often come with British protection. Thus, in Egypt no group would uniformly 
embrace this fraught category of inclusion/exclusion in the nation-state, and, due to its 
implications for national sovereignty, neither was it imposed on any group. In fact, in the name 
of unity Egyptian legislators eschewed it altogether in drafting the 1923 Constitution (see 
Chapter 5). Interiorizing the logic of Paris, such legislators saw the cultivation of a loyal nation 
as their overriding aim, and the establishment of a nationality regime as the primary means of 
achieving it.  
																																																						
67 TNA FO 141/552, “Projet de Loi sur la nationalité,” April or May, 1920. 
68 For a nationality dispute in which sovereignty and loyalty were at stake, see TNA FO 141/502 
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A significant and lengthy nationality dispute arose in August of 1922, when the vice 
governor of Cairo, Mahmud Fahmy al-Nuqrashi, approached the British Consulate about the 
status of two “military recruits,” sons of a certain David Abraham Khoury, who was born an 
Ottoman subject in Bilad al-Sham in 1864. Khoury served as an interpreter for the British army 
in Egypt between 1882 and 1922—his whole adult life—and by 1908 he was able to naturalize 
as a British subject along with his children, who had been born in Egypt and were now four and 
six years old (no information is available on their mother). As with most Ottomans who 
naturalized, however, Khoury did not first obtain permission of the Ottoman state, required by 
the 1869 Ottoman nationality law. The Ottoman government had therefore never formally 
recognized Khoury or his sons as British subjects, and Egypt, as the inheritor of this law, could 
not do so either. In its view, the Khourys had remained Ottoman and then become Egyptian. The 
British Consulate replied to al-Nuqrashi’s inquest by confirming the family’s British status. 
There the matter lied until September 1924, when the consulate received another note from the 
vice governor threatening arrest of the Khoury children as “deserters” of the army, a message 
they forwarded to David Khoury advising him to keep his children at home until the matter was 
settled.69 As al-Nuqrashi explained, “The laws in force in Egypt, and especially the recruiting 
laws of 1902, insist that every Ottoman subject born in Egypt from parents of Ottoman subjects 
and residing in Egypt is dealt with as an Egyptian and has the right to election and is subject to 
military service.”70 The father Khoury denied this claim, producing naturalization papers as 
evidence. 
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As the affair escalated, the Egyptian government renounced its claim to the father in what 
it said was a gesture of “compromise,” though the British perceived that because he was “a 
person who was Syrian born, [Egypt] did not take any special interest in him.”71 Egypt did claim 
the children, however, because, unlike the father, it viewed them as assimilable. For this claim, 
the law was on its side, a point on which the British Judicial Advisor Maurice Amos could only 
agree.72 The children were born in Egypt, making them Egyptian by the terms of the Ottoman 
Nationality Law (of Egypt), and while they may have naturalized as British subjects, they had 
not obtained required permission of the Egyptian or Ottoman state for change of nationality. This 
conclusion did not nullify their earlier naturalization. Rather, it made them dual nationals, with 
their primary nationality, according to recent international legislation, being that of the territory 
on which they resided.  
As for the British, their concern was to not set a precedent whereby Egypt could claim 
British subjects and “foreigners” more generally. Being the first of its kind, the Khoury case was 
seen to be determinative of similar cases, many centering on Egyptian-born and British-
naturalized children and young adults. Advised by the Judicial Office of the legality of Egypt’s 
claim, the Foreign Office sought a diplomatic solution to the crisis through the creation of a list 
of subjects whose status would be mutually agreed upon by British and Egyptian authorities. 
Although the British produced this list, which contained the names of some thirty individuals 
along with their family members living in Cairo alone, the two sides did not come to terms 
before the pronouncement of an Egyptian nationality law in 1926, which reshuffled nationality 
politics. By that time, the youngest Khoury had decided to retain Egyptian nationality so as not 
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to lose a position in one of the Egyptian ministries, which was closed to foreign nationals, while 
the older child still sought to preserve his British nationality.73 It is unclear what came of the 
Khourys because their archival trail ends, but their story illuminates the relationship between 
nationality and questions of sovereignty during the 1920s. As one parliamentarian put it, defining 
the Egyptian national was important to “show to other countries that we are an independent 
country and have our own sovereignty (siyada).”74 Egypt’s path to sovereignty involved 
excluding subjects with Capitulatory privileges and access to the Mixed Courts, leaving a more 
loyal and governable population. During the 1920s, the Egyptian state and Egyptian nationalists 
increasingly called for disbanding the Capitulations and integrating the Mixed Courts into the 
National Courts, though both persisted until 1949.  
 Through its extension of the nation-state system across the globe, the Paris System helped 
render sovereignty a universal aspiration of “peoples” that did not yet possess it. But, as with 
nationality, the translation of sovereignty into various languages and contexts was a contingent 
process that gave rise to a multitude of meanings. In Egypt, nationalists did not associate 
sovereignty with, for instance, the overthrow of absolute monarchy, as in revolutionary France. 
In fact, Article 1 of Egypt’s first Constitution of 1923 emphasized that Egypt’s celebrated new 
government was a hereditary monarchy with a parliamentary form.75 Rather, nationalists 
associated sovereignty with the stripping away of colonial and imperial control over Egypt’s 
affairs, a process that Egyptians often saw as perpetually incomplete.  
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At the level of language, Egyptian officials needed to find a word relatively equivalent to 
“sovereignty” in Arabic and ascribe it new meaning. This was the task of the Egyptian 
Constitutional Committee, which, in writing an early draft of the Constitution, defined Egypt as 
“an independent, free, and sovereign country,” with the adjective sayyida used for the French 
souverain. However, one committee member, drawing on a fourteenth-century Arabic dictionary, 
objected to this translation because sayyida’s historical meaning was “one who exercises 
authority over the great majority” (alladhi yamlak tadbir al-sawwad al-‘azm), which in his view 
inadequately expressed the collective active will and capacity (qidra) associated with the French 
original. Another committee member, al-Shaykh Bakhit, agreed, adding that the word sayyida 
also means honorable (sharif), and this second meaning may sow confusion. Incidentally, 
sayyida is also an honorific title for women (i.e., lady, Mrs.), and whereas Egypt was often 
represented as a women during this period, the nation’s natural, indispensable companion—
sovereignty—likely had to be expressed in masculine terms.76 Al-Shaykh Bakhit preferred the 
phrasing tamat al-qidra, as in, Egypt has “complete capacity” or “complete ability.” But not all 
on the committee agreed. “We spent much time searching for a word that indicates the meaning 
Souvrainté and we did not find its equivalent. Perhaps the word is unfamiliar [to us Egyptians],” 
argued al-Shaykh Bakhit’s colleague Mahmud Abu al-Nasr. Favoring the original term sayyida, 
he contended that “there is adequate time to mitigate its peculiarity to the mind” and that its other 
meanings (e.g., honorable) would not interfere.77   
 Uneasy about sayyida’s multiple meanings, al-Shaykh Bakhit countered that the 
committee seeks a word that “bears no resemblance” to any other word, that is entirely clear and 
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decisive in meaning. He proposed al-siyada, from the same trilateral root as sayyida but with two 
meanings that could not be confused: su’dud (dominion, rule) and nifadh al-qawl (effective in 
speech). “For this reason,” he concluded, “I request its adoption because we want to write a 
Constitution [whose meaning] every person understands.” This emphasis on clarity, that the 
Constitution be legible to all national subjects, was reiterated later in the debate when another 
member suggested that the word al-siyada needed to be modified by the word tama (complete)—
tamat al-siyada (complete of sovereignty). The added noun may have signified Egyptian 
administrators’ desire to challenge Egypt’s limited independence. But perhaps because Egypt 
could hardly be described as completely sovereign, the phrasing that won out was more 
ambiguous: misr dawla dhat siyada (Egypt is a country possessing sovereignty). The word al-
siyada became the common Arabic translation of sovereignty.78 
In addition to maximizing sovereignty, Egypt’s nationality project had to adapt to a new 
world spanned by contiguous, bounded nation-states regulated by emergent, international modes 
of governmentality. On 10 August 1920, the Allies and the defeated Ottoman Empire signed the 
Treaty of Sevres, which partitioned large parts of the empire into separate states. Although the 
Turkish nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal later rejected the treaty, forcing the Allies back to the 
negotiating table, it had important effects on nationality in Egypt (and Ottoman successor states). 
For one, the Ottoman Empire formally recognized the Protectorate and renounced all rights over 
Egypt effective retroactively to 5 November 1914. It also abandoned claims to Ottoman subjects 
habitually residing in Egypt on 18 December 1914, while those who came to habitually reside in 
Egypt after that date and remained there until the signing of the treaty could opt for Egyptian 
																																																						
78 Ibid. Indicatively, nineteenth-century Arabic–English dictionaries defined siyada not as 
sovereignty but rather as “chiefdom,” “lordship,” “mastery,” etc. See, for example, Lane, An 
Arabic-English Lexicon, 1461. 
	 137	
nationality—an option Egypt could lawfully reject presumably based on the question of loyalty. 
European “experts” of international law viewed the right of option as complimentary to the 
plebiscite that granted individual subjects the ability to choose between nationalities. But in 
making this available, it adhered to the Paris ideal of homogeneity by discouraging the 
constitution of minority populations. Thus, the Treaty of Sevres stated that only former Ottoman 
subjects not belonging to the “majority race” where they lived could opt for another Ottoman 
successor state, but on the condition that they were part of that state’s “majority race.”79 As we 
shall see, this clause would soon be adapted by Egyptian legislators. 
The Treaty of Lausanne replaced the Treaty of Sevres in 1923, establishing the Republic 
of Turkey, but it dealt with the nationality question similarly to its predecessor. The treaty did 
not apply to Egypt, which was already independent, but as one legal observer noted, Egypt could 
not ignore it.80 The right of option forced Ottoman successor states to settle the status of some 
subjects on their territories cooperatively. Already by the start of World War I, Egypt had come 
to terms with France and Greece over the national status of subjects from French Tunisia and 
Greece. Between 1923 and 1927, Egypt reached a settlement with Italy over subjects from 
Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, and with France over subjects from Morocco and Mandate Syria and 
Lebanon (though Syrians and Lebanese established in Egypt prior to the treaty’s signing were 
left out). It also negotiated with the British over “Iraqis,” “Palestinians,” and “Transjordanians.” 
While each settlement was different, foreign consulates in Egypt were generally expected to 
create lists of subjects to claim, which the Egyptian government and subjects themselves could 
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approve or challenge based on claims about the subject’s past.81 Egypt fought, and generally 
succeeded, in preventing subjects appearing on these lists from enjoying Capitulatory privileges. 
The status of now former Ottomans not covered in these arrangements could not be 
determined until Egypt pronounced a nationality law. In the meantime, subjects began to adapt 
new national categories operative in international legal treaties. On 22 February 1924, the 
satirical weekly al-Kashkul (Scrapbook) ran two articles describing separately the nationality 
status of “Syrians” and “Lebanese” in Egypt. In the first article, the author divided Syrians in 
Egypt into four categories: merchants and capitalists who want to be French for Capitulatory 
privileges; bank and shop employees who generally want to be Egyptian, except for some who 
seek “status as well as moral and material benefits” linked to French nationality; government 
employees, who generally wish to be Egyptian, except for a minority who desire French 
nationality if afforded the “rights of foreigners”; and youth, who “refuse everything but to be 
Egyptian.”82 The second article, written by a self-identified “Egyptianized Lebanese” (lubnani 
mutamassari) named Farid Hubayshi, suggested that most like him— “Lebanese” born or having 
long lived in Egypt—desire Egyptian nationality “if the Egyptian nation makes up its mind to 
absorb the Egyptianized [Lebanese] mutamassarin and to treat them as brothers.”83  
Egypt’s nominal independence rendered the passing of an Egyptian nationality law more 
urgent. However, when the Constitution was passed in 1923, it stated only that “the law defines 
Egyptian nationality.”84 On 31 July 1925, the Egyptian government formed a committee under 
the leadership of Minister of Justice Sa‘id Dhu al-Fiqar to draft a law. This committee was 
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composed largely of a generation of French-educated jurists and legislators who generally shared 
an inclusive view of citizenship articulated by the likes of the liberal Egyptian intellectual 
Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. It also included a British “advisor” who communicated British 
interests.85 In fact, a copy of a draft of the law in the British National Archives is replete with 
cross outs and revisions for the committee’s attention, though in many cases this “advice” was 
unheeded.86 The new law was pronounced by royal decree on 26 May 1926.87  
 
The Egyptian National 
 Based largely on the 1920 British draft, the 1926 law was the first legislation to define the 
Egyptian national. However, as the jurist Paul Ghali pointed out, the law’s priority, reflected in 
the order of its articles, was to determine the status of Ottomans whose loyalties were thought to 
lie outside Egypt.88 In this sense it was a product of Paris thinking. Different from prior British 
draft laws, whose purpose was to create Egyptian nationals out of a population presumed to be 
Ottoman, this law assumed a priori the existence of “original Egyptians,” while producing the 
new category “Ottoman nationals” which it subjected to special legislation.  
The law’s first article defined “Ottoman nationals” as all (non-Egyptian) nationals of the 
former Ottoman Empire before the Treaty of Lausanne came into effect, meaning that only 
Tunisians, Libyans, and others subject to bilateral nationality agreements concluded prior to 24 
July 1923 were excluded. Among the rest, those habitually residing in Egypt on 5 November 
1914 who maintained their residency until the date of the decree law were deemed Egyptian, 
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while those who did not could apply to the Interior Ministry within a year. Those who came to 
habitually reside in Egypt after 5 November 1914 and preserved their residency until the date of 
the decree law were also Egyptian. Meanwhile, any Ottoman born, or whose father was born, in 
territory that had been incorporated into an Ottoman successor state could opt for that state’s 
nationality within one year, after which he or she would be required to leave Egypt within six 
months. If that person failed to leave Egypt or returned within five years, the option would be 
canceled and he or she would automatically become Egyptian. Ottoman nationals filling none of 
these conditions had a year to make Egypt their place of habitual residence, and could then apply 
for Egyptian nationality after five years. In general, the law presumed everyone on Egyptian 
territory to be Egyptian until his or her nationality was established. Yet absent the latter, political 
rights were disallowed, leaving many as neither full citizens nor foreigners with access to the 
Mixed Courts.89  
Similar to the 1920 British draft, the 1926 law’s definition of the Egyptian favored jus 
sanguinis through the father’s line. The Egyptian included anyone born in Egypt or abroad to an 
Egyptian father, unknown parents, or a foreign father also born in Egypt. Importantly, however, 
this law specified that the foreign father had to belong “in his ethnicity” (bi-jinsihi) to a country 
with an Arabic-speaking or Muslim majority.90 In fact, echoing the logic of the Treaty of Sevres 
and other Paris treaties, the 1926 law’s main innovation was the insertion of Arabic and Islam as 
terms of inclusion. Thus, for example, it stipulated that those wanting to naturalize needed not 
only ten years of residency in Egypt, good behavior, and the ability to earn a living, but also 
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knowledge of Arabic.91 The category “Egyptian” also included those born in Egypt who 
established habitual residence there prior to reaching “majority,” at which point he or she could 
opt for Egyptian nationality. 
The 1926 law was only partially enacted. After Sa‘d Zaghlul’s Wafd Party dominated the 
1924 parliamentary elections and British Governor-General of the Sudan Lee Stack was 
assassinated, King Fu’ad disbanded parliament. Having no opportunity to review the law, it 
deemed it unconstitutional.92 In consequence, the Interior Ministry, which now handled issues of 
nationality, never systematized naturalization. Still, the law was referred to in the courts and used 
as a basis for resolving interstate disputes over nationality. It also elicited a range of reactions 
among former Ottomans. Al-Kashkul reported on one case involving Princess Na‘mat Mukhtar, 
daughter of the former khedive Isma‘il, sister of King Fu’ad, and aunt of the future king Faruq. 
The princess’ lawyer appeared before the National Courts to declare that she had become 
Turkish based on her marriage to Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, son of the former Ottoman High 
Commissioner in Egypt, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, and himself a former commander in the 
Ottoman army. The princess was presumably Egyptian, but the 1926 law stated that Egyptian 
women follow the nationality of their husbands, which caused her to become Turkish on the 
consummation of her marriage. On this basis, Princess Na‘mat’s lawyer sought to clear the way 
for her to access the Mixed Courts because in his view, “the National Courts are not competent 
in the affairs of the princess.” The matter drew great surprise from the public, with many feeling 
that, given the princess’ status, it was her husband who should naturalize.93 But these were new 
times, when the authority of the law of the nation was increasingly paramount. The case shows 
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how the new law opened space for some locals to bypass the national courts and access the 
Mixed Courts, a move widely seen as a violation of Egyptian sovereignty. 
Other reactions emanated from outside the courts. In the pages of Le Revéil, a Lebanese 
lawyer in Egypt named Bishara Tabbah, who had recently opted for French protection, expressed 
dismay at being forced to leave Egypt. He made a passionate plea for Egypt to allow optants of 
other countries to remain in its territory.94 Others sought Egyptian nationality. Likely unaware 
that applications were not being processed, Egypt’s Chief Rabbi Haim Nahum, who hailed from 
Manisa in the Aegean region, tried to convince his Sephardic Jewish community to submit 
applications to the Interior Ministry, part of an effort to emphasize his and his community’s 
loyalty to the Egyptian nation. Unlike many of his coreligionists, the chief rabbi was able to 
naturalize immediately after the 1926 law was replaced by its successor law.95  
This successor law appeared in 1929 as the brainchild of ‘Abd al-Hamid Badawi, a 
graduate of the Khedival Law School who later studied in France and had a long career in 
Egyptian and international law.96 Though generally following the previous law’s logic, this one 
introduced several changes to address parliament’s concerns. Most notably, it prioritized the 
definition of the “Egyptian,” which the committee felt should be explicated in the first clause 
(instead of the status of “Ottomans”). The “Egyptian” included first and foremost members of 
the royal family, a new insertion that likely allayed King Fu’ad’s fear that some in his family 
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would not qualify for Egyptian nationality. It also included Egyptian local subjects according to 
Article 1 of the 1900 decree law (though not the more lenient Article 2), meaning residents of 
Egypt since 1 January 1848, their offspring, and those with military recruitment certificates. 
Legislators chose the 1900 decree as a basis for Egyptian nationality rather than prior Ottoman 
law out of national pride. Despite the decree’s colonial origins, they saw it as a national past for 
Egyptian nationality, even as the committee head, Salama Mikha’il, understood that the 1900 law 
was not a nationality law.97 Members of the committee who supported an exclusive definition of 
Egyptian nationality even saw those meeting the first article’s criteria as “pure Egyptians” (al-
misriyin al-samimin), a new concept that, as we will see, would make its way into the popular 
imagination.98 While not all committee members shared this view, they did all believe that 
defining the Egyptian national was critical to achieving a purified national body.  
Parliament was split over how to deal with “Ottomans” and “foreigners.” The committee 
had a relatively inclusive view of Egyptian nationality based generally on the French model. It 
favored including those for whom assimilation (indimaj) was possible, and thus sought to 
preserve the 1926 law’s clause rendering naturalization of former Ottomans available only to 
those from a country with an Arabic-speaking or Muslim majority. As the parliamentarian ‘Abd 
al-Salam Fahmy Muhammad put it, “there is no debate that we complain about the large number 
of groups (tawa’if) that are minorities (aqalliyyat), but there are groups that are not minorities, so 
why don’t we permit the integration of those into the Egyptian nation so it is not said in the 
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future that they are minorities that require protection.”99 (Notice how the minority is outsider.) 
Opposing the committee’s recommendation was another group of parliamentarians led by, 
among others, future prime minister Isma‘il Sidqi. In this group’s view, such an approach would 
“open the flood gates to naturalization” in a country with an already large and growing 
population. Moreover, it would render it too easy for those who “live a sectarian life” to 
naturalize, and their inability to integrate would cause them to become “another Balkans.” 
Decrying Egypt’s openness in prior centuries, one parliamentarian argued: “Enough of what was 
inflicted upon us due to the generosity that we are known for and that makes us proud—that 
generosity which was the reason for granting the Capitulations that we are still unable to get rid 
of.”100 
 Ultimately the 1929 law accepted the principle of assimilation, maintaining its 
predecessor’s preference for jus sanguinis and its construction of a “majority ethnicity.” The law 
considered former Ottoman nationals habitually residing in Egypt on 5 November 1914 who then 
maintained residency until the publication of the 1929 law to be Egyptian. Perhaps due to outside 
pressure, it dropped the requirement that optants for Ottoman successor states had to depart 
Egypt, though the Interior Ministry maintained the ability to lawfully expel them and, in any 
case, opting periods for most subjects had already expired. For former Ottomans wishing to 
become Egyptian, conditions became more difficult. Those who fixed their habitual residence in 
Egypt after 5 November 1914, or who had done so prior to that date but did not maintain it, were 
no longer automatically Egyptian; they had to request nationality within one year from the 
Interior Ministry.101 Despite such restrictions, some considered the law too lenient. In al-Siyasa 
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(Politics), one writer with the penname “pure Egyptian” (misri samim)—which echoed the 
discourse of the committee that drafted the 1926 nationality law—complained that the new law 
rendered Egyptian nationality wide open. In his view, its effect would be to create new 
minorities out of subjects of the old Ottoman Empire who, unlike the “pure minority” (aqalliyya 
samima) of the Copts, have no allegiance to Egypt—and this at a time when minorities in general 
have become a complicated international problem.102 In this writer’s view, the Copts were 
unquestionably Egyptian, but other minorities should depart to their majority states, for their 
loyalty was questionable and their ability to claim “minority rights” would sow division. The 
“pure Egyptian” had interiorized the equation of difference with disloyalty. 
By the time the 1936 Anglo–Egyptian Treaty afforded greater sovereignty to Egypt (as 
mentioned earlier, the last British soldiers left Egypt only in 1956), inspiring attempts to 
gradually “Egyptianize” (tamsir) Egypt’s public and private sectors, the “pure Egyptian” had 
become synonymous with the “Egyptian,” ironically excluding already “Egyptianized” 
(mutamassir) subjects. Thus, when in 1937 the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian 
government agreed to gradually Egyptianize the company’s staff, it was “pure Egyptians” (as 
understood by some of the committee members who wrote the 1929 nationality law) who were 
the intended beneficiaries.103 When it was discovered that a certain employee of the Suez Canal 
Company was born in Egypt to a father born in Lebanon, he was forced out of his position and 
was unable to regain it through legal avenues. His father, while having worked for the Egyptian 
government since 1915, having been confirmed as a local subject by the Egyptian government 
after demonstrating more than fifteen years of residence in Egypt, having been excused from 
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army service due to his employment with the state, having been issued an Egyptian passport to 
travel to France to study law, having been eligible to vote and served as head of the election 
council in the mudiriyya (governorate) of Aswan, and even having been appointed by the 
Ministry of Justice to the Mixed Courts in attempt to increase Egyptian representation in its halls, 
was Egyptian by residence rather than blood.104 The 1929 legal construction of the Egyptian 
national had come to shape definitions of the Egyptian in other domains.  
The 1929 law remained in place until 1950, when a more restrictive nationality law was 
passed that rendered obsolete the earlier, automatic conferral of Egyptian nationality on many 
Ottoman subjects. Unlike its predecessor of 1926, the 1929 version was put into effect by the 
Interior Ministry, but the latter processed few naturalizations during the 1930s and 1940s.105 
According to al-Ahram, by late August 1929 the Interior Ministry still had not explained to the 
public how to resolve nationality issues. By 1930, the names of those who managed to naturalize 
were being published in the official state periodical al-Waqa’i‘a al-Misriyya (Egyptian Gazette) 
each month, but their numbers gradually decreased.106 In a context of emergent leftist politics, 
the state was arguably more concerned with denaturalizing nationals, a new power it granted 
itself in Article 13 of the 1929 law and later enhanced in a 1931 revision of this article.107 As late 
as 1951, the United Nations could report that “a considerable number of former Ottoman 
subjects, through neglect, ignorance or for other reasons, lost their opportunity of becoming 
Egyptian nationals through option, and many of them are to-day still legally stateless and can 
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become Egyptian only through the more difficult, time-consuming and costly process of 
naturalization.” Neither was the Egyptian state very eager to process applications.108   
I have argued that such conditions, which created conditions of possibility for the mass 
dislocations of the late 1940s through 1960s, were the outcome of the emergence of the 
“Egyptian national” as a legal subject. By the 1920s, the boundaries of Egyptian national 
community were largely drawn, encompassing a Muslim majority and a Coptic minority, even if 
some Copts and the 1923 Constitution resisted this category. The rest, mostly non-Coptic 
Christians and Jews, were constructed as semi-foreign “Ottoman nationals” and then, through a 
global Paris episteme, tied to racialized nations emerging after World War I, making them 
minorities with questionable loyalty to Egypt. After Lausanne, they were classified as “former 
Ottomans” and became a new type of human produced and managed by the Egyptian state and a 
postwar international legal system: the stateless person. If, as Hannah Arendt argued long ago, 
the nation-state is inherently exclusionary, the conceptual architecture for exclusion in Egypt was 
established in the colonial and liberal periods, and proceeded through a looping effect involving 
heterogeneous subjects and colonial, national, and international regimes of governance.109 As we 
will see, a very similar dynamic was at play in the emergence and transformation of one of 
nationality’s constituent categories—the minority. 
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In the spring of 1908, the Coptic lawyer and reformer Akhnukh Fanus announced the 
establishment of the General Coptic Egyptian Reform Society (Mujtama‘ al-Islah al-Misri al-
Qibti al-‘Amm) whose aim was to “search for the causes of the backwardness [ta’akhur] of the 
Copts and methods of treatment to facilitate for them a path toward modern progress [al-
taqaddum al-‘asiri].”1 Fanus was both a likely and curious messenger of “Coptic awakening.” 
Born in Anbub in 1854 to a Coptic Orthodox family, while in his twenties he earned a law 
degree from the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut (later the American University of Beirut).2 
During his studies in Beirut, he also converted to Protestantism and later became a leading figure 
in Egypt’s Anglican community, maintaining close ties to American and British missionaries. 
With the rise of Egyptian nationalism in the early twentieth century, Fanus would join Mustafa 
Kamil’s National Party which called for Egyptian independence from the British within an 
Ottoman framework. However, like many other Copts, Fanus left the party after Kamil’s death in 
1908 citing its shift toward pro-Ottoman and pan-Islamic politics in the context of the Young 
Turk Revolution in Istanbul. It was at this point that Fanus set out to establish his new reform 
society. While he was careful to emphasize that his movement sought “to strengthen the love and 
unity between the two elements [Copt and Muslim] of the Egyptian nation,” Fanus’ Protestant 
faith made him suspicious to many Copts, and proximity to British power a potential traitor to 
nationalists.3  
Soon after its establishment, Fanus’ society morphed into a new organ called al-Ahrar al-
Aqbat (the Free Copts), the first political party in Egypt claiming to represent Copts. 
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Historically, Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant denominations in Egypt had existed within a 
communal frame, but recently there had emerged a notion, heavily informed by new European 
understandings of civilization and approaches to antiquity, of “the Copts” as an “originally 
Egyptian” nation whose Pharaonic roots could be scientifically proven. Although Egyptian 
nationalist in orientation, Akhnukh’s new party, which he would rename the Independent 
Egyptian Party to allay accusations of sectarianism, aimed to “defend the general rights of the 
Copts.”4 By asserting “Coptic rights” at a time of Egyptian nationalist ascendance and British 
attempts to sow division, Fanus unfurled a backlash that even this known provocateur may not 
have anticipated. What began as a squabble between the Coptic communal and the nationalist 
presses turned into a three-year sectarian war of words that would culminate in competing Coptic 
and Muslim Congresses and the birth of the “minority” as a contested category of political 
identification in Egypt. 
This chapter analyzes the translation of the category “minority” during this weighty 
historical moment in Egypt, and traces how individuals and groups in Egypt claimed it and 
transformed it into the national period. Recent historical literature on minorities and minority 
politics has begun to chart the breakdown of what European Orientalists came to term the 
Ottoman “millet system” and its replacement by the minority rights regime during the interwar 
period.5 They have shown how minorities and minority politics represented a significant break 
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with prior group formations and political practices. Millets were non-Muslim communities (e.g., 
Armenians, Greek Orthodox, Jews) that the state recognized and granted a large degree of 
autonomy in exchange for payment of a special tax called the jizya. As millets, they could 
practice their religion, collect communal and state taxes, manage their own affairs (e.g., 
education and welfare), and administer their own courts (though they could and often did access 
shari‘a courts). Moreover, members of millets were not conscripted into the army, instead paying 
an exemption tax (bedel askari) that later became optional and after the 1908 Young Turk 
Revolution unavailable. More significantly, religious difference did not form the basis of state 
politics until the nineteenth century—and then only gradually. State politics was the domain of a 
Muslim Ottoman elite that, as Ottoman censuses reveal, was concerned less with regulating 
religious difference than with property, taxation, and conscription, evaluated through the male 
head of each household. The only operative religious distinction in Ottoman state censuses was 
that between Muslim and non-Muslim, which determined whether the state could tax and 
conscript particular households.6 For their part, millets pursued political objectives, mainly 
through the intercession of religious elites, but, unlike the minority, the millet itself was not a 
category of political identification and was not associated with rights. The nineteenth century 
witnessed the gradual politicization of religion due to European imperialism and Ottoman 
reform, which rendered subjects equal before the law regardless of religion. 
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Scholarship on the concept of the minority in Egypt has suggested that this category first 
appeared in the context of the postwar emergence of a semi-independent Egyptian nation-state.7 
Extending that genealogy into the colonial period, this chapter argues that the consolidation of 
the nation-state was not the start of minority politics in Egypt but rather its culmination, setting 
the contours of minority–majority relations going forward. To carry out this analysis, the chapter 
traces the myriad understandings of the minority after its translation into Egypt, when its 
meaning was still opaque and unsecured, and how its significations shifted over time through the 
contingent looping effect described in the last chapter involving the colonial state and Coptic and 
Muslim elites.8 Egypt’s other numerically substantial religious group, the Jews, does not seem to 
have embraced the category of the minority. The autochthonous Karaites largely remained within 
a communitarian frame (ta’ifa), while the belonging of rabbinate Jews—most of them Ottoman 
Sephardim who did not speak Egyptian Arabic fluently—within the nation remained tentative 
throughout the period under study. Nevertheless, I explore how, unbeknownst to themselves, 
Jews played a role in debates over minority rights at the level of discourse. 
 Likely the first to attach the “minority” to non-Muslims in Egypt, British officials tended 
to associate the category with religion and to see minority status as a condition of permanent 
disempowerment that necessitated colonial intervention. Egyptians had a very different, if not 
unified, view. The Arabic equivalent of “minority,” aqalliyya, was used for the first time to 
describe Copts and other non-Muslims in relations of unequal political power with a new Muslim 
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majority during the sectarian crisis introduced earlier. During this initial period, Copts tended to 
see it as a neutral avenue of nationalist participation and political empowerment toward equality. 
Muslim Egyptian nationalists, by contrast, likened it to a cleaver that bifurcated the nation and 
threatened its future existence. Copts and Muslims alike distinguished between political and 
religious minorities, though they tended to agree that Copts, unlike other groups, were a “pure” 
or “original” minority that belonged in the nation. Nevertheless, inclusion was contingent upon 
the acceptance of a normative secular understanding of the relationship between religion and 
politics, public and private. In other words, the act of becoming a minority would have 
transformative effects on religion and religious subjectivity. After the minority was transformed 
into an international legal concept following World War I, the British made “protection of 
minorities” a condition of Egyptian semi-independence. Analyzing debates over whether 
protection of minorities should be included in the Egyptian Constitution, I show how 
associations between the minority and the violation of sovereignty shaped conditions of 
possibility for the minority’s legal manifestation in Egypt. This association grew only stronger 
when missionaries adopted the banner of minority rights in the 1930s. 
The birth of the nation-state heralded an era of homogenous ethnic, national, and 
religious political communities defined by citizens’ rights, with individuals having a direct 
relationship to the state. National communities were and remain anathema to difference within 
the public sphere. Yet the post-World War I minority rights regime demanded that certain states 
(excluding the “Great Powers,” which often had their own problems with minorities) grant 
special privileges to officially recognized minority groups. In other words, minority rights swam 
against the current of the nation-state by differentiating certain groups within national 
communities desiring homogeneity. As the last state to join the League of Nations (in 1937), 
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Egypt was affected by the minority rights regime only indirectly. Associating the minority with 
national fissure, Egyptian legislators excluded minority rights from the Constitution. Undefined 
in law, the term remained vague, opaque, and available to be deployed in a range of contexts. 
Most significantly, while a communal frame remained in place in Egypt principally through its 
configuration of personal status laws, newly constructed minority communities were left without 
avenues of collective political participation. 
 
Minority in Translation 
The English word “minority” comes from the middle French minorité and the post-classical 
Latin minoritat-, minoritas. Until the mid to late nineteenth century, its noun form referred to the 
period of one’s life prior to attaining adulthood (as in, “being a minor,” or in one’s youth); “the 
condition or fact of being smaller, inferior, or subordinate in relation to something else”; or a 
“group or subdivision whose views or actions distinguish it from the main body of people” (i.e., 
a political party), or more generally, the smaller number or part. The third meaning (a group or 
subdivision), according to the Oxford English Dictionary, dates to about the mid-eighteenth 
century and its appearance likely relates to the then-increasing power of parliaments in the Anglo 
world. Portions of all three meanings seem to have converged into a new one by around the 
1850s, when “minority” could also refer to a group whose religion was different from that of the 
rest of a society—a “religious minority.” Not until the World War I period was the word 
“minority” connected explicitly to groups constructed as ethnicities and/or nations as well.9 After 
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the war and the establishment of the League of Nations, such groups could also claim legal rights 
within international law.  
A similar definitional shift centered on one word does not appear to have occurred in 
Arabic. The contemporary Arabic equivalent of “minority”—aqalliyya—does not appear in pre-
twentieth-century Arabic dictionaries, even if it may have been in use during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. To my knowledge, the word aqalliyya was used in the Egyptian press to refer 
to a minority for the first time in the context of the Coptic and Muslim Congresses of 1911, to be 
discussed shortly. However, in staggered fashion the term displaced, though in some cases never 
fully, prior terms used to refer to non-Muslims, including dhimma, milla, ta’ifa, and umma. 
Whereas after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire dhimma and milla faded, the word ta’ifa 
continued to refer to “group” or “sect” and umma to “nation,” while aqalliyya made explicit 
reference to a minority—in the context of Egypt, a politically disempowered non-Muslim or 
perhaps non-Arab group.10 At one point, a group could have been a ta’ifa, umma, and aqalliyya 
at once, but the meanings of these terms diverged with the establishment of the nation-state 
system in the region. 
 Despite this seemingly direct definition, the meaning of aqalliyya has been unstable in 
Egypt since it first appeared. As in English, the word often takes adjectival modifiers, such as 
“political” (siyasiyya), “national” (wataniyya), or “religious” (diniyya) that add meaning. During 
the Egyptian Congress of 1911, for example, participants took great pains to clarify that not all 
minorities were the same. Whereas political minorities (aqalliyyat siyasiyya) could pursue 
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politics in the public sphere, religious minorities (aqalliyyat diniyya) had no public role. Their 
religious identifications and practices had to remain confined to the private sphere lest they 
violate public interest (al-maslaha al-‘amma).11 More significantly, as we saw in Chapter 4, 
debates over the meaning of the term aqalliyya itself, and questions over to whom it applied, 
continued well into the 1920s, especially because no legal definition of it was ever established. 
In consequence, aqalliyya ultimately took on a range of meanings specific to Egypt’s history, 
and different from the minority’s significations within European languages. Thus, some groups, 
while perhaps fitting the definition of a minority or the category of ta’ifa, are never associated 
with this vocabulary. Nubians, for example, are referred to as ahl al-nuba (the people of Nubia) 
and almost never in other glosses.   
 Relatedly, the Arabic term in use today to designate a majority, aghlabiyya, appears to 
have emerged around the same time as aqalliyya, but in early twentieth-century Egyptian texts 
the counterpart to aqalliyya is more often, and logically, another neologism—akthariyya. This 
term comes from the trilateral root verb kathara, meaning “to outnumber, to exceed in 
number.”12 Its use reflects an increasing awareness of the science of population and 
demography.13 However, the term akthariyya, with its quantitative quality, may have proven 
inadequate in the long term for conveying the political dynamics associated with majority 
identification. The word aghlabiyya, by contrast, whose trilateral root ghalaba means “to 
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predominate” or “to conquer,”14 implied not numerical superiority but rather political domination 
in the nation-state. As Talal Asad has pointed out, that minorities are typically smaller in number 
than equally historically constituted majorities is accidental: minorities are defined as minorities 
less in terms of their relative quantity than in terms of structures of dominant power.15 By the 
1920s, when Egyptians began to debate the contours of a new Egyptian national polity 
independent of the Ottoman Empire (though not yet of British control), aghlabiyya began to 
displace akthariyya. However, the word aqalliyya persisted. Normativizing majority dominance 
was logical where highlighting relative powerlessness would not have been, particularly in an 
anticolonial national context where colonial and imperial powers portrayed themselves as 
protectors of aqalliyyat. 
 
Sectarianism, Equality, and the Birth of the aqalliyya 
The word aqalliyya made its initial appearance in Egypt during the sectarian discord that would 
give rise to the Coptic Congress of 1911. While it may be impossible trace the immediate 
circumstances around the act of translation that produced it, this act was clearly prefigured by 
use of the English term “minority” by British officials in Egypt to describe Egyptian Copts in 
unequal relations of power to a Muslim majority. Lord Cromer did not use the term in his many 
annual reports as Egypt’s consul-general, but he did use it in his political memoir Modern Egypt 
published in 1908 after he stepped down. Explaining that Copts are stagnant because of their 
Islamic cultural milieu rather than any qualities inherent to themselves, Cromer asserted that  
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the Copt has been arrested by barriers very similar to those which have applied in the 
case of the Moslem. It is, indeed, natural that such have been the case. The minority must 
of necessity submit to the influence of the majority.16  
 
Cromer’s Coptic minority is characterized by submission, whether cultural or political, to 
Muslim-majority sovereignty. This characteristic, perhaps reflecting an English or a Western 
European concept of the minority with which he was familiar, justified British claims to be the 
natural protector of non-Muslim groups and the only available conduit to awakening and 
progress.    
Whether British discourse shaped Egyptian discourse is an open question. But by 1910, 
some Copts began to demand political rights based on a minority status. To chart the emergence 
of such demands, I draw on a description of events leading to the Congress that appeared in its 
published proceedings. Immediately after the Congress, the proceedings were printed in Arabic, 
English, and French for dissemination in Egypt and Europe.17 The author of the description, 
Tawfiq Hunin, was a Copt who had been commissioned to write it by Tawfiq Habib, the then 
editor of the Coptic newspaper al-Akhbar who also had a role in the Congress.18 
Hunin attributed the emergence of these demands to two factors. The first factor was the 
political revolts (al-inqilabat) that had occurred in Egypt since the late nineteenth century that 
“defined the public obligations of individuals and made clear their rights.” Through these revolts, 
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the “enlightened class [al-tabaqa al-mutanawwira] realized its rights in the face of the ruling 
group.” Hunin pointed out that whereas in an earlier era Egypt’s various groups (fi’at) had been 
assigned their roles in society, recently they began to demand equal access of opportunity.19 
Most significantly, in 1879–82 Colonel Ahmad ‘Urabi had led a group of Egyptian Muslim 
officers to challenge the Turko-Circassian elite officer class that had dominated the army since 
its founding under Mehmet Ali. However, according to Hunin this revolt, which eventually 
spread well beyond army ranks, had benefited only Muslims, and the Copts “did not enjoy any of 
its seeds.”20 Following on Muslim gains, Copts felt a need to assert their own rights: “the silence 
of the Egyptian in [such a] situation—regardless of his creed [madhhab]—from protest and 
complaint becomes lethargy that renders him unworthy of national life.”21 Copts’ assertion of 
rights was thus an act of nationalism rather than disloyalty to the nation that sowed division. 
According to Hunin, the second factor that led Copts to demand rights was the British 
occupation that had put down the ‘Urabi revolt. Hunin claimed that the occupation introduced 
“religious distinctions [al-tamiz al-dini] between the Muslim and the Copt in public affairs as a 
principle.” Specifically, the British had opened positions in the state bureaucracy historically 
monopolized by Copts, such as in accounting, while restricting high administrative and military 
positions to Muslims.22 After the start of the occupation in 1882, the Coptic awakening (istayqaz) 
occurred gradually. Hunin cites two critical events. The first occurred in 1897 when a group of 
Coptic lay leaders including Akhnukh Fanus and Tadrus Shanudah, an Orthodox Copt who 
founded the Coptic daily Misr (Egypt), delivered a formal petition to the government on behalf 
																																																						
19 Habib, Tidhkar al-Mu’tamar al-Qibti, 2–4. 
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of Copts. The delegates made a set of demands centered on equality. These included improved 
access to government employment, the closure of courts on the Christian day of rest, the 
appointment of an additional Coptic member to the Council of Ministers and to the judicial 
supervisory committee, and Christian instruction for Coptic students in state schools, which until 
then had only included Islamic instruction. The petition led to a meeting with Lord Cromer in 
which he assented to some of these demands, though the gains were rolled back soon after.23  
The second event occurred in 1908 when the only Coptic governor general of police 
(hikmidar al-bulis), who until then had worked in the mudiriyya (governorate) of Minya, was 
demoted to the role of inspector (mufattish) in Cairo where he would “spend the rest of his 
service in the ‘storeroom’ [al-makhzin].” Hunin points out this was not the first such incident, 
but it had a “negative influence upon the souls of the Copts.” In response, Tadrus Shanudah 
published an article in Misr containing a series of letters from Copts residing in different areas of 
Egypt in which they described the religious discrimination they had experienced around 
employment. Directed to Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi II, the articled repeated the largely unfulfilled 
demands made years earlier to Lord Cromer and added a new one: that he open employment in 
the state bureaucracy to all Egyptians based on merit, and “without restriction of creed and 
religion.”24 Shanudah followed up the article with a formal petition that he and Fanus had 
penned.25 
The petitions from 1897 and 1908 both produced a vociferous response in the Muslim 
nationalist press. In 1897, for example, the periodical al-Ahali accused the Copts in question of 
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undermining ancient Coptic–Muslim brotherhood by directing their complaints to the British.26 
The petitions were also harshly denounced by certain Copts, revealing new political divisions 
among Copts themselves even as the category of the Copt was becoming more unified and 
coherent. Writing in the Egyptian Times in 1908, a certain Salim Sidhum Tadrus accused Fanus 
of betrayal (al-khiyana), saying that “he became the person who if he passed on the street we 
would say this is an agent of the British in Egypt and a tool operated by al-Muqattam [a pro-
British daily]. Fear God oh you who strives for falsehood [al-mujtahid fi al-batil].”27 The war of 
words in the press, which played a major role in amplifying sectarian tension, continued through 
the Egyptian Congress of 1911. This three-year period is still recalled in Egyptian national 
memory as an extreme point of fissure to which a united nation should never return.28  
Over the course of the crisis, many harsh attacks were delivered by all sides. However, 
Hunin cites as particularly “painful [mu’allim] to the souls of the Copts,” what quickly became a 
well-known article titled “al-Islam Gharib fi Biladihi” (Islam Is Strange in Its Own Country). 
The article was written by the Egyptian-born, Oxford-educated Islamic reformer of Tunisian 
origin al-Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish and published in the National Party organ al-Liwa’ (The 
Banner).29 Responding to a different article by a Coptic author named Farid Kamil in the Coptic 
daily al-Watan (The Nation) likening Islamic history to the “torture of humanity,” al-Jawish 
defended the Islamic tradition against the accusation of intolerance and suggested that, through 
their recent demands for equality, Copts had attempted to take the reins of power in Egypt. He 
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also harshly attacked both Kamil and al-Watan, and implicitly threatened them by suggesting 
that Egypt’s “eleven million Muslims will never let this go.”30 Jawish cursed them so severely 
that Akhnoukh, in his reply to al-Jawish in al-Watan published several days later, claimed that 
“no matter how far we veer from politeness [adab], and no matter how much we search in the 
dictionaries of vulgarity and abomination we would not find a drop in the sea of he who came 
from the college of ‘Oxford,’ professor in lampoonery and slander [ta‘n], and shaykh in abuse 
and cursing.”31 Sectarian discourse had reached unprecedented heights. According to Hunin, al-
Jawish’s article opened “the eyes of the Copts, ‘as a nation [umma] or group [ta’ifa],’ to their 
true political position and caus[ed] them to realize that they are treated differently than other 
[i.e., Muslim] Egyptians [wataniyyin] in some of the public sectors, requiring them to have a 
distinct public opinion that reflects their particular status and works toward their particular 
benefit [khayrhum al-khass].”32  
As the sectarian crisis deepened, calls for action spread beyond the Coptic lay leadership. 
Sometime in 1909, an obscure Coptic youth movement, wishing to push matters ahead, 
petitioned the then British consul-general Eldon Gorst to demand access for Copts to Christian 
education in state schools and subsidies to support communal projects where Copts saw the state 
as falling short (as in education).33 Gorst responded by promising to undertake a fact-finding 
mission, though the demands touched on issues of which he had long been aware. As the colonial 
state slowly expanded its public education system, which had its roots in Egypt’s nineteenth-
century state reforms, it had to manage the problem of accommodating a religiously diverse 
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student body.34 According to Gorst, in 1907 the Egyptian government announced, likely in 
response to a prior petition, that it would provide non-Muslim pupils in public schools access to 
a teacher from their own religion—whether a local or someone from another area of Egypt—to 
provide religious instruction, so long as the pupils numbered at least fifteen. If the non-Muslim 
pupils numbered less than fifteen, they would be permitted to leave school prior to the last lesson 
of the day devoted to Islamic instruction. Some Copts reportedly complained that due to a 
shortage of government teachers, they invariably had to pay for their children’s religious 
instruction, whereas Muslim pupils received religious instruction for free. The state responded by 
producing more teachers with the ability to provide a Christian education through the Khedival 
Training College, a salient example of the Egyptian state’s increasing power to shape religion.35 
Yet on 1 January 1909 the Egyptian state shifted control over Egypt’s schools to the 
Provincial Councils, a set of partially elected local bodies initially established in 1883 with the 
Legislative Council and General Assembly (see Chapter 4). On succeeding Lord Cromer, Gorst 
had sought to strengthen these councils to appease Egyptian nationalists who demanded to see 
tangible steps toward autonomy as well as the Liberal Party back home. He also sought to 
counterbalance the Legislative Council and General Assembly. These institutions, though having 
a strictly advisory role and essentially powerless, had become bastions of nationalist agitation. In 
1908, for instance, members of the Legislative Council petitioned the British to establish real 
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parliamentary rule in Egypt rather than the empty shell they had created and maintained.36 Once 
empowered, the Provincial Councils set up a special education tax to fund local schools, which 
had been severely neglected by the British. Feeling that their communities were contributing to 
local coffers but not reaping rewards, some Coptic community leaders demanded state subsidies 
from the tax amounts paid by their communities to set up their own local schools.37 Though this 
demand seems to have been brushed aside, the Copts came to realize the importance of Coptic 
representation on the Provincial Councils. As a result, in June 1909 the Coptic notable, founder 
of the Coptic Museum, and palace-appointed parliamentarian Murqus Sumayka suggested in 
parliament the idea of instituting Coptic representation on the Provincial Councils. When this 
request was swiftly rejected, the Coptic leadership began to consider the problem of Coptic 
representation in all governing institutions.  
According to Hunin, it was at this point that “‘representation of minorities [aqalliyyat]’” 
in parliamentary bodies first appeared within Copts’ standard list of demands. Before this 
innovation could be acted upon, however, on 2 February 1910 the Coptic prime minister Butrus 
Ghali, the first Copt to hold so high an office in Egypt, was murdered. The assassin, twenty-
three-year-old Ibrahim al-Wardani, was a member of the National Party. Though he was a 
Muslim and Ghali a Copt in a time of heightened sectarianism, al-Wardani claimed to have taken 
Ghali’s life solely due to nationalist considerations. In 1906 Ghali had presided as judge in the 
infamous Dinshawai trial in which four Egyptian villagers were sentenced to die by hanging for 
alleged involvement in the death of a British soldier. Locally garrisoned British troops had often 
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hunted pigeons in the area to the great dismay of locals, who relied on pigeon manure for 
fertilizer. On that fateful day, the British soldier had turned up dead, probably due to heat stroke, 
after a series of scuffles between villagers and soldiers in which a female villager was shot and 
injured. The British sought to use the soldier’s death as a rationale for punishing and disciplining 
the nationalists, but the outcome of the case only galvanized Egyptians to the national cause. Al-
Wardani himself was deemed by some a national hero. Given Ghali’s prominent leadership role 
within the Coptic community and representation of Copts within the state, many Copts viewed 
his death as a major blow. It propelled a heightened sense of anxiety among Copts and the 
feeling that their interests were not represented at the state level.38  
Making matters worse, on 26 January 1911 a telegram was dispatched to London through 
the Reuter’s agency that became public knowledge. It included a summary of Gorst’s promised 
fact-finding mission: “Sir Eldon Gorst … found that outside Cairo there were no serious 
complaints. Moslems and Copts, he declares, generally live together quietly if they are left along, 
and the worst possible service to the Copts would be to treat them as a separate community.”39 
With Ghali lost and their appeals to parliament and Gorst deflected, Coptic activists began to 
devise new strategies.  
 
The Coptic Congress: Activating the aqalliyya 
In February 1911 a group of Coptic landowners (a‘yan) in Assiout, including the head of the 
reform committee of Coptic internal affairs Bishri Hanna, Akhnukh Fanus, and others, called for 
a General Assembly (later dubbed the Coptic Congress) to be held on 6 March to more formally 
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establish a set of demands of the state and to elect a permanent committee to pursue them. In the 
lead up to the meeting, Misr published the demands that the assembly intended to make.40 These 
were largely equivalent to their precursors, though with a few changes. Most significantly for our 
purposes, the Coptic leadership was now demanding “representation of the minority [al-
aqalliyya] in parliamentary bodies.”41 This was the first time that a non-Muslim group in Egypt 
made a political demand based on minority status, and it specifically referred to parliamentary 
representation.  
The Coptic Congress was held in Assiout between 6 and 8 March and attracted upwards 
of one thousand supporters. While the organizers may have been satisfied with this turnout, the 
Congress did not enjoy the support of the Coptic Orthodox Church, with political fissures among 
Copts persisting.42 Moreover, both the nationalist press and the palace vehemently opposed it.43 
The palace had even taken steps to prevent its occurrence or, short of this, to force the organizers 
to hold it in Cairo where Copts were fewer in number. But the organizers won out. The Congress 
formally lodged five demands: equality of all Egyptians in taking the day off required by their 
religion, and, relatedly, excusal of Christian government workers and students from working on 
Sunday; dependence on merit in appointing government positions to Egyptians, with no other 
factor playing a role, especially religion-based rations; representation of all of the Egyptian 
elements (‘anasir) in each of Egypt’s parliamentary bodies that guarantee to all defense of their 
rights and preservation of them; all the rights of national education and a portion of tax revenue 
to be used for the community’s expenses; and, finally, that government grants aid all 
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communities rather than just Muslims. Significantly, in the third demand, the word aqalliyya, 
which had appeared in the same demand included in the earlier list published by Misr, had been 
replaced with the word ‘anasir (elements), for reasons we will address shortly.44 
Nevertheless, the word aqalliyya featured prominently when this demand was discussed 
during a session at the Congress. Its meaning was still open and opaque, and the Coptic delegates 
sought to shape it in a way that served their own aims at this historical juncture. The discussion 
opened with a speech by the nationalist lawyer and later Wafdist politician Murqus Hanna on the 
issue of parliamentary representation. Hanna made a nuanced argument rejecting sectarian 
categories in favor of what seemed to him the more neutral category aqalliyya. “I detest 
[abghad] with all hate and resist with all my power, feelings, and sensibilities out of 
consideration for the great nation that no one can deny I love deeply,” he urged, “that method 
which is raised sometimes to appoint by law a specific number of Copts [to parliament], because 
I detest that the words Copt and Muslim would be mentioned in the law.” Hanna instead 
proposed a constitutional system of proportional representation where “each rules himself,” 
meaning that aqalliyyas, rather than having a representative appointed for them, would vote for 
the representatives they desired—the “most beautiful meaning” of a constitution. He took as his 
model the Belgian system, “which all of the experts praise … [and] was adopted in many 
countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Spain, parts of the United States, and even France which 
just legislated the enactment of something like this law.” Accordingly, Hanna suggested that 
each citizen vote as an individual, rather than as a minority or majority, for the delegate he 
preferred (women did not gain the franchise until 1956), showing that he thought it possible to 
split the undifferentiated citizen from the minority. He also suggested that members of minority 
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groups be able to vote separately for a certain number of additional delegates to represent them 
as aqalliyyas. The number of delegates for each aqalliyya would depend on its size, financial 
importance, social status, and scientific ability. This way, Hanna argued, “the parliament or 
senate are constitutional bodies in the true meaning … a real representation of the nation.”45  
Hanna’s construction of the aqalliyya, then, was an attempt to ensure that the specific 
interests of his community were represented at the level of state but in a way that reinforced 
national unity rather than reinscribe sectarian division. Fair representation of all elements of the 
nation, he argued, enabled the nation to reach its maximum potential. His proposal was met with 
applause and the chant “long live the Constitution!” at the Congress. However, one delegate, the 
lawyer Mikha’il Fanus, urged that the speech contained “concepts” (alfadh) that perhaps some 
would misunderstand (fahamha al-ba‘d maqluba) and therefore requested that they be removed 
before ratification of Hanna’s proposal.46 The meaning of aqalliyya had yet to congeal: it was 
still too open to interpretation, too likely to contain unintended significations that could 
reverberate in unexpected and hazardous ways. Akhnukh Fanus, whose relation to Mikha’il 
Fanus is unclear, agreed. For this reason, the word aqalliyya did not appear in the official 
demands of the Congress.  
After the conclusion of the Congress, the British consul-general Gorst released the full 
report of his fact-finding mission. Leveraging statistical evidence, the report undercut each of the 
Copts’ claims of discrimination and demands for equality. What interests us here is the contrast 
between Fanus’ notion of aqalliyya and Gorst’s minority. Whereas for Fanus and other Copts the 
category aqalliyya, always addressed in the context of parliamentary representation, was a 
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politically empowering antisectarian expression of national unity, for Gorst the minority was a 
general state of disempowerment necessitating colonial rescue from majority sovereignty. While 
Gorst acknowledged slight underrepresentation of Copts in Egypt’s parliamentary bodies, he 
claimed that Copts would never be represented in exact proportion to their numbers. The Copts,  
he insisted, “must … be a minority on [these bodies] and they should be ready to trust the British 
control to see that no substantial injustice is done to them.”47 Evaluating the relationship between 
majorities and minorities in general, Gorst concluded that “Majorities can afford to be just, and 
minorities cannot expect wholly to escape from the inherent inconvenience of being a minority 
and should not be unreasonable.”48  
Rather than put out the fire sparked by the Coptic Congress, Gorst’s report fed the 
flames. The Coptic press vigorously challenged both his data and the logic of his argumentation. 
The Coptic journalist Qiriyaqus Mikha’il, for example, whom the Coptic press had dispatched to 
London in 1910 to gain support of the British public for the Copts’ demands, wrote his own 
“Collection of Facts and a Résumé of Authoritative Opinions on the Coptic Question.”49 The 
text, published in English just prior to the Egyptian Congress, provided a summary of events, 
Gorst’s full report, a response to the report, and a list of quotations from the Coptic Congress and 
the Egyptian and British press. What is fascinating about it for our purposes is that it was 
prefaced, introduced, and opened by three British writers: the Assyriologist and Egyptologist 
Archibald Sayce, the Orientalist historian of Egypt and the Coptic Church Alfred J. Butler, and 
the amateur historian and enthusiast of the Copts Edith Louisa Butcher (a.k.a. Mrs. Butcher). 
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Two of the essays provide a historical account of the Copts in Egypt stretching back to antiquity 
to emphasize the Copts’ authenticity as “real Egyptians” based on scientific evidence of racial 
lineages. A pair of the essays also refers to Copts as an aggrieved “minority” that possesses 
“natural” rights.50 Together, the writings link the notion of a coherent category “Copt” as an 
expression of authentic and original Egyptianness to deservedness of rights. Such narratives were 
often interpolated within the Coptic press or adapted by Coptic authors, especially those with 
strong links to European institutions in Egypt or overseas. Qiriyaqus’ own discussion focuses on 
the details of the Coptic grievances rather than the Coptic past, and he uses the word “minority” 
only once when quoting verbatim the list of demands put forth by the Coptic Congress.51 But this 
European discourse clearly shaped notions of Coptic community and history. 
Rather than the ideal notion of Copt as an undifferentiated aqalliyya, it was the Copt as 
original, different, and set apart that entered into law after the Congress. In 1913, Gorst’s 
replacement as consul-general, Herbert Kitchener, in many ways a throwback to Cromer, 
pronounced the Organic Law discussed in the last chapter, which combined the Legislative 
Council and General Assembly into a large Legislative Assembly. This assembly, which 
included prominent figures such as the future nationalist hero Sa‘d Zaghlul and Murqus 
Sumayka, possessed expanded power. However, it also incorporated two features that members 
of the Congress had explicitly wished to avoid: the use of quotas identifying Copts as a category 
apart and government-appointed rather than elected delegates. The Legislative Assembly 
included the Council of Ministers (itself part of the executive branch), sixty-six elected members, 
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as well as seventeen government-appointed members, Copts among them.52 Lord Dufferin’s 
conception of the Legislative Council and General Assembly, and Cromer’s implementation of 
these chambers, had never involved the managing of religious difference. If anything, they 
managed a presumed difference between “Egyptians” and “Turko-Egyptians” in the wake of the 
‘Urabi revolt.53 In this sense, the 1913 Organic Law was an important innovation of 
governmentality.  
 
The Egyptian Congress: aqalliyya as Cleaver to the Nation 
Planned in the run-up to the Coptic Congress, the Egyptian Congress was held between 29 April 
and 4 May 1911.54 The Congress was organized by landowners and intellectuals associated 
largely with the liberal nationalist Umma Party, which had a more elite constituency compared to 
the Watani Party. Presided over by the Egyptian statesman Riyad Pasha, it included significant 
Egyptian national figures such as Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyid, Ali Sha‘rawi, and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz 
Fahmy who advocated the creation of a liberal Egyptian polity independent of Britain. Each day 
attracted “members and sympathizers” numbering in the several thousands. The organizers of the 
Congress initially titled it the “Muslim Congress,” seeing it as an attempt to defend the interests 
of Egypt’s Muslim majority in the face of a perceived assault by a disloyal Coptic minority. 
However, prior to the conference they changed the name to the “Egyptian Congress” because, 
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even if it involved few if any Christians and Jews, “Muslims constitute the absolute majority in 
the country.”55 In addition to the demands of the Coptic Congress, the Egyptian Congress 
addressed broad economic and social issues impacting all in Egypt. For our purposes, its 
importance lies in the way it establishes both the aqalliyya and the akthariyya as categories of 
political subjecthood. The aqalliyya, rather than anonymous and neutral, becomes a cleaver that 
bisects the nation. 
 The Congress opened with a report by its organizing committee, read aloud by its likely 
chair, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (with the aid of Ahmad ‘Abd al-Latif and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmy). 
This report laid out the objective of the Congress to secure the cohesion of the Egyptian nation, 
“the structure of which was almost cracked by the Coptic Congress.” The national body, rather 
than in formation, is here presumed to already exist and to be threatened from the inside. Lutfi 
al-Sayyid announced that the aim of the Congress was, “to look into the action of the Copts in 
order to assess it, to analyze the claims of the Copts, to weigh their demands on the scale of 
justice, to distinguish between the beneficial and the damaging, and the possible and the 
impossible, and to grant the Copts their due so as to remove any and all reasons for complaint.” 
These proceedings, he assured the audience, were completely impartial and free of all political 
objectives. Emphasizing again the Congress’ fairness and tolerance, characteristics central to a 
unified national community, Lutfi al-Sayid read, “Indeed, Egyptians are first in dealing justly 
with Egyptians.”56  
In the eyes of the speakers at the Egyptian Congress, tolerance was the mark of 
civilization, an ideal to which all in the new Egypt should aspire. Yet tolerance, as Wendy 
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Brown has shown, is not only a political discourse that is protean (rather than universal) in 
meaning across time and space. It is also exemplary of Foucault’s notion of governmentality in 
so far as it organizes "the conduct of conduct” well beyond the formal domain of politics. 
“Absent the precise dictates, articulations, and prohibitions associated with the force of law,” 
Brown points out, “tolerance nevertheless produces and positions subjects, orchestrates meanings 
and practices of identity, marks bodies, and conditions political subjectivities.”57 In Egypt, 
tolerance became the idea of civility, the mark of the ideal Egyptian citizen. Like the minority, it 
was deposited within national memory to gain salience in the national present, and it was 
invested with power to authorize certain religious sensibilities and practices while disabling 
others. For the conveners of the Egyptian Congress, the Coptic Congress and its political 
demands violated the limits of tolerance. In asserting rights as Copts, this group of Copts was not 
behaving in the way a religious minority should.  
 Revealing its significance to the proceedings, the first matter of substance taken up in the 
report was that of “al-Aqalliyya wa-l-Akthariyya” (The Minority and the Majority). The authors 
sought to clarify the meaning of these two terms in order to frame their disagreement with the 
Copts. In their view, the minority and the majority were wholly political organisms that act in the 
public sphere to pursue their interests. As Lutfi al-Sayyid said,  
 
A nation [umma] in its expression as a political organism or system is composed of 
political elements. The political doctrine that enlists individuals of greatest number and 
influence is the majority [akthariyya] and the other is a minority [aqalliyya]. On this 
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basis it is possible to understand the majority and the minority in every nation, and 
religion has nothing to do with it.58  
 
In other words, nation-state politics divides into majority and minority elements that exist in 
unequal relations of power. Because these elements are inherently public, they can have no 
relation to religion, which in secular doctrine should be confined to the private sphere. When that 
relation does exist, when religion creeps into the public sphere, serious consequences can follow. 
In the words of the organizing committee: 
 
Nothing is more harmful to the country than the consequences of that error which has 
implanted itself into the minds of some Egyptians in general, and many Copts in 
particular. This gross error is the splitting the Egyptian Nation, as far as it constitutes a 
political organism, into two religious elements—a Muslim majority and a Coptic 
minority.59 
 
For the committee, the coupling of the political categories “majority” or “minority” with 
religion, as many Copts had done, constitutes a dangerous error that can cause fissures in the 
nation’s unity and threaten the country’s future. The marriage of politics and religion causes the 
type of sectarianism (al-ta‘assub al-dini) that the British had so long sought to sow. 
 The speakers at the Congress understood the Coptic Congress’ insertion of religion into 
politics as exemplary of “medieval fanaticism.” Many speakers drew analogies to the fifteenth- 
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and sixteenth-century wars of religion in Europe pitting Protestants against Catholics. These 
often-violent sectarian conflicts, they argued, were only resolved through the emergence of 
civilization, characterized primarily by the practice of tolerance. The Copts, by organizing 
themselves as a political minority, threatened to return Egypt to the past, always in “Europe,” 
when religion—unconstrained by state power—was the only available category of identification. 
The speech by Egyptian nationalist Ahmad ‘Abd al-Latif, for example, described a 
transhistorical competition between national and religious identification in which the ascendance 
of the former is characterized by peace and calm and that of the latter by violence and 
persecution. It was the Christians, he argues, who first introduced religious division to a Europe 
that had been united during the Roman period. Religious division then persisted over many eras 
until “the day that people grew tired of war and resolved to put an end to it.” 60 That day arrived 
in 1789 with the start of the French Revolution. In the wake of the Revolution, “political parties 
arose on the remains of the religious factions which Europe had come to regard with horror.” 
‘Abd al-Latif had to wonder whether Copts really sought to “return” to the distant past by 
building “religious parties on the remains of political parties.”61 
This secularist historical narrative, expressed by many of the speakers at the Congress, 
makes two moves that are crucial to understanding the formation of the minority and majority as 
categories and changing conceptions of religion in Egypt. First, ‘Abd al-Latif projects the 
neologisms aqalliyya and akthariyya back into history, overlaying prior categories of 
identification and politics and activating new forms.62 Thus, for ‘Abd al-Latif a Protestant 
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“majority” had subjected the Catholic “minority” to torture in Elizabethan England for its beliefs 
and practices.63 Similarly, for Shaykh ‘Ali Yusuf a Coptic “minority” had endured persecution 
under Roman and Byzantine overlords until the emergence of Islam and the later Arab takeover 
of Egypt.64 In this way, aqalliyya and aktharriya come to stand in for prior categories such as 
ta’ifa and milla, the systems of political organization in which they held meaning, and the kinds 
of subjects they produced. Second, he casts religion in the public sphere as dangerous, atavistic, 
violent, and fanatic. Politics can be pursued solely for the good of the nation, not for one’s 
private interest. 
Yet, even as the organizing committee shunned the notion of religion in the public 
sphere, and more particularly the marriage of religion and politics, it advocated an Islamic 
identity for the state. In the opening address, Lutfi al-Sayyid, then the leader of the territorial 
nationalist Umma party, stated that,  
 
for every nation there is an official religion … and the religion of the nation [umma] is 
the religion of its government or the religion of the majority [akthariyya] in it … It is 
unthinkable that there be more than one official religion in the nation. The religion of the 
Egyptian people is Islam alone because [Islam] is the religion of the government and of 
the majority at the same time.65  
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Lutfi al-Sayyid and his party have been understood in Egyptian historiography as an elite 
vanguard that forged a liberal secular strand of Egyptian nationalism.66 While this 
characterization may be correct, less attention has been paid to the ways in which this vanguard 
shaped what was meant by religion in an emerging national polity.  
The attempt to assert the Islamic character of Egypt at the Congress was a reply to the 
Coptic demand to make Sunday an official day of rest. The Congress members’ manner of 
refuting this demand shows both the connection between the nascent notion of Egyptian 
sovereignty (and, by extension, anticolonial politics) and religion, and the way in which secular 
power authorized certain formations of religion while inhibiting others. Many of the speakers 
pointed to practical problems associated with acknowledging Sunday as a Christian holiday. For 
example, as Lutfi al-Sayyid pointed out, the Copts now want, 
  
two days off per week, Friday for Muslims and Sunday for Christians. But this leaves the 
Jews without a day [off] despite the fact that their observance of Shabbat [al-sibt] is 
stronger than the Christian’s observance of Sunday. Thus the days [off] are divided 
between the religious elements and they are required three days per week!67  
 
For Lutfi al-Sayyid, three days off per week was less inconceivable than it was complicated. But 
the matter at hand went beyond practicalities. Lutfi al-Sayyid went on to say that,  
 
the Islamic governments designated Friday the official day off, so having that as a day  
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off became a custom for the Islamic governments and one of its ancient traditions that 
distinguish it from other governments. It is thus not possible for it to make any day of the 
week other than Friday a vacation day if it was possible … For that reason, and because 
taking off Friday constitutes part of sovereignty, the government of Lebanon, which is a 
Christian government and the majority of its people is Christian, enacted Friday as a 
vacation day, preserving the traditions of the Ottoman Empire [al-dawla al-‘uliya] that 
has sovereignty over it.68  
 
For Lutfi al-Sayyid, a cultural definition of Islam divested of its sacral quality becomes central to 
the construction of Egyptian sovereignty.  
The Muslims Congress’ refutation of the Coptic Congress’ demand for Sunday as a state-
recognized day off betrays the power that the secular came to have over religion in early 
twentieth-century Egypt. Challenging the view that the secular is a successor to a distinct and 
stable category of the religious which it contains within the private sphere, Talal Asad has shown 
secularism to be a political doctrine initially formed in early modern Europe with power to 
construct the religious and the life worlds it contains.69 During the debate over the Coptic 
Congress’ demand for state recognition of Sunday as an official day off, for example, Lutfi al-
Sayyid observed, probably accurately, that this demand represented a completely new and 
unprecedented phenomenon. The politicization of the Christian Sabbath in turn precipitated new 
discursive knowledge about Coptic Christian tradition and practice. Mahmud Bey ‘Abd al-Nasir, 
in his speech, argued that while the Christian scriptures do make reference to a day of rest, they 
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do not specify the day on which Christians should rest, which calls the validity of the Coptic 
demand into question.70 Another speaker, Ibrahim Ghazali, went further. Invoking a Christian 
sect that holds there is no Gospel ordaining the observance of Sunday as a Christian day of rest, 
he implied that Christian doctrine contradicts itself over whether a Christian day of rest exists at 
all.71  
In addition to dismantling the association between the Christian Sabbath and Sunday—or 
the very notion of the Christian Sabbath itself—the speakers pursued other tacks to bolster their 
argument. Even if the Christian day of rest were admitted to fall on Sunday, ‘Abd al-Nasir 
argued, he had “consult[ed] a number of the most respected works and ecclesiastic authorities on 
this subject” and found that “prohibitions that are attached to Sunday observance apply in 
principle only to manual labor, cases of extreme urgency being excepted.”72 Hence, even if the 
legitimacy of Sunday as a day of rest was recognized, Christian doctrine actually permits the 
work from which Christian government employees wish to be exempted. Ibrahim Ghazali took 
this point up in his speech as well. Dismayed by the Coptic Congress’ demand, he asserted that,  
 
the majority of Copts do not hesitate to work every day of the week. They did not even 
follow Lent during the conference—banqueting sumptuously on the fat of the land! What 
about their ancestors, all of whom worked on Sunday? Were they less intelligent? Or did 
they with reason prefer to respect the feelings of their compatriots and the character of 
the government?73 
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Coptic demands for a day off on Sunday, he suggested, have nothing at all to do with “real” 
Christianity. Instead, they are a ploy by the minority Copts to dispossess and disempower the 
majority, rendering their loyalty to the nation suspect. 
Until now, my discussion has focused on Copts because it was they who made demands 
as a minority and upon whom this label was applied. The one other non-Muslim group 
mentioned at the Egyptian Congress with some regularity is Jews. For the speakers at the 
Egyptian Congress, and for authors in the press who joined the debate, the Jews played the role 
of a foil whose inclusion in the national body was uncertain. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid’s dismissal 
of the Coptic demand for Sunday as a day off for Coptic government employees, for example, 
was based in part on the notion that honoring the demand would logically require recognition of 
Saturday as a day off for the Jewish Sabbath, and it was impractical to have three recognized 
days off per week. This point was echoed in speeches by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the reformist writer 
Salih Hamdi Hammad, and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish, whom we met earlier. For his part, Jawish also 
invoked Jews in countering the Coptic Congerss’ demand for the establishment and state support 
of Coptic courts equivalent to shari‘a courts. He argued that this demand was impractical not 
only because Coptic marriage and divorce were matters for the clergy rather than the courts, but 
also because the Copts are divided into sects, each of which could conceivably demand its own 
courts. Worse still, there are “other elements among the Egyptians like the Jews for example,” 
who are also divided into sects (Rabbinate and Karaite) that may desire their own courts. “Was 
this forgotten,” Jawish asked, or were these other Egyptian elements considered as negligible 
quantities compared with Copts?”74 Jawish, clever as always in his argumentation, turned the 
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Coptic critique of majority Muslims back onto the Copts. In contrast to many speakers at the 
Congress who represented Egypt as composed of two elements, Muslim and Copt, here Jawish 
considered the Jews to be an “Egyptian element.” 
The Syrian-born Muslim reformer Rashid Rida, who reported on the Coptic and Egyptian 
Congresses in his journal al-Manar, also used this rhetorical device to echo Muslim critiques of 
the Coptic Congress. In an article entitled “The Jews are More Honorable than the Copts,” for 
example, Rida opposed the Congress’ demand that the Egyptian government introduce Christian 
teaching in public schools by undermining Coptic claims to distinction based on ancient 
Egyptian lineage:  
 
The Jews are more honorable than them [the Copts] in terms of descent because they 
descend from the prophets of God, glorified be He. And the Copts descend from the 
idolater pharaohs [who are] enemies of God, glorified be He. If they [the Copts] do not 
have a trait that demands their distinction from other Egyptians then the basis upon which 
they built their demand for the teaching of their religion in government schools is 
destroyed.75  
 
Having demoted the Copts relative to other groups in Egypt, Rida goes on to say that when it is 
impossible to teach all of the religions and doctrines present in Egypt, the government is justified 
to offer only the “religion of the ruler, which is the religion of the most numerous group [akthar 
sha‘b].”76 For Rida, a “Syrian” and “outsider” who nonetheless saw himself as belonging to a 
																																																						
75 Muhammad Rashid Rida, al-Muslimun wa-l-Qibt wa-l-Mu’tamar al-Islami Majmu‘ Maqalat 
Ijtima‘iyya Nushirat fi al-Mu’ayyad wa-l-Manar (Cairo: Matba‘at al-Manar, 1911), 73–74. 
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newly constituted Egyptian majority, invoking the Jews allows him to face the threat posed by a 
perceived disloyal minority challenge to the sovereignty of the majority.  
 
Constituting the Minority 
If nothing else, the two Congresses achieved the insertion and normativization of the minority 
within the Egyptian lexicon. The swirl of press reports published in their aftermath is filled with 
references to the debate over aqalliyyas.77 On the eve of World War I, some Coptic journalists 
began to articulate demands on behalf of the Coptic community explicitly in terms of minority 
rights (huquq al-aqalliyyat), reflecting a new vocabulary that would become common after the 
war.78 However, its meaning and connection to particular groups continued to be slippery and 
unclear. 
Two events occurred between the Congresses and the establishment of a semi-
independent Egyptian nation-state with its own Constitution in 1923 that have particular 
relevance to our story. The first event was the 1919 nationalist revolt, which reunified Egyptians 
against the British. The second was the emergence of the minority as an international legal 
subject by the nascent League of Nations after the war. And yet what differentiated Egypt from 
many other new nation-states carved out of the Ottoman Empire and in Eastern Europe was that 
it did not come under the League of Nations minority protection regime. Still legally a British 
Protectorate at the time of the League of Nation’s establishment, Egypt was beyond the League’s 
jurisdiction. Even when the Protectorate ended in February 1922, “the special relations existing 
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between Great Britain and Egypt were notified to all the Powers represented on the Council of 
the League.”79 Egypt, as far as the British were concerned, was the property of the British 
Empire. Yet the legal concept of minority protection, which first appeared in the 1919 Polish 
Minority Treaty, still found its way into Egypt. One of Britain’s infamous “reserved points,” or 
the areas that Britain would continue to control after it granted Egypt semi-independence, was 
the “protection” of “foreign interests” and “minorities.” Minority protection had only been 
included in the reserved points because it had been part of Lord Curzon’s original draft of the 
1921 “agreement” between Great Britain and Egypt which was based on the Treaty of Sevres. 
Although British officials and judicial advisors disagreed over the utility of it in advancing 
British interests in Egypt,80 the connection between minority rights and colonial violation of 
Egyptian sovereignty was the frame for its “legal life” in Egypt. The adoption of the banner of 
minority rights by Protestant missionary groups in the 1930s only strengthened that link. 
 In March 1922, the Council of Ministers under King Fu’ad appointed a committee of 
thirty members to draft a Constitution. These members were partly representative of the complex 
make up of Egyptian society, including the three major religious groups—Muslims, Christians, 
and Jews. Eighteen of the members were appointed to a subcommittee to discuss the principles to 
be included in the Constitution.81 Over the course of their meetings, the question of whether the 
Constitution should guarantee the representation of minorities in the new parliament was among 
the most divisive. The subcommittee essentially broke into two camps. The first, represented by 
the Copt Tawfiq Duss, who had earlier been a participant in the Coptic Congress, was to support 
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80 See TNA FO 141/452/5, “High Commissioner Egypt,” 28 July 1924. 
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the inclusion of minority representation. As the 1914 elections to Egypt’s representative bodies 
showed, without legally mandated measures of inclusion in national politics, non-Muslim groups 
risked being left out of decision-making processes. Moreover, codifying minority rights would 
resolve the open-ended question of who was responsible for protecting minorities—the Egyptian 
state—rather than leaving it unresolved and inviting continued British interference.82  
The second camp, led by the chief legal advisor of the subcommittee ‘Abd al-Hamid 
Badawi (whom we met in Chapter 4) and supported by the Wafdists, argued against the 
proposition. After the events of 1919, this camp argued, Egyptians would vote on the basis of 
merit rather than religion, a position echoing the demand for merit-based employment at the 
Coptic Congress. Moreover, constitutionally mandating minority representation would deepen 
religious division. This would prevent the gradual unification of the Egyptian nation and benefit 
the British, who had tried to divide Egypt by religion in the first place. ‘Abd al-Hamid Badawi 
and others asserted that Copts and other religious groups in Egypt were not political minorities, 
like some of the minorities in Europe, but rather religious minorities with no role (as a group) in 
the political sphere. While Duss enjoyed some support on the committee, particularly among its 
Coptic and one Jewish member (Yusuf Qattawi), ‘Abd al-Hamid Badawi’s side proved the 
victor. Neither the representation of minorities, nor the very existence of minorities, was 
recognized by the Constitution.83 Nevertheless, even as the two sides disagreed over the 
representation of minorities, both proceeded on the basis that the Copts, and to some extent other 
religious groups, were religious minorities. They differed only over the place of religious 
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minorities within the realm of politics. As such, the proceedings of the Constitutional Committee 
reveal the completion of a process of linguistic transformation wherein tawai’f, millal, and other 
categories became aqalliyyat in relations of power with the majority.  
 
Conclusion 
As I have attempted to show, Egypt’s establishment of a semi-independent constitutional order, 
rather than the onset of minority politics, was the culmination of a contingent process of defining 
the minority that began amid sectarian conflict in the early twentieth century. As scholars have 
observed, the 1923 Constitution did not acknowledge minorities, and Egypt remained outside of 
the jurisdiction of the League of Nations until 1937, by which time this international governing 
institution had already lost its credibility. Nevertheless, as part of the law of states and due to 
British claims to be the protector of minorities in Egypt, the category of the minority haunted the 
new national order after semi-independence. Part of a new global order of nation-states 
established at Versailles, Egyptians were conscripted to a new language structuring political 
communities the world over. The question, heavily conditioned by both colonial politics and 
missionary activity, was not whether but how that language should be translated and activated.  
With minority rights excluded from law, the question of how to define the minority and 
to whom the term applied remained open. The word aqalliyya, opaque and unclear, remained 
available for subjects to claim and disclaim to achieve their own interests. It struck on a 
multitude of registers, allowing for complex categorizations of Egypt’s population along a grid 
of loyalty with the aim of producing homogeneity. Some minorities were excluded on the basis 
of suspicion, while the belonging of Copts, often considered “original Egyptians” who cannot be 
tied to any outside nation, was never in question. However, the price paid by Copts for inclusion 
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in the nation was, following a secular logic, the confinement of religious minority identification 
to the private sphere. While the persistence of communal structures in Egypt, even if no longer 
autonomous from the state, has reinforced communal boundaries and identifications, few 
avenues have been made available for collective communal politics. This has left already 
politicized religious groups feeling wedged, as one British judicial advisor put it, “between the 
devil and the deep sea.”84 
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CONCLUSION 
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By way of conclusion, I would like to return to Murad Farag, the Jewish intellectual, lawyer, and 
reformer whom we met in Chapter 2. I described how Farag, embedded within his tradition, 
encountered modern colonial conditions to articulate a notion of the common good that was open 
and inclusive but ultimately displaced by the secular notion of public interest. In this section, I 
would like to briefly analyze a lengthy essay he wrote in 1908 titled “Harb al-Watan” (The 
Nation’s Struggle) that was serialized in the journal al-Jarida (The Newspaper), edited by the 
prolific Egyptian liberal thinker Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, amid the sectarian crisis described in the 
last chapter. In the essay, Farag offered a vision of society wherein no contradiction exists 
between the moral subject/community and the citizen of the nation-state. His vision represents an 
ephemeral ripple, a moment of anticipation and aspiration, that I contrast with the secular legal 
formations described over the last four chapters. 
Adapting new ideas of Egyptian nationhood, Farag’s essay represents a break from his 
prior writings on social and political themes that have come down to us, most of which derive 
from his community reform journal al-Tahdhib (Edification) published in 1902–3.1 Whereas in 
his journal Farag had written as a Jew, in this essay, published one year after the founding of the 
Watani Party, Farag foregrounded a new Egyptian national identification. Likewise, whereas al-
Tahdhib had been addressed to Farag’s Karaite Jewish community while obliquely contributing 
to a broader, intercommunal project of reform, the 1908 essay addressed the Egyptian nation, the 
virtues of which Farag extolled. Confronting the challenges faced by the Egyptian nation, Farag 
engaged, in a partial way or directly, with the four concepts under study in this dissertation: 
religious freedom, public interest, nationality, and the minority. He did so not to advocate and 
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disseminate the binaries of secular ideology, but as part of his long-standing effort to contribute 
to the construction of a moral society in modern Egypt. 
 In this way, Farag’s essay is a sign along the road of the secularization of Egyptian 
society. Against the growing sectarianism around him, he called for dissolving perceived 
obstacles presented by religion to the unification of the nation, which “knows for itself one 
homeland” and whose “Egyptian nationality” (al-jinsiyya al-wataniyya), a phrase that had only 
recently entered Egypt’s lexicon, prevails over every other affiliation, national or otherwise.2 As 
Farag put it, “In order for the national community [al-jam‘iya al-wataniyya] to be a sound 
national community [jama‘iya wataniyya sahiha], it is necessary that in its life it remain distant 
from all that damages it from the direction of religion.”3 However, in contrast to secular political 
ideology, Farag did not seek to confine religion to the private sphere. Rather, he argued that 
unifying the national spirit (nafs) required equity in what he termed “public morality” (al-adab 
al-‘amma), maintained through the practice of sincerity (al-ikhlas), or continuously identifying 
and untangling “unfavorable mutual feelings.”4 Drawing on his own personal experience to 
convey his point, Farag invoked the many occasions when a Muslim would greet him in public 
with the common Islamic salutation al-salam ‘alaykum (peace be upon you) only to stop mid-
utterance on realizing that Farag was a Jew and switch to the more neutral though less warm 
“good afternoon” (naharak sa‘id).5 Similarly, he described how whereas the Muslim press would 
note the passing of a Muslim with the prefix al-marhum (“the late,” denoting mercy and 
expressing grief), it would note the passing of a non-Muslim with the less elegant al-mu’sif (the 
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regrettable).6 Such distinctions, he asserted, while often premised on doctrine, violated religion 
because they caused humiliation and pain (idha’) where religion “preserves its strength in 
noninjury [‘adam idha’] to others,” exemplified in his view by the Qur’anic injunction “there is 
no compulsion in religion” (la ikrah fi al-din). Citing postrevolution Ottoman society as a 
paragon of the practice of sincerity between religious groups, with Muslims agreeing to join non-
Muslims in commitment to “public morals” (al-adab al-‘amma), Farag contended that Egypt 
ought to develop (tataqaddum) along similar lines. While “nothing is greater than people from 
all religions and doctrines coming together in friendship to become Egyptians in the true national 
sense of the word,” he remarked, “nothing hurts more than moral injury [al-idha’ al-ma‘nawi].”7 
For Farag, the main difference between the Ottoman Empire and Egypt was that the 
empire enjoyed constitutional rule that Egypt lacked. A constitution, he argued, would serve 
Egypt as “a contract of sound partnership between all of us,” overcoming any “estrangement, 
hatred, or inequality” in terms of public morality. With a constitution, Egyptians would “take 
responsibility on our shoulders and be forced to truly serve the nation by virtue of serving public 
interest [al-maslaha] and preventing it from all [moral] injury.”8 Just as Farag criticized Muslims 
for not extending the dictates of public morality to non-Muslims, he criticized Christians and 
Jews who rejected a constitution out of fear that Muslims, “greater in number and stronger,” 
would use it to degrade their status. This stance, he argued, was to put one’s private interest, the 
security of one’s “minority” community, ahead of the public interest. Private and public interest 
converged in the prevention of harm: “the nation should not hear with its ears or see with its eyes 
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anything harmful from the direction of religion.”9 “My words are not directed to one group 
without the other,” Farag concluded, “they are directed to all Egyptians, and I am one of them.” 
Although Farag embraces liberal-secular concepts in his essay, his articulation of them is 
characterized by confluence between inside and outside, individual and collective, morality and 
law, public and private. In other words, Farag articulates key secular concepts as an extension of 
his long-standing project of moral reform on the individual, communal, and societal levels. His 
program was one of radical openness and inclusion, crossing religious divides. It was also one 
that, as a participant in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Arab cultural and social 
reform movement called the nahda, he shared with other reformers in Egypt of this period. Farag 
could not have known that the very concepts he expounded, as they entered the modern legal 
system for which he worked and in which he had tremendous faith, would contribute to the 
emergence of new forms of exclusion that would mark him and his community as outsiders, even 
traitors, to an increasingly sovereign nation.  
This dissertation traced how these concepts were initially translated into Arabic and 
Egypt during the colonial period, and their shifting significations through the national-colonial 
period. Chapter 2 described how religious freedom, initially articulated through a local ethical 
vernacular as defense of one’s religion in a context of perceived missionary attacks, was inserted 
into Egypt’s expanding public law in the name of a majority-defined public order, rendering 
protection of religion a legal issue punishable by law. Unlike prior laws of blasphemy intended 
to maintain, bottom-up, a moral community (not unrelated to Farag’s notion of moral injury), 
religious freedom was a technology of public order intended to produce and reproduce, top-
down, a governable population through the regulation of religion. In Chapter 3, I described how 
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a secular notion of public interest, which entered Egypt’s criminal law and was linked to national 
security, displaced a prior Islamic notion of the public social good focused on conditions for 
sustaining a righteous society modeled on an ideal past. Focused on Egyptian Jewry, I showed 
how as the Egyptian nation-state took form, secular public interest proved critical to 
transforming Jewishness into a private interest that was inherently suspicious, contributing to the 
exclusion of Jews from the nation. Chapter 4 described the emergence of the category of the 
Egyptian national as part of colonial governance, how local subjects, Egyptian legislators, and 
colonial officials deployed it to suit their interests in a complex historical moment, and Egypt’s 
implementation of a nationality regime. I focused on how nationality, with its many constituent 
categories, politicized religious communities in unprecedented ways, rendering Muslims a 
national majority, Copts a minority, and other Christian and Jewish groups part of racialized 
nations whose loyalty was not to be trusted. In Chapter 5, I traced how the category of the 
minority emerged in Egypt not with semi-independence in 1922, as has been asserted by other 
scholars, but amid an earlier sectarian crisis that itself was an outcome of the politicization of 
Coptic communities and their demand for collective rights from the state in a time of emergent 
nationalism under colonial rule. While in other ways preserving a communal framework for 
society, Egyptian legislators decided to exclude minority rights from the 1923 Egyptian 
Constitution due to the association of these rights with the colonial violation of sovereignty. As a 
result, newly constructed minorities were left without protection and avenues of collective 
political participation. 
As a whole, the dissertation has argued that, translated into Arabic and Egypt, these 
secular-liberal concepts accumulated new significations over time as locally embedded actors—
whether in the courtroom, in colonial offices, in the halls of parliament, or on the streets—
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claimed them to meet an ever-evolving contingent set of needs and desires. Rather than a 
teleological story of the “evolution” of concepts into a generic final form, the dissertation has 
highlighted ephemeral possibilities overtaken by larger forces, and critical moments that affected 
conceptual pathways. As the concepts under study entered into law in the liberal period in often 
surprising ways, part and parcel to the construction of the nation-state, they served as critical 
technologies of governmentality in the Egyptian state’s effort to produce a governable population 
loyal to the nation and obedient to its laws. Increasingly, the Egyptian state came to define 
Egypt’s moral and political vocabularies and imaginaries, creating the conditions of possibility 
for the homogenization of Egyptian society in the subsequent decades.  
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